Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di ET, conseguenze sul mezzo e sul mercato

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Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di ET, conseguenze sul mezzo e sul mercato

Messaggio da leggereda C-ALEX » gio 05 mar 2020, 11:45:07

new da BOEING per il MAX ?
questo problema sul coronavirus sta dando tempo a Boeing per risolvere se è risolvibile il problema MAX in quanto credo che anche ryanair non ha cosi bisogno di aerei in questo momento

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Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di ET, conseguenze sul mezzo e sul mercato

Messaggio da leggereda malpensante » gio 05 mar 2020, 21:35:42

‘It’s More Than I Imagined’: Boeing’s New C.E.O. Confronts Its Challenges

In a candid interview, David Calhoun largely laid the blame for the company’s 737 Max crisis on his predecessor.

By Natalie Kitroeff and David Gelles
March 5, 2020
Updated 2:24 p.m. ET


FLORISSANT, Mo. — In his eight weeks on the job, Boeing’s chief executive, David L. Calhoun, has come to one overriding conclusion: Things inside the aerospace giant were even worse than he had thought.
In a wide-ranging interview this week, Mr. Calhoun criticized his predecessor in blunt terms and said he was focused on transforming the internal culture of a company mired in crisis after two crashes killed 346 people.
To get Boeing back on track, Mr. Calhoun said, he is working to mend relationships with angry airlines, win back the confidence of international regulators and appease an anxious President Trump — all while moving as quickly as possible to get the grounded 737 Max back in the air.
“It’s more than I imagined it would be, honestly,” Mr. Calhoun said, describing the problems he is confronting. “And it speaks to the weaknesses of our leadership.”

Boeing’s previous chief executive, Dennis A. Muilenburg, was fired in December after presiding over a series of embarrassing setbacks that culminated in the shutdown of the 737 factory this year.
Mr. Calhoun formally took over in January, but he has been involved in this mess from the beginning. A protégé of Jack Welch from his time at General Electric, Mr. Calhoun has been on Boeing’s board since 2009, and was elevated to chairman late last year.

Before becoming the chief executive, he vigorously defended Mr. Muilenburg, saying in a CNBC appearance in November that Mr. Muilenburg “has done everything right” and should not resign. One month later, the board ousted Mr. Muilenburg and announced Mr. Calhoun as his replacement.
“Boards are invested in their C.E.O.s until they’re not,” Mr. Calhoun said, sitting in a dim conference room at the Boeing Leadership Center, a corporate campus outside St. Louis where Mr. Muilenburg’s photo is still displayed prominently.
“We had a backup plan,” he added. “I am the backup plan.”

Now that he’s in charge, Mr. Calhoun has become more willing to openly criticize Mr. Muilenburg. He said the former chief executive had turbocharged Boeing’s production rates before the supply chain was ready, a move that sent Boeing shares to an all-time high but compromised quality.

“I’ll never be able to judge what motivated Dennis, whether it was a stock price that was going to continue to go up and up, or whether it was just beating the other guy to the next rate increase,” he said. He added later, “If anybody ran over the rainbow for the pot of gold on stock, it would have been him.”
Mr. Muilenburg declined to comment.
Mr. Calhoun and the rest of Boeing’s board never seriously questioned that strategy, in part because before the first Max crash off the coast of Indonesia in October 2018, the company was enjoying its best run in years. What’s more, the board believed that Mr. Muilenburg, an engineer who had been at Boeing for his entire career, was so deeply informed about the business that he was a good judge of the risks involved in ramping up production.

“If we were complacent in any way, maybe, maybe not, I don’t know,” Mr. Calhoun said. “We supported a C.E.O. who was willing and whose history would suggest that he might be really good at taking a few more risks.”
It was only after the Max was grounded last March following a crash in Ethiopia that Mr. Muilenburg’s optimistic approach became viewed as a liability. Airlines grew livid after he repeatedly voiced overly optimistic timetables about when the Max would return to service. The head of the Federal Aviation Administration, Stephen Dickson, was so frustrated that he reprimanded Mr. Muilenburg in a private meeting and publicly told F.A.A. employees to resist pressure from the company.
“They felt like they were being pushed into a timeline,” Mr. Calhoun said of the F.A.A., adding that the “regulator was never there alongside of us, but apparently our team didn’t quite come up to grips with that.”
One of Mr. Calhoun’s initial tasks as chief executive was to go on an apology tour, holding a series of what he called “greet-and-mend opportunities.” The first stop was the White House.

At a private meeting with Mr. Trump on Mr. Calhoun’s third day on the job, the president told him that he liked Mr. Muilenburg but believed a leadership change had been needed. The president said he hoped Boeing was investing all of its resources into getting the plane back in the air.

“He wants us to get back on our horse,” Mr. Calhoun said. “He wants us to get the Max flying again, safely.”
Mr. Calhoun said he had recently asked Boeing employees to “lay out in gory detail what needed to be done” to get the plane certified. “And then when they told me exactly what that was, I added a day or two to it,” he said.

His conclusion was that the Max might be approved sometime this summer, pushing back again the likely return of the plane by six months.
“Restoring credibility with the F.A.A. was not as hard as people think,” he said. “They just didn’t want to be boxed in anymore. They were sick of it.”
While he has been contrite about damaging internal messages released in January, Mr. Calhoun stopped short of saying the company has systemic cultural problems. He called the messages, in which Boeing employees ridiculed the F.A.A. and denigrated their own colleagues, “totally unacceptable,” but said they were not representative of Boeing more broadly.
“I see a couple of people who wrote horrible emails,” he said.
He also delicately maneuvered between accepting responsibility for the two crashes and pointing the finger elsewhere.

When designing the Max, the company made a “fatal mistake” by assuming pilots would immediately counteract a failure of new software on the plane that played a role in the Lion Air and Ethiopian Airlines accidents. But he implied that the pilots from Indonesia and Ethiopia, “where pilots don’t have anywhere near the experience that they have here in the U.S.,” were part of the problem, too.
Asked whether he believed American pilots would have been able to handle a malfunction of the software, Mr. Calhoun asked to speak off the record. The New York Times declined to do so.
“Forget it,” Mr. Calhoun then said. “You can guess the answer.”
He dismissed concerns about the board’s decision to give him a $7 million bonus based in part on whether the Max returned to service. “The objective is to get the Max up safely,” he said. “Period.”
When asked why he didn’t elect to forgo his salary altogether, he said, “’Cause I’m not sure I would have done it.”

Pulling Boeing out of the hole it has dug will take years, Mr. Calhoun said. He said that he would focus on insulating engineers from business pressures and that he wasn’t done shaking up the company’s leadership. At a meeting with his senior leadership team on Tuesday, Mr. Calhoun introduced a new set of values intended to guide the company, which he hopes will inspire employees still working on getting the 737 Max back in service.
“You don’t just win this one,” he said. “You don’t just go out and fight and win and now you’re a hero. One airplane at a time.”
In the meantime, Mr. Calhoun is focused on the basics: producing jets at a pace the factory can handle, instilling discipline up and down the company, and hunting for bad news and acting on it.
“If I don’t accomplish all that,” he said, “then you can throw me out.”


https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/05/busi ... &smtyp=cur

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Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di ET, conseguenze sul mezzo e sul mercato

Messaggio da leggereda mattaus313 » ven 06 mar 2020, 13:01:31

Boeing 737 MAX Recertification Flight Edges Closer
by
Nicholas Cummins
March 6, 2020
12 comments
3 minute read
Boeing’s recertification of the 737 MAX has edged closer, with the FAA Chief saying that it could be a matter of weeks until the aircraft is back in the air. Stephen Dickson is reported to have made the remarks yesterday, suggesting this key milestone is just around the corner.

https://simpleflying.com/boeing-737-max ... m=facebook
"Because you needed a lot of capital in an airline, you needed to be where the financial markets were, and obviously that's New York"

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Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di ET, conseguenze sul mezzo e sul mercato

Messaggio da leggereda Tropicalista » lun 09 mar 2020, 15:43:32


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Messaggio da leggereda malpensante » mar 10 mar 2020, 00:20:22

ET302 Interim Report Fingers MAX Flight-Control System, Offers No Analysis
Sean Broderick March 09, 2020

The Ethiopian Transport Ministry’s interim report on the crash of Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 (ET302) focuses on the role played by a now-redesigned 737 MAX flight control law implicated in an earlier MAX accident as well as inadequate pilot training.

Released Mar. 9, a day before the one-year anniversary of the ET302 accident, the 136-page report contains no analysis. “The analysis is in progress and will be included in the final report,” it said.

Six recommendations highlight problems already identified in other probes, including the final report on the first fatal MAX accident, the October 2018 crash of Lion Air Flight 610 (JT610), and work done by the U.S. NTSB and several committees.

The ministry’s report recounts the failings in the MAX’s design, particularly its maneuvering characteristics augmentation system (MCAS) flight-control software that provides nose-down horizontal stabilizer input in certain flight profiles. In both MAX accidents, MCAS was activated by faulty angle-of-attack (AOA) data, triggering a series of nose-down inputs that confused and ultimately overwhelmed the crews.

Designed to be transparent to pilots, the system was not included in MAX training or flight manuals, so pilots had no idea it existed. Boeing assumed an MCAS-related failure would be recognized as runaway stabilizer—a scenario that it believed any pilot could manage in seconds. The function’s supposed transparency and familiar failure modes led Boeing to conclude that pilots did not need special training or information about it.

“The difference training from B737NG to B737 MAX provided by the manufacturer was found to be inadequate,” one of the report’s findings said.

The MCAS’s existence became widely known following the JT610 accident. Boeing and the FAA combined to issue an emergency airworthiness directive in early November 2018 that explained the system’s function and failure modes. Boeing followed up with an airline operators’ message that reference the MCAS specifically, introducing it to most pilots for the first time.

While the first accident was enough to prompt Boeing to start work on changing the MCAS logic, the system was not thrust into the spotlight until after the ET302 accident and subsequent MAX grounding. The FAA directive and Boeing message are two key differences between the JT610 and ET302 accidents—the Lion Air crew had no idea the MCAS existed, but the ET302 crew apparently did. The ministry’s report confirmed that the airline revised MAX flight manuals on the day the directive was released. The report does not provide details on whether Ethiopian’s crews were given any additional information on the MCAS.

The ET302 crew’s reactions to the MCAS activation included using electric trim switch inputs to counter the nose-down movements and pulling back on their control yokes. But they did not counter all of the nose-down input, and the faulty AOA data continued to trigger the MCAS. After two MCAS activations, the crew toggled stabilizer-trim cutout switches, which interrupted the MCAS, but also left pilots with only the hand-operated trim wheel to move the stabilizer.

Aerodynamic forces created during a runaway stabilizer condition can render the trim wheel nearly impossible to move. If one pilot is pulling back on the yoke—a natural reaction to counter-act uncommanded nose-down inputs—the force on the elevator, part of the horizontal stabilizer, increases. This makes the stabilizer harder to move. Add in an airspeed increase that a nose-down attitude introduces, and the situation becomes more difficult. This is what the ET302 crew faced.

When the crew attempted to manually adjust the stabilizers, the mis-trim was 2.5 deg., the report said. The aircraft’s airspeed—its thrust levers set at 94% N1 takeoff thrust and never adjusted—was 340 kt.

“By the time the [first officer] tried to move the trim wheel manually, a force between 42-53 lb. was required according to the aircraft manufacturer computation,” the report said. Investigators determined that the ET302 crew would have needed 40 turns of the wheel to correct the 2.5 deg. of mis-trim. Simulator trials done as part of the probe found that difficulty in turning the wheel increased as airspeed and amount of mis-trim increased. Investigators concluded the trim wheel was “not movable” at airspeeds higher than 220 kt. and mis-trim values of 2.5 deg. or more, the report said.

Unable to crank the trim wheel, the ET302 crew toggled the stabilizer motor back on, which enabled the MCAS—still acting on faulty AOA data—to activate again. The ET302 was able to climb but could not counter the MCAS’s nose-down inputs, leading to a final, fatal dive.

The ministry’s report makes clear that faulty AOA data started the fatal accident sequence because the MAX’s flight control computer software detected, erroneously, that the aircraft’s nose was too high. That activated the MCAS and the series of nose-down stabilizer movements. The failed JT610 AOA sensor was caused by improper calibration by a supplier. The Ethiopian report does not shed light on why ET302’s vane failed, nor does it mention the part as being among the wreckage recovered. The report offers no insight into flight-crew actions not directly related to managing the MCAS activations.

ET302’s accident and the quick link to an MCAS activation led to the MAX fleet’s global grounding—which is still in place—while Boeing addresses several issues, including revisions to the MCAS logic. Recommendations made by the ministry’s report, including adding a second AOA data feed to the system, ensuring that an alert detailing AOA data variations is active on all MAXs, and adding simulator sessions for all MAX pilots, are either in the works or have been urged by Boeing.

Boeing’s changes to the MAX also will include training modules that focus on manual trim wheel scenarios.


https://aviationweek.com/air-transport/ ... 59c734b3ab

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Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di ET, conseguenze sul mezzo e sul mercato

Messaggio da leggereda kco » mar 10 mar 2020, 17:50:12

https://www.seattletimes.com/business/b ... ssion=true

Altri commenti sulla prima bozza del rapporto dell incidente.

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kco
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Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di ET, conseguenze sul mezzo e sul mercato

Messaggio da leggereda kco » lun 16 mar 2020, 21:28:28

Da copia di flight international in mio possesso


For Boeing, 2020 is a second year consumed by the aftermath of two fatal crashes and a global grounding of 737 Max airliners. But heralding a new approach to the Max crisis, the company started this year with a change of leader at its Chicago headquarters. David Calhoun – a long-time Boeing board member and former GE Aviation executive – has even won early praise for transparency and humility, while mending ties with the federal agency which will decide the fate of the 737 Max.

But apart from the Max problem, Calhoun must grapple with related issues of product strategy, finances and other changes to top management, including the October 2019 replacement of commercial aircraft division head Kevin McAllister – described at the time by the Seattle Times as “the first Boeing executive head to roll as a result of the ongoing 737 Max crisis”. Other recent departures ­include legal counsel and senior advisor ­Michael Luttig, who is viewed as having ­crafted Boeing’s legal response.

Where predecessor Dennis Muilenburg drew criticism for a tight-lipped style – and setting goals Boeing failed to reach – Calhoun has been characterised by candour and accountability. Says Scott Hamilton, aerospace consultant and founder of Leeham News and Analysis: “Muilenburg came across as incredibly scripted, incredibly uncomfortable in any kind of a public forum, incredibly reserved. Calhoun comes across as much more animated, much more engaging and much more open.”

Michel Merluzeau, aerospace analyst with consultancy AIR, describes Calhoun as taking over Boeing on “the morning after the earthquake”. He praises Calhoun’s deferent tone with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and calls his openness “refreshing”.

“Right now, big is not so beautiful. Smaller-sized, twin-aisle aircraft are the flavour of the month” Steven Udvar-Hazy, executive chairman, Air Lease

Likewise, McAllister’s successor Stan Deal has support. Merluzeau describes Deal – a long-time executive within the Seattle-area commercial jet division and formerly head of the services division – as “an exceptionally driven individual. He’s resolute and very defined in what he wants to achieve… He’s one of the best leaders [Boeing] could have hoped for.”

CUSTOMER SUPPORT

One major customer, Air Lease executive chairman Steven Udvar-Hazy, believes ­Calhoun has a solid grasp of Boeing’s ­challenges and gives the company credit for its response to the Max grounding. “Boeing has been out there working with customers,” Udvar-Hazy says. “Overall the team has done a very credible job to support the ­requirements that have arisen as a result of these tragedies.”

Despite positive signs, watchers note that Calhoun has only been in the post since 13 January. In addition to the Max crisis, Boeing must quickly devise a product development strategy while facing significant uncertainty stemming from the coronavirus outbreak. Meanwhile, due largely to the Max, Boeing lost $636 million in 2019, reversing its $10.5 billion profit in 2018. In January Boeing estimated Max issues will ultimately cost it $18.6 billion – about 18% of its 2018 revenue – including $8.3 billion in concessions to customers and $10.3 billion in production and programme costs.

Calhoun quickly started mending Boeing’s strained relationship with the FAA. Under Muilenburg, Boeing made optimistic projections about when the Max would return to service – projections earning Boeing and Muilenburg public reproach from FAA ­administrator Steve Dickson. “[Calhoun’s] pushing the Max return-to-service date out by months [to mid-2020], to remove any kind of perceived pressure on regulators, was very smart,” Teal Group analyst Richard ­Aboulafia says.

Observers initially expected Calhoun to be a temporary solution, setting a course before stepping aside for a rising Boeing star or even an outsider. However, expectations of a short-term departure have been downgraded.

There are many outsiders who may have the institutional knowledge and market vision to succeed at Boeing. “Rising stars” include Boeing Global Services head Ted Colbert, who Merluzeau calls a “visionary” and “potential CEO material”. Others to watch are Marc Allen, who heads the Embraer partnership and group operations; Travis Sullivan, vice-president and general manager at Boeing Distribution Services; and Jenette Ramos, senior vice-president of manufacturing, supply chain and operations.

BEYOND THE MAX

As for its overarching commercial aircraft strategy, analysts see Boeing in a competitive pinch. The Max grounding disrupted its plans to develop a twin-aisle, 270-seat New Mid-market Airplane (NMA), which was originally pitched for mid-2020s certification. That timeframe is critical, analysts say, because airlines need to replace ageing 757s and 767s. With NMA sidelined, Airbus stepped into the void last year, launching its own mid-market aircraft, the A321XLR, which has proved a hot seller.

Calhoun in January said he ordered a “clean sheet of paper” rethink of NMA – suggesting a broader review in anticipation of decisions with long-lasting implications.

Those implications are hard to decipher. Aboulafia urges Boeing to launch a new ­mid-market airliner – a single-aisle that could ­replace both NMA and the 737. Hamilton doubts the business case for the 270-seat NMA concept, as ­airlines will need maybe 2,300 such aircraft, half of which Airbus might supply. And, Udvar-Hazy reckons Calhoun must, while improving morale and cultivating a more “co-operative relationship” with regulators, resolve compensation arrangements with Max customers – and sell more Max aircraft.

Sagging 777X demand is another quandary; deliveries are expected from 2021, but Boeing has only 309 orders, with demand in Asia slowing even before the coronavirus outbreak put on the brakes. Says Udvar-Hazy: “Right now, big is not so beautiful. Smaller-sized, twin-aisle aircraft are the flavour of the month.”

Aside from strategy, there is execution. Udvar-Hazy, whose company holds orders for 135 737 Max and 33 787s, thinks the sales team has been “very engaged” and “done a very good job considering their formidable challenges”.

Also voicing support for Boeing is one senior fleet executive at a major North ­American airline, who says the sales team has acted with “integrity” amid the Max ­crisis and kept him well informed. Boeing’s sales staff have held frequent calls with that airline that have communicated “real-time information to us as best as they could”, says the source, who asked to remain anonymous due to the sensitive nature of the Max ­situation: “ have not at all felt like there is something lacking in the sales team ­whatsoever.”

Merluzeau’s assessment, however, is cutting: “It’s clear to me that the Max crisis has damaged relationships with key customers.”

At Boeing, vice-president of commercial sales and marketing Ihssane Mounir stresses that his team has valuable customer relationships and product knowledge. Mounir notes the 737 Max issues are “unprecedented” and that customers have been justifiably ­disappointed. He says his team has had the difficult job of informing frustrated customers of issues. But he insists that the Max’s ­difficulties bear no reflection on the sales team’s performance.

His team is also helping negotiate Max-related settlements with customers and working to help alleviate fleet issues caused by the Max grounding. That sometimes means helping customers make broader fleet adjustments, tweaking services support or other forms of assistance, but: “It’s impossible for us to just settle to the tune of what they’re asking, in some cases. Some customers, we have ways to address it, and others, you don’t have ways to address it.”

Udvar-Hazy concurs: “A lot of customers are asking, I think, [for] a lot more than is reasonable. Others are more modest.”

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Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di ET, conseguenze sul mezzo e sul mercato

Messaggio da leggereda kco » lun 16 mar 2020, 21:38:47

Boeing faces a long list of daunting challenges in recovering from the 737 Max calamity, which only begins with actually fixing the problems that caused two fatal crashes of its best-selling airliner. The world’s biggest aerospace company must also overhaul its ­management structure, grapple with a heavy financial impact, re-establish rapport with ­regulators, help suppliers cope with the massive disruption of a production shutdown, make up lost ground in deliveries to its airline customers and work out how to train pilots to fly the aircraft.

Perhaps equally massive, though, will be the task of repairing the damage to its brand and reputation. And, in this soft but critical context, Boeing looks to be sailing in uncharted seas, such is the global complexity of the situation it faces. One communications industry consultant contacted by Flight International observes that Boeing faces two different problems. One is to restore the faith of the aerospace industry in Boeing as a partner and customer. The second, says Harry Pirrwitz, founder of London-based space, telecoms and IT consultancy Cicero & Friends, is to address the “emotional side” of the problem.

Pirrwitz reckons that when it comes to restoring trust, suppliers and airlines will be more quickly forgiving than the flying public.

But complicating things for Boeing, he adds, is the fact that, for those people, the relationship with the aircraft maker is indirect via the airline, though both share an interest in ensuring flight and cabin crews are confident in their aircraft.

PRECEDENT?

Chris Bullick, managing director of the Pull Agency, a branding and marketing firm based in Surrey, the UK, highlights the difficulty Boeing faces for want of historical precedent in how to deal with such a huge problem. The modern “textbook” on handling a consumer confidence crisis was, he notes, written by Perrier in 1990, when bottles of the naturally sparkling spring water were found to be contaminated with benzene.

Up to then, says Bullick, the normal corporate reaction would have been to cover up the problem, but Perrier took the “radical” approach of quickly tracing the source of the problem, admitting fault and recalling the entire world supply of some 160 million bottles. Such transparency meant a huge financial hit but he reckons it was the only way to restore confidence in a brand that boasts “purity”. Significantly, the root problem was traced to a cleaning fluid used at one bottling plant and, hence, could be fixed.

But for a better guide to Boeing’s dilemma, Bullick points to Coca-Cola’s ill-starred attempt to change its formula, launching “New Coke” in 1985 – to immediate consumer derision. As Bullick notes, Coca-Cola did not try to “intellectualise” its way out of the problem by citing taste test trials in which people preferred the new formula. Instead, it gave in almost immediately, reintroducing “Classic” Coca-Cola within three months.

Boeing looks to be sailing in uncharted seas, such is the complexity of its situation

Bullick warns Boeing against any instinct to intellectualise its 737 Max problem. From a passenger or pilot perspective, the problem was caused by software – and fixing the problem with more software will not restore confidence. To go down this route and also try to keep the 737 Max brand, he says, would be like pushing on a string: “The consumer won’t buy it.” At the extreme, he says, such an approach could see Boeing “heading for an existential problem of their own making”.

Ultimately, Bullick reckons Boeing’s room for manoeuvre is very limited. Even the case of the de Havilland Comet, the pioneering 1950s jetliner that suffered a string of catastrophic structural failures, gives little guide to the Max problem. The Comet’s problem was quickly identified as its square windows – fixed by a very visible design change. Boeing’s problem may well stem from having made one too many upgrades of an ageing platform, and few will have true confidence in a software fix.

Pirrwitz agrees that the Max dilemma “has all the hallmarks of a new paradigm” in restoring brand reputation. His advice to Boeing is, first, to fix the underlying problem. Then it should inform about the steps taken to ensure no ­similar issues happen again and find pilots who are happy to report about their positive results in the simulator. But, he warns, in his experience, Boeing would have to wait about a year after things calm down before stakeholders are receptive to messages promoting the brand and its century of delivering safe flying.

Another approach for Boeing to take is to address the name problem. Indeed, industry figures including leasing titan Steven Udvar-Hazy and Qatar Airways boss Akbar Al-Baker have called on Boeing to drop the Max name, and Bullick agrees that has to happen – if only to protect the hugely valuable 737 brand.

But he goes on to point out that nobody would be fooled by such a change, which leaves Boeing with the impossible challenge of having to convince all parties that they should have ­confidence in a software-based fix to what was a software-created problem. To Bullick, then, the only way out of this dilemma is to find a different solution – perhaps going so far as to promise an all-new model and manage the transition as best as possible.

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Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di ET, conseguenze sul mezzo e sul mercato

Messaggio da leggereda kco » mer 18 mar 2020, 21:16:34

US leasing firm Aviation Capital Group was bestowed last year with the dubious honour of being the final customer to take delivery of a Boeing 737 Max before the type’s grounding. It acquired the aircraft on 11 March 2019 and, as result, was the only company to receive a 737 Max after the Ethiopian Airlines accident that sparked Boeing’s greatest commercial air transport crisis.

Aviation Capital Group is based in Newport Beach, California, practically next door to Long Beach, where Boeing – two decades before 737 production became embroiled in the Max saga – once considered assembling its ubiquitous single-aisle jet to simplify the 737 lines at its Renton plant.

The lessor’s acquisition took total Max deliveries to 387 in the 665 days from when the first was formally handed over – to Lion Air Group’s Malindo Air division – in May 2017.

Boeing’s backlog for the re-engined Max family has stayed remarkably stable over this period, despite the highly publicised problems, barely wavering from a figure of just over 4,500 aircraft attained by the time of the grounding. When deliveries came to a halt, Boeing continued to take a small number of orders, including a deal for four aircraft just six weeks into the suspension.

A total of 37 post-grounding Max jets have been ordered – the largest identified carrier being Turkey’s SunExpress for 10 aircraft, while an undisclosed customer is taking 20 – but Boeing has also notably received encouragement from British Airways parent IAG after the company provisionally agreed to take 200 of the Max 8 and Max 10 variants.

The steadiness of the backlog is probably a consequence of customers not wanting to lose their place in the production queue, given that there are few alternative avenues through which to source new single-aisle jets.

“It might look like a paradox but, in the short term, we don’t benefit from the situation with [Boeing],” said Airbus chief executive Guillaume Faury during a briefing in Toulouse on 13 February.

Airbus is trying to smooth production flow for its A320neo family and cut through a similarly voluminous backlog, which stood at more than 6,180 aircraft at the end of January – close to 10 years’ output at Airbus’s current rates. “We cannot take benefit for the A320,” says Faury. “We are sold out until roughly 2025 and therefore we cannot step in to offset the needs of some airlines.”

Neither is Airbus gaining on the margin side from the 737 Max situation, adds chief financial officer Dominik Asam. “When the backlog we are currently executing for 2020‑2021 [was] locked in for the single-aisle programme, that was way before the grounding of the 737,” he says. “So prices for that time-frame are fixed.”

COMPLEX BURDEN

While the rivals’ five-figure combined backlogs will ease the immediate sales pressure, the suspension of 737 Max production in January places a complex burden on Boeing as it strives to secure recertification of the aircraft. The US airframer cut monthly Max production from 52 to 42 aircraft per month after the grounding, maintaining this reduced rate for several months before the January halt and parking the undelivered aircraft.

Powerplant supplier CFM International had expected to produce 1,800 Leap engines last year, including the 737 Max’s Leap-1B, taking into account this reduced Max production rate.

Aerostructures firm Spirit AeroSystems, however, had continued to produce the Max’s fuselage at the monthly rate of 52, with Boeing paying for those in excess of its moderated 737 Max output.

Spirit also agreed to store and maintain excess fuselages – primarily at Boeing’s risk – at its own facilities. Both Boeing and Spirit had intended this arrangement to last until the beginning of May 2020. The production rates suggest Boeing has built more Max jets since the grounding (around 400) than it had delivered beforehand – none of which it has been able to hand over to customers.

Boeing’s production stoppage in January led to a revised agreement with Spirit under which the supplier would provide fewer fuselages, just 216, this year. This covers barely one-third of the 605 fuselages it delivered in 2018, and appears to put Boeing at least four years behind its ramp-up schedule for the re-engined jet.

Spirit had been undergoing a transition to Max production in 2018, bringing the monthly fuselage output up to 52, while also coping with a design which, it says, is 35% different from previous 737 variants built on the same fuselage assembly lines. Its revised pact with Boeing – which depends heavily on the Max’s reintroduction to service – shows that Spirit “does not expect” a return to the pre-­grounding 52-per-month rate until late 2022.

Boeing had been intending to raise monthly Max production to 57 aircraft last year, but the new Spirit agreement means this hike will probably be delayed until the end of 2023 – and possibly later.

Spirit had been preparing for the higher rate by alternating daily output between two and three fuselages, to practise for a constant three-per-day rate, pointing out that a rate of 57 meant it would have three “balanced” production lines, each turning out 19 fuselages monthly, with “built-in surge capacity”. But the manufacturing halt and delayed introduction of this increased production rate means deliveries of hundreds of aircraft that were contracted to be built and delivered over the next three years will need to be deferred.

REORGANISATION EFFORT

While the Max backlog could undergo a restructuring as a result of airlines’ reassessing their fleet requirements – as a consequence of economic cycles or unexpected developments, such as the Chinese corona­virus outbreak – Boeing still faces a daunting and costly reorganisation effort, requiring modification of aircraft already delivered, as well as those undelivered, and renegotiation of delivery arrangements for aircraft yet to be built.

“We recognise we have a lot of work to do,” new Boeing chief executive David Calhoun acknowledged during the airframer’s full-year results briefing at the end of January.

“We are focused on returning the 737 Max to service safely and restoring the long-standing trust that the Boeing brand represents with the flying public.”

Adapting the aircraft, recovering production rates, compensating customers and resuming normal service are a matter of logistics, engineering, finance and mathematics. Boeing’s most challenging task, arguably, is to rebuild its own reputation as well as that of the 737, its most successful aircraft family, so badly tainted by the debacle of the Max.

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Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di ET, conseguenze sul mezzo e sul mercato

Messaggio da leggereda kco » mer 18 mar 2020, 21:17:53

Da copia di flight international in mio possesso

Recent statements by Boeing’s new chief executive, David Calhoun, make it clear that the company is ­preparing to change the way it designs its aircraft for pilots.

Since the early days of commercial aviation, manufacturers had inevitably provided imperfect aircraft to the airlines, and their imperfect pilots had to learn to manage their shortcomings. Travellers assumed aviation was a relatively risky business, so the occasional accident – even a fatal one – was seen as just one of those things. Mechanical failures were common, and from time to time failure by the pilots to cope with the mishap was inevitable.

This has not been so for about 30 years. Passengers have become accustomed to the hugely improved reliability and higher safety standards that modern engineering and smart aircraft systems have provided.

So when – last year – the second of two fatal crashes within five months involved Boeing’s latest product, the 737 Max 8, it caused considerable shock. As facts gradually emerged from the investigations, regulators at national aviation authorities (NAAs) all over the world deliberated about how to react. Gradually, a consensus developed that a change in the approach to airworthiness certification is overdue.

NEW PHILOSOPHY

Calhoun has clearly thought deeply about the implications for the future. This is what he said about the design philosophy his comp­any must adopt for its next all-new product: “We might have to start with the flight-control philosophy before we actually get to the airplane. We have always favoured airplanes that required more pilot flying than maybe our competitor did. We are all going to have to get our heads around exactly what we want.”

Calhoun says Boeing needs a change in company culture: “It will be built around the level of light we shed on safety processes. It will be built on the engineering disciplines and what we do for pilots around the world, not just pilots in the USA.” He explains why this is necessary: “Things have changed a bit. The competitive playing field is a bit different. We have to plan for China… We are going to start with a clean sheet of paper again.”

In summary, the regulators believe that long-established assumptions about pilot reactions to failures might no longer be valid in the modern aviation environment. The fundamental question that arises is this: what can reasonably be expected of pilots when something goes wrong with the complex integrated systems in today’s aircraft?

In both the accidents – the Lion Air and the Ethiopian Airlines losses – there were remedies the pilots could have deployed to prevent the crashes. On the other hand, critical failures of angle-of-attack (AoA) sensors in both cases had triggered very confusing aircraft behaviour for which the pilots had been ill prepared by their training and by Boeing’s aircraft manual. This is where the consensus question arises in the case of the two Max crashes: was it reasonable to have assumed that, in the short time available, given the aircraft’s low height in both cases, they would definitely have been able to cope with the stabiliser trim movement that the AoA sensor failure triggered – and kept triggering?

Calhoun accepts that a flaw in the Max’s flight-control system had proved disastrous, but claims the design did not result from a decision to put cost factors ahead of safety. The flaws, he says, came from long-standing assumptions about how pilots would react to a failure. Boeing designers had assumed they would get the measure of it within 3s, and act in mitigation.

A great deal has changed on flightdecks in the past 40 years. The advent of the digital flightdeck in the early 1980s gradually – over the subsequent four decades – brought ever-higher levels of automation, greater systems integration, more information for the pilots on their electronic flight instrument systems, more flight mode options for the flight management system/autopilot, and generally greater complexity. In the transitional 1980s the most commonly voiced exclamation on the flightdeck became “What’s it doing now?”

Throughout this period – indeed, before it – the 737 series was doggedly present, its flightdeck gradually developing through four iterations of the aircraft from an analogue/electric interface to digital/electronic by the time the highly electronic Max entered service in 2017.

Meanwhile, the pilot supply had been changing, too. Gone was the military as the primary source of aviation training; it has been replaced by a massive worldwide industry of commercial training providers. This industry has been primed to supply licensed pilots at the lowest possible price to an airline industry looking for the lowest possible pilot induction cost, followed by the lowest possible recurrent training cost.

Of course, the airlines also want the highest possible pilot quality, but given the economic imperatives under which the training industry operates, it is reasonable to wonder how many of the graduate pilots could possibly achieve that level. Ryanair’s former head of training, Captain Andy O’Shea, has famously said that more than half of them have not reached an adequate standard, despite being awarded licences.

During the US Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) investigation of the 737 Max since its grounding, it set up the multinational Joint Authorities Technical Review (JATR) team as an independent group to look at the big picture. One of its most profound – but simple – statements is that systems design “must not rely on pilot action as a primary means of risk mitigation”. Also, says the JATR, assumptions about pilot reaction to system failures need to be reviewed in the light of the complexity of aircraft systems and a new generation of pilots trained in different ways.

JATR head Christopher Hart told the FAA: “As aircraft systems become more complex, ensuring that the certification process adequately addresses potential operational and safety ramifications for the entire aircraft that may be caused by the failure – or inappropriate operation – of any system on the aircraft, becomes not only far more important, but also far more difficult.”

FAA administrator Steve Dickson concurs: “The lessons learned will ideally lead to a more holistic, rather than transactional item-by-item approach to aircraft certification – not only in the US, but around the world, where we will more effectively integrate human ­considerations throughout the design process as aircraft become more automated and ­systems more complex.”

Meanwhile, in a recommendation related to the introduction of the Max that may sound the death knell for “grandfather rights”, the JATR says: “The FAA should be provided [by the manufacturer] all system differences between related aircraft in order to adequately evaluate operational impact, systems integration and human performance.”

Summing up the need for change in design for the man/machine interface – or, to be more precise, the need to design a workable relationship between a pilot and what is effectively a network of integrated systems, Hart continues: “Other specific [JATR] recommendations relate to revisiting the FAA’s standards regarding the time needed by pilots to identify and respond to problems that arise. Although existing standards have served the industry well for decades, the JATR members recommend an examination of whether those standards are as appropriate for the complex integrated systems in today’s airplanes.”

MULTIPLE ALARMS

For clarity, Hart adds: “For example, when the failure or inappropriate operation of a ­system results in cascading failures and multiple alarms, query how adequately the certification process considers the impact of multiple alarms, along with possible startle effect, on the ability of pilots to respond appropriately. Inherent in this issue is the adequacy of training to help pilots be able to respond effectively to failures that they may never have encountered before, not even in training.”

The return of the Max to service is not only about the approval of new software and systems redesign, it is equally dependent on the FAA and other NAAs agreeing an approved pilot training regime to qualify them on the modified Max. The airlines would each also have to satisfy the regulators that they have prepared appropriate training arrangements. This would obviously entail a complete type rating course for those not rated on earlier 737 marques, and a differences course for those who are. It has already been agreed that the latter will entail time in a capable flight simulation training device.

The importance of pilot preparation has been heightened by revelations in internal emails within Boeing that Indonesia made it clear in June 2017 that it wanted Max simulator time for its carriers’ pilots. Boeing, however, talked it around, persuading airlines that computer-based training was sufficient. The manufacturer is not arguing this time.

There is very little doubt that a programme to return the Max to service will begin sometime in summer, and it will be successful. But this episode means Boeing will never think the same way again about the relationship between its increasingly sophisticated aircraft and their pilots.

Meanwhile, thousands of the world’s faithful Boeing pilots are wondering whether the company is finally heading for sidesticks and more complete flight envelope protection. But the good news is that absolutely no-one is talking about the elimination of pilots from the equation.

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malpensante
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Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di ET, conseguenze sul mezzo e sul mercato

Messaggio da leggereda malpensante » mer 18 mar 2020, 22:57:03

Quante frottole per non voler ammettere che Airbus aveva ragione da decenni.

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Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di ET, conseguenze sul mezzo e sul mercato

Messaggio da leggereda I-Alex » sab 21 mar 2020, 08:58:38

Visto quanto sta accadendo nel mondo aeronautico con migliaia di aerei grounded, possiamo ritenere piuttosto fortunata i manager di Boeing che ora avranno mesi diciamo più lunghi per poter rimediare al pasticcio del 737 Max senza l'ossessione di perdere troppo tempo prezioso
Malpensa airport user

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Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di ET, conseguenze sul mezzo e sul mercato

Messaggio da leggereda KittyHawk » sab 21 mar 2020, 11:59:01

Non credo che la situazione attuale sia una fortuna per Boeing. Già fioccano le cancellazioni degli ordini, per aerei di qualsiasi taglia, quando si riprenderà a volare ci saranno comunque molti più velivoli di quelli necessari per trasportare i passeggeri disponibili, ci sarà chi ridurrà la flotta e chi fallirà proprio e questi velivoli usati finiranno sul mercato a prezzo ribassato, i consumi di carburante non saranno un problema per un po', visto l'andamento del petrolio, e non ci sarà la necessità di velivoli nuovi con motori più parchi.

Boeing (e probabilmente anche Airbus) venderà a ritmo molto ridotto, perché chi sopravviverà, tra le compagnie, si farà bastare quanto ha già in casa e nel caso attingerà al mercato dell'usato. Ma i costi fissi del costruttore rimarranno gli stessi, a meno di massicci licenziamenti e quindi la prospettiva non è rosea.

A proposito: non se ne parla, ma tra qualche mese ho l'impressione che vedremo molti lessor in difficoltà, dato che chi fallirà non pagherà più le rate di leasing e che le compagnie che sopravviveranno facilmente non richiederanno altri velivoli, dato che avranno già i loro problemi con flotte che risulteranno sovradimensionate per le richieste del mercato. E ai lessor rimarranno sul groppone decine e decine di velivoli.

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mattaus313
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Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di ET, conseguenze sul mezzo e sul mercato

Messaggio da leggereda mattaus313 » sab 21 mar 2020, 12:22:06

https://www.lastampa.it/economia/2020/0 ... vggf1XeSYA


Hanno bisogno di 60 miliardi di dollari, direi che non se la passano bene...
"Because you needed a lot of capital in an airline, you needed to be where the financial markets were, and obviously that's New York"

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Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di ET, conseguenze sul mezzo e sul mercato

Messaggio da leggereda easyMXP » sab 21 mar 2020, 12:50:56

In tutto il mondo è partito l'assalto alle casse pubbliche, con la scusa della pandemia. Sparano altissimo per avere il più possibile.
Ottima occasione per Boeing di farsi pagare oltre al fermo impianti (doveroso) anche il lucro cessate dei prossimi anni e l'intero sviluppo del nuovo NB, mantenendo i guadagni degli azionisti negli anni a venire e coprendo gli errori fatti finora.

kco
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Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di ET, conseguenze sul mezzo e sul mercato

Messaggio da leggereda kco » sab 21 mar 2020, 13:06:50

Da copia di flight international in mio possesso

One year has passed since regulators grounded the Boeing 737 Max in the wake of the crash of Ethiopian Airlines flight 302, setting in motion events that transformed the aerospace industry.

Those events upended Boeing, its customers, regulators and the broader industry.

Since flight 302 crashed on 10 March 2019, killing 157 people, Boeing has come under immense public pressure while absorbing a massive financial and reputational hit. 

It has overhauled its internal structures and hired leaders who have changed the company's tone, displaying more openness and contrition.

The Ethiopian loss and October 2018 crash of a Lion Air 737 Max 8 spurred criticism of aircraft certification processes, with efforts underway to change how the US Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) oversees the industry. 

In addition, the Max grounding (and now the ongoing coronavirus outbreak) has provided relief to overstretched suppliers struggling to meet high production rates. However, the needle has now moved so far the other way that different questions about supply chain health are being asked.

Boeing still estimates the Max will receive clearance to fly commercially again in mid-2020, though issues remain, including reports of potential risks posed by wiring bundles.

But when the Max does return – and by all accounts it will – the narrowbody will resume operations in an environment far different to that seen one year ago.

FINANCIAL UPHEAVAL

Boeing entered 2019 as the world's largest aerospace company by revenue and aircraft deliveries.

In 2018, it had handed over 806 commercial aircraft (beating Airbus by six jets) and logged $101 billion in revenue – a staggering sum even within the highly consolidated aerospace industry (in contrast, Airbus had revenues of $72 billion). 

The company was still building the Max in 2019 at a rate of about 42 monthly, even amid the grounding. But it was not delivering the hundreds of new jets churning through its factory. Nor was it receiving delivery payments, which Boeing would have used, according to analysts, to fund its next major aircraft programme.

Boeing lost $636 million in 2019. Revenue plummeted 24% year on year, to $77 billion – a $25 billion drop stemming nearly entirely from the performance at Boeing Commercial Airplanes (BCA).

The company's 2019 deliveries slipped by about half to 380 aircraft, meaning Boeing lost its top spot to Airbus, which shipped 863 aircraft.

Boeing in January halted production of the 737 Max, which should go far in stemming cash outflow.

But earlier this year the fuller financial scope of the Max grounding came into view, with Boeing pegging the expense at $18.6 billion. That includes $6.3 billion in additional costs tagged to the Max's production life, $4 billion in "abnormal production costs" and $8.3 billion in "estimated potential concessions" to customers.

A NEW BOEING?

For most of 2019, Boeing's board expressed steadfast support for former chief executive Dennis Muilenburg, who had led the company down a path that generated increasing criticism. 

Under Muilenburg, Boeing for months insisted Max pilots should not be required to undergo simulator training, a stance that seemed at odds with statements from regulators. It also set return-to-service goals that were never met, earning a Muilenburg a dressing down from the FAA's administrator.

The company did announce an internal overhaul during his tenure, however: it created a new engineering function so that engineers report to a chief engineer, not to business division heads. It also created a new "Product and Services Safety" division. 

Additionally, Boeing jettisoned BCA chief Kevin McAllister, replacing him with Stan Deal, the former head of Boeing Global Services.

Still, pressure mounted, especially after emails surfaced in which Boeing's former chief 737 technical pilot raised questions about the safety of the Max's new flight control system and said he unknowingly lied to regulators.

In December 2019, the airframer announced Muilenburg was out. Days later, Boeing former legal counselor Michael Luttig, who oversaw Max legal matters, also departed.

Muilenburg was succeeded by longtime board member and board chair David Calhoun, a former General Electric executive.

Calhoun has led Boeing only since January, but already has received praise for openness, transparency and setting a more-realistic return-to-service goal of mid-2020.

CUSTOMER AND CONSUMER CONFIDENCE

Amid Boeing's unmet return-to-service promises, continual delays and ongoing regulatory hang-ups, relations with some Max customers have become strained, analysts have said.

Boeing's vice-president of commercial sales and marketing Ihssane Mounir has conceded some customers are upset – after all, what customer would not be annoyed with the long delivery delays? But Mounir insists his team is doing everything possible for customers and has kept relationships strong amid the grounding.

While some customers have been vocal in their disappointment, most airlines have kept tight-lipped and supportive, saying they believe in the Max and have every intention of bringing the aircraft into their fleets as soon as possible.

Questions also remain about whether consumers will shy away from booking Max flights, though some precedence suggests passengers will return as time passes and memories fade.

Some executives have said Boeing should do away with the name "Max" as a means of moving past the brand's baggage.

For instance, in early March, Air Lease executive chairman Steven Udvar-Hazy said that "hopefully" Boeing will "drop the name Max" and call the aircraft 737-8, -9 and -10.

Others disagree. A Southwest Airlines executive said last year his company would not change the name because doing so would be "disingenuous".

STATE OF SUPPLY

Some companies supplying Boeing and other aircraft manufacturers were, by many accounts, strained to the limit in early 2019. At that time, Boeing was producing 52 Max aircraft monthly and eyeing an increase to 57 monthly, with possible further rate jumps to follow. Airbus was likewise boosting narrowbody production, and both companies were eager for suppliers to pick up the pace.

Supply shortages had been reported in several sectors, but issues were most pronounced among engine makers CFM International, maker of the Leap turbofans which power the Max and A320neos, and Pratt & Whitney, supplier of the Airbus A320neo's PW1100G.

Engine makers had struggled to meet production goals and reported ongoing shortages, particularly of major components produced through casting and forging.

The Max grounding eased back on the supply throttle, allowing CFM to return to on-time production. But as the crisis dragged on suppliers began to feel the financial pinch, especially after Boeing stopped Max production in January.

Fuselage maker Spirit AeroSystems, for instance, responded in January by laying off 2,800 staff: 22% of its workforce at the time. And if a company the size of Spirit is feeling the strain, then those lower down the pecking order where cash flow is even more important will be more acutely affected.

FLEET CONSEQUENCES

The grounding immediately forced airlines to remove 357 already-delivered aircraft from their fleets, effectively halting many carriers' growth plans and forcing them to rejig schedules, work older aircraft harder and, in some cases, bolster capacity with leased jets.

Still, the global air travel industry expanded last year: IATA says that global passenger traffic saw a 4.2% year-on-year increase in 2019 (albeit down on the 7.3% growth seen in 2018).

Some Max customers like American Airlines and United Airlines, which operate a broader range of aircraft types, managed to grow capacity in 2019, though only slightly.

But 737-only operator Southwest Airlines' capacity in available seat miles dipped 1.6% year on year in 2019.

Until recently, those airlines and other Max operators were clamouring for capacity, eager for the FAA to clear the Max. But in an ironic twist, they are clamouring no more.

The rapidly spreading coronavirus has already impacted the market more severely than the Max ever did, leading airlines to slash capacity by double digits and, with no end in sight, contemplate lay-offs.

What that means for hundreds of Max aircraft sitting grounded as the FAA finalises certification remains unknown, though some analysts suggest airlines may defer, or possibly seek to cancel, some orders.

FOCUS ON CERTIFICATION

The Max grounding shone a spotlight on the FAA, with several inquiries detailing alleged failures in overseeing the Max's certification.

The agency has been accused of bowing to Boeing pressure, and the Max's issues have spurred criticism of the FAA's Organization Designation Authorization (ODA) programme, under which the FAA delegates some certification work to manufacturers like Boeing.

The aircraft manufacturing industry insists the ODA process is a safe means of oversight that helps companies bring new technology to market faster. ODA supporters also note the FAA has neither the expertise nor funding to complete all certification work itself.

Still, some US lawmakers think certification needs a revamp. Those include the heads of the US House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, which has been investigating the Max and its certification.

On 6 March, the committee said it soon will release legislation to "address failures in the certification process uncovered by the committee’s investigation".


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Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di ET, conseguenze sul mezzo e sul mercato

Messaggio da leggereda kco » sab 21 mar 2020, 13:10:52

A US congressional committee investigating the 737 Max has highlighted alleged failures by Boeing and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).

The preliminary report from the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure came shortly before the one-year anniversary of the deadly crash of Ethiopian Airlines flight 302, which prompted the global grounding.

The committee says its investigation remains ongoing and that it will introduce legislation in the coming weeks to “address failures in the certification process”.

“Developing a transport category commercial aircraft that is compliant with FAA regulations, but fundamentally flawed and unsafe highlights an aviation oversight system in desperate need of repair,” say the preliminary findings.

Boeing says it has “co-operated extensively for the past year with the committee’s investigation” and will review the report.

The FAA says it “welcomes the observations” of the committee. “While the FAA’s certification processes are well-established and have consistently produced safe aircraft designs, we are a learning agency and welcome the scrutiny. We are confident that our openness to observations and recommendations will further bolster aviation safety worldwide.”

Boeing placed undue “pressures” on the 737 Max programme and relied on “faulty assumptions” in developing the aircraft’s systems, says the report.

“There was tremendous financial pressure on Boeing and subsequently the 737 Max programme to compete with Airbus’s A320neo aircraft,” it adds.

The pressure resulted in cost cutting and intense efforts to meet schedule. “The committee’s investigation has identified several instances where the desire to meet these goals and expectations jeopardised the safety of the flying public,” it says.

The report notes that in 2012, to cut costs, Boeing reduced the Max’s avionics regression testing by 2,000 work-hours, cut flight-test support by 3,000h and slashed 8,000h of engineering flight-deck simulator work.

The report faults Boeing for “concealment of crucial information” and cites “conflicts of interest” among Boeing staffers tasked with performing certification work.

“Our committee’s investigation will continue for the foreseeable future, as there are a number of leads we continue to chase down,” says committee chair Peter DeFazio.

The report says Boeing made faulty assumptions about pilot responses to activation of the Max’s Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS). As a result, Boeing designed that system, which pushes the aircraft’s nose down, to rely on only a single angle-of-attack (AoA) indicator.

Investigators have said a faulty AoA sensor precipitated the October 2018 crash of a Lion Air 737 Max 8. The Ethiopian crash report remains outstanding. Those crashes killed 346 people.

The Lion Air accident report also cited notable problems with pilot performance and the carrier’s maintenance and operations.

The committee’s report says Boeing “withheld crucial information from the FAA, its customers and 737 Max pilots” by failing to initially disclose the existence of MCAS. Boeing also did not initially inform airlines that an AoA disagree alert was inoperative.

At one point, an estimated 80% of 737 Max aircraft had inoperative AoA alerts, according to the report.

The report says “multiple career FAA officials documented” cases in which FAA managers, “at the behest of Boeing”, overruled FAA technical experts who had raised concern about the safety of Boeing’s design approaches.

Those cases involved the 737 Max and a lightning protection feature on the 787, it says.

The FAA’s “poor, disjointed” communications kept FAA employees from making “informed decisions”, the report adds.

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Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di ET, conseguenze sul mezzo e sul mercato

Messaggio da leggereda kco » sab 21 mar 2020, 13:14:33

nvestigators probing the fatal Ethiopian Airlines Boeing 737 Max accident have given additional insight into a crucial period during which the crew, having temporarily stopped the aircraft from automatically nosing down, struggled vainly to regain pitch and trim control.

In an interim update into the 10 March 2019 crash near Addis Ababa, the Ethiopian accident investigation bureau says the differences training provided by Boeing – to convert 737 pilots to the 737 Max – was “inadequate”.

It adds that the reliance of the controversial Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS) on a single angle-of-attack sensor input left it “vulnerable to undesired activation”.

When the sensor, on the left-hand side of the jet, started transmitting bad angle-of-attack data, MCAS responded by repeatedly triggering the stabiliser trim to force the aircraft’s nose down, and causing the pilots to counter by pulling on their control columns.

But while MCAS triggered on four occasions, the third of these had no effect on the aircraft’s pitch because – for a period of 2min 33s – the crew had been flying the jet with the stabiliser trim cut-out engaged. Engaging the trim cut-out de-activates MCAS and, for this critical period, the crew would not have been battling directly against MCAS to control the aircraft’s pitch.

The inquiry says the captain, at this point, succeeded in increasing the aircraft’s pitch, and the 737 started climbing at 1,800ft/min. He asked for the first officer to “pull with me” and, over the 2min 33s interval, the crew was applying an average of 94lb force to the control column.

Pitch varied between 7° nose-up and 2° nose-down, increasing when both pilots pulled and falling when only a single pilot pulled, and this resulted in the vertical speed swinging between a 4,400ft/min climb and a 2,500ft/min descent.

Air traffic control approved a request from the crew to climb to 14,000ft in order to troubleshoot their flight-control problems. The aircraft was travelling at excessive speed, some 360-375kt (666-694km/h), and the captain made a “speed” call-out, which was acknowledged by the first officer.

The captain again sought the first officer’s help to pitch the aircraft nose-up, and then asked him whether the trim was functional. The first officer replied that the trim was not functioning, and asked if he could try to activate it manually, but subsequently stated: “It is not working.”

At the time of the first officer’s comment, the aircraft was mis-trimmed and flying at 340kt.

Simulations of the flight, with the thrust and trim settings at the time, aimed to evaluate the control column forces required for the climb and to turn the trim wheel. With both simulator pilots pulling they achieved a nose-up pitch of 5-10°.

But the inquiry says: “The forces needed from both pilots to achieve this were considered significantly very high and unbearable for the duration held.”

The simulations also revealed that, for the trim setting, the pilots could not move the trim wheel manually at speeds above 220kt.

Several times the Ethiopian aircraft’s captain remarked “keep with me”, stating that they should continue climbing to 14,000ft. But the crew then decided instead to return to the airport.

The inquiry states that, shortly afterwards, manual electric trim-up inputs were recorded, indicating that the stabiliser cut-out had been disengaged – enabling MCAS to continue triggering nose-down stabiliser trim.

Investigators have not specifically stated why, having been engaged, the cut-out was subsequently disengaged, and whether this related to the difficulties with pulling the control column or turning the trim wheel. But the inquiry states that, with MCAS again active, the remainder of the flight lasted just 33s as it pushed the aircraft into its final fatal descent.

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Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di ET, conseguenze sul mezzo e sul mercato

Messaggio da leggereda mattaus313 » sab 21 mar 2020, 14:26:09

In tutto il mondo è partito l'assalto alle casse pubbliche, con la scusa della pandemia. Sparano altissimo per avere il più possibile.
Ottima occasione per Boeing di farsi pagare oltre al fermo impianti (doveroso) anche il lucro cessate dei prossimi anni e l'intero sviluppo del nuovo NB, mantenendo i guadagni degli azionisti negli anni a venire e coprendo gli errori fatti finora.
Beh, scusa mi pare un termine un pò forte. Che poi per alcune aziende questa pandemia sia capitata al momento giusto e da una mano a coprire gli errori del passato sono d'accordo. Tanto per Boeing quanto per quella che abbiamo in casa.

La differenza è che Boeing potrebbe non chiedere aiuti di stato semplicemente dicendo a Trump che hanno nuovi aerei che sparano un raggio invisibile che sconfigge il COVID e come unico effetto collaterale rischia di provocare qualche influenza in più. Sono sicuro che potrebbe comprarne un pò :green:
"Because you needed a lot of capital in an airline, you needed to be where the financial markets were, and obviously that's New York"

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I-Alex
Moderatore
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Iscritto il: sab 13 ott 2007, 01:13:01
Località: near Malpensa

Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di ET, conseguenze sul mezzo e sul mercato

Messaggio da leggereda I-Alex » sab 21 mar 2020, 18:20:41

Non credo che la situazione attuale sia una fortuna per Boeing. Già fioccano le cancellazioni degli ordini, per aerei di qualsiasi taglia, quando si riprenderà a volare ci saranno comunque molti più velivoli di quelli necessari per trasportare i passeggeri disponibili, ci sarà chi ridurrà la flotta e chi fallirà proprio e questi velivoli usati finiranno sul mercato a prezzo ribassato, i consumi di carburante non saranno un problema per un po', visto l'andamento del petrolio, e non ci sarà la necessità di velivoli nuovi con motori più parchi.
fortuna nel pasticcio dei Max e relativo ritardo non sanabile che avrebbero accumulato vs Airbus
Sul lato economico e finanziario vediamo tra qualche mese quanti vettori saranno aimè saltati
Malpensa airport user

KittyHawk
Messaggi: 5222
Iscritto il: mer 11 giu 2008, 23:29:09
Località: Milano

Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di ET, conseguenze sul mezzo e sul mercato

Messaggio da leggereda KittyHawk » sab 21 mar 2020, 20:00:34

Ovviamente non ho alcuna certezza, ma visto lo scenario attuale e quello futuro per il MAX potrebbero già iniziare a recitare il De profundis.

jetblue
Messaggi: 706
Iscritto il: gio 10 apr 2008, 17:34:22

Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di ET, conseguenze sul mezzo e sul mercato

Messaggio da leggereda jetblue » dom 22 mar 2020, 08:03:05

Comunque non dimentichiamo che gli eventuali aiuti federali ai vettori USA si tradurranno poi quando le cose si riprenderanno in ordini “domestici” a Boeing..... my 2 cents

KittyHawk
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Iscritto il: mer 11 giu 2008, 23:29:09
Località: Milano

Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di ET, conseguenze sul mezzo e sul mercato

Messaggio da leggereda KittyHawk » dom 22 mar 2020, 10:18:20

Su come debbano essere erogati gli aiuti c'è discrepanza di visione tra le compagnie aeree USA e l'amministrazione Trump.
Le prime vorrebbero che metà degli aiuti fosse concessa come sussidio e l'altra metà come prestiti senza garanzia e interessi. L'amministrazione non è d'accordo e tra le condizioni che vorrebbe applicare c'è la proibizione del buy-back delle azioni da parte delle compagnie che riceveranno aiuti. Vedremo come andrà a finire.

easyMXP
Messaggi: 4577
Iscritto il: mer 20 ago 2008, 16:00:52

Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di ET, conseguenze sul mezzo e sul mercato

Messaggio da leggereda easyMXP » dom 22 mar 2020, 13:45:22

Non l'avrei mai detto che i pirati della finanza alla guida delle compagnie stessero cercando di approfittare della situazione, strano davvero

kco
Messaggi: 4696
Iscritto il: sab 05 gen 2008, 09:01:18

Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di ET, conseguenze sul mezzo e sul mercato

Messaggio da leggereda kco » gio 26 mar 2020, 09:06:02

Da copia di flight international in mio possesso


Eleven years after the end of the 2007-2009 Great Recession, the USA is again having “too big to fail” discussions.

Back then, the concept applied to car makers, major banks and financial institutions that sought or took government help. Although some of those financial institutions had made terrible bets using mortgage-backed securities, the US Department of the Treasury stepped in to hammer out a rescue, deeming the risk to the global economy as a whole too great if banks besides Lehman Brothers were allowed to go to the wall.

Deliberations about encouraging moral hazard – the idea people take larger bets when they think the risk will not be borne by them – were temporarily put on hold.

More than a decade later, “too big” is back. But this time, the term has been applied to airlines and Boeing, which seeks at least $60 billion for itself and the broader aerospace manufacturing industry to help weather the coronavirus crisis.

If Boeing’s stock price is any indicator – now hovering around $100 per share – investors are worried

Observers generally believe the US government should not, and likely will not, let Boeing wither and fold. As well as the huge number of jobs that would put at risk in an election year, the airframer generates vital exports through its commercial business and is so tightly linked to the USA’s military needs that to do without it would seem impossible.

But too big or not, Boeing’s bailout request will likely raise many eyebrows on Capitol Hill, where US lawmakers are hammering out aid packages.

Remember moral hazard? Few can argue that, like taking on those risky credit default swaps, Boeing’s financial struggles are ­primarily of its own ­making – namely the 737 Max crisis.

The jet is still grounded and, virus or no virus, the company will not see revenue from deliveries for at least another three months.

Also, Boeing is seeking help after 12 months of seemingly ceaseless criticism for its handling of the Max crisis.

The company’s new chief executive, David Calhoun, had started righting the ship earlier this year, but he, too, has been criticised recently for deflecting blame.

The full scope of Boeing’s financial troubles remain somewhat unknown because of uncertainty about the Max grounding and potential withering demand across its commercial product range.

But if Boeing’s stock price is any indicator – now hovering around $100 per share, having slipped 75% in one month – investors are worried.

Do not bet that any bailout will come without any strings attached.



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