Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di ET, conseguenze sul mezzo e sul mercato

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I-GABE
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Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di ET, conseguenze sul mezzo e sul mercato

Messaggio da leggereda I-GABE » mar 07 gen 2020, 10:31:34

kco ha scritto:https://mobile.reuters.com/article/amp/ ... ssion=true

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Si comincia... ora ci sara' da divertirsi.

kco
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Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di ET, conseguenze sul mezzo e sul mercato

Messaggio da leggereda kco » mar 07 gen 2020, 19:58:35

https://www.seattletimes.com/business/b ... ssion=true

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kco
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Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di ET, conseguenze sul mezzo e sul mercato

Messaggio da leggereda kco » mar 07 gen 2020, 22:00:22

https://leehamnews.com/2020/01/07/boein ... um=twitter

E siamo a 60gg di stop della produzione. Parallelamente su vocifera che il max richiederà una sessione supplementare di addestramento rispetto all NG.

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kco
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Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di ET, conseguenze sul mezzo e sul mercato

Messaggio da leggereda kco » mer 08 gen 2020, 08:56:38

https://www.bloomberg.com/amp/news/arti ... ssion=true

Come anticipato boeing raccomanda un corso basato al simulatore di aggiornamento al max.

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easyMXP
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Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di ET, conseguenze sul mezzo e sul mercato

Messaggio da leggereda easyMXP » mer 08 gen 2020, 10:18:54

kco ha scritto:https://www.seattletimes.com/business/b ... ssion=true

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Quei cavi saranno lì da qualche decennio, dubito che abbiano cambiato il routing dal 737NG.
Stanno passando da lasciar passare di tutto a spaccare il capello in quattro su qualunque cosa, chissà quando finirà il processo di (ri)certificazione!

easyMXP
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Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di ET, conseguenze sul mezzo e sul mercato

Messaggio da leggereda easyMXP » mer 08 gen 2020, 10:25:52

kco ha scritto:https://www.bloomberg.com/amp/news/arti ... ssion=true

Come anticipato boeing raccomanda un corso basato al simulatore di aggiornamento al max.

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Inevitabile.
Il MCAS serve a far comportare un Max come un NG. La soluzione in caso di singola failure è escludere il sistema, perché non ci sono 3 sonde con majority voting, ma soltanto 2, a quel punto il Max non è come un NG.
In altre parole il Max da questo punto di vista non è failure tolerant, un singolo guasto lo fa diventare diverso da un NG. Siccome un guasto del MCAS è catastrofico l'aereo deve invece essere failure tolerant: per raggiungere questa condizione il comportamento del pilota fornisce la failure tolerance, ma ovviamente deve essere addestrato per questo.

kco
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Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di ET, conseguenze sul mezzo e sul mercato

Messaggio da leggereda kco » mer 08 gen 2020, 18:17:21

Consiglio di mettere su aziende per costruire simulatori del max e in fretta

https://www.flightglobal.com/air-transp ... 28.article

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kco
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Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di ET, conseguenze sul mezzo e sul mercato

Messaggio da leggereda kco » ven 10 gen 2020, 18:17:31

https://aviationweek.com/air-transport/ ... equirement

Boeing’s efforts to keep 737 Next Generation and MAX training as similar as possible included limiting external discussion of the maneuvering characteristics augmentation system (MCAS) as early as 2013, as well as an aggressive lobbying effort to dissuade Lion Air from requiring simulator sessions for its pilots, new documents released by the manufacturer reveal.

The documents, comprising external and internal emails and internal instant message exchanges, underscore the priority Boeing placed on positioning the MAX as nearly the same as its predecessor, the 737 Next Generation (NG). They also offer some of the most compelling evidence yet that Boeing consciously chose less costly approaches over safer, more conservative ones during the MAX’s development.

Boeing determined early on that ensuring 737 pilots could transition to the MAX without simulator time would be a huge cost advantage when pitching the model to customers. It also realized that regulators could consider some of the MAX’s new features as too much to cover in computer-based training (CBT). The MCAS, a flight control law that commands automatic stabilizer movements in certain flight profiles, was chief among them.

A version of the MCAS was developed for the 767 tanker program, "but treated as analogous function, as a speed trim-type function,” a Boeing document summarizing a June 2013 MAX program meeting said. "If we emphasize MCAS is a new function there may be a greater certification and training impact.”

Boeing’s solution: refer to the MCAS externally as an addition to the 737 Speed Trim, not by its name. Boeing knew the approach might be questioned, so it sought input from its FAA-designated authorized representative (AR) "to ensure this strategy is acceptable” for certification.

"After speaking with the [AR], concurrence was provided that we can continue to use the MCAS nomenclature internally...while still considering MCAS to be an addition to the Speed Trim function,” the memo said. "This will allow us to maintain the MCAS nomenclature while not driving additional work due to training impacts and maintenance manual expansions."

The plan extended to keeping mention of the MCAS out of MAX pilot training materials. Its erroneous activation played key roles in two MAX accidents—Lion Air Flight 610 in October 2018 and Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 in March 2019—that led regulators to ground the MAX in mid-March. The fleet remains grounded while Boeing addresses regulators’ concerns, including adding MCAS training and modifying the system’s logic.

Most pilots did not know the MCAS existed until after the Lion Air accident. Boeing has said repeatedly that it kept the MCAS out of manuals to simplify pilot training, and that an erroneous MCAS activation would be quickly diagnosed as a runaway stabilizer. The 2013 memo casts doubt on the former, and the two MAX accident sequences disproved the latter.

Boeing’s efforts to win approval for simulator-free MAX transition training succeeded with FAA approval in August 2016, nine months before Malindo Air become the first customer to take delivery of a MAX. But some MAX customers and regulators were not convinced that CBT, or Level B training, would be sufficient. Among them: Lion Air and Indonesia’s Directorate General of Civil Aviation (DGCA).

Lion Air was the first Asia-Pacific customer to order the MAX, and would be one of the model’s first operators. In June 2017, with its first delivery just days away, the airline was still developing its training curriculum, and simulator sessions were on the table. The airline's early entry-into-service status meant other MAX customers would be monitoring its progress and fleet-related decisions, including training.

"I would like to discuss what if any requirements beyond the Level B CBT the DGCA has required of you, or if your airline has determined any additional training is required,” a Boeing employee asked a Lion Air 737 training captain in early June 2017.

The captain replied that the airline “decided to give the transition pilot one simulator familiarization” in addition to CBT.

"There is absolutely no reason to require your pilots to require a MAX simulator to begin flying the MAX,” the Boeing employee replied. "Once the engines are started, there is only one difference between NG and MAX procedurally, and that is that there is no OFF position of the gear handle. Boeing does not understand what is to be gained by a three-hour simulator session, when the procedures are essentially the same.”

The Boeing employee then listed six regulators that “have all accepted the CBT requirement as the only training required” to transition to the MAX. “I’d be happy to share the operational difference training with you, to help you understand that a MAX simulator is both impractical and unnecessary for your pilots.”

In a subsequent email, the Boeing employee provided presentations on the MAX technical and operational differences for the Lion Air captain and his team. The Boeing employee also urged Lion Air to consider alternatives to simulator time, such as a flight-hour minimum in 737s or ensuring a pilot’s first MAX flight is always done alongside a pilot with MAX experience.

The following day, the Boeing employee followed up, again pitching alternatives to simulator sessions. “I am concerned that if [Lion Air] chooses to require a MAX simulator for its pilots beyond what all other regulators are requiring, that it will be creating a difficult and unnecessary training burden for your airline, as well as potentially establish a precedent in your region for other MAX customers,” the Boeing employee wrote.

Around the same time as the Lion Air exchange, two Boeing employees discussed the airline’s concerns in an instant-message chat.

“Now [Lion Air] might need a sim to fly the MAX, and maybe because of their own stupidity,” one Boeing employee wrote.

"WHAT THE…..!!!! But their sister airline”—Malindo—"is already flying it!” the second responded.

“I know. I’ve asked for a webex so we can [go] thru this with the DGCA. Not sure if this is Lion's fault or DGCA yet,” the first employee replied.

Boeing in a Jan. 9 statement issued a profuse apology for the document’s contents. "The language used in these communications, and some of the sentiments they express, are inconsistent with Boeing values, and the company is taking appropriate action in response,” Boeing said.

"We provided these documents to the FAA and Congress as a reflection of our commitment to transparency and cooperation with the authorities responsible for regulating and overseeing our industry. We welcome, and will fully support, any additional review the FAA believes is appropriate in connection with any of these matters, as well as the continued involvement of the relevant congressional committees with these issues.”

Boeing on Jan. 7 changed its position on the need for MAX simulator training. It is recommending all 737 pilots have simulator sessions before flying a MAX, including those who were flying the model before the 387-aircraft fleet was grounded. Its recommendation is based on simulator trials last month during which some line pilots did not follow checklists during emergency scenarios. Boeing is modifying several checklists as part its MAX changes.

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malpensante
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Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di ET, conseguenze sul mezzo e sul mercato

Messaggio da leggereda malpensante » ven 10 gen 2020, 19:50:29

Che schifo. Ci vorrebbe la sedia elettrica.

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D960
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Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di ET, conseguenze sul mezzo e sul mercato

Messaggio da leggereda D960 » ven 10 gen 2020, 20:30:46

Da Boeing, non da un'azienda nata pochi anni fa e senza know how. Ogni giorno emergono dettagli peggiori. Una vergogna americana.
AHO-ARN-BLQ-BGY-CAG-DUB-FCO-FLR-FRL-GOA-GRO-KIR-KBP-LIN-MXP-MUC-OLB-PMF-PSA-STN-TBS-TPS-TRN-TRS-TSF-VCE

Primo anno in perdita, secondo in pareggio e terzo in utile

easyMXP
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Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di ET, conseguenze sul mezzo e sul mercato

Messaggio da leggereda easyMXP » ven 10 gen 2020, 21:23:26

malpensante ha scritto:Che schifo. Ci vorrebbe la sedia elettrica.
Hai postato tu l'articolo sui figliocci di GE in giro a far danni alle imprese per far soldi a breve termine.
Boeing è la conseguenza più clamorosa del potere della finanza, delle stock options, dei risultati finanziari a breve termine, dei CEO e in generale degli amministratori che cambiano azienda dopo aver preso i bonus per i risultati a breve e prima di pagare le conseguenze a lungo termine.
È ormai una compagnia con una morale marcia e non basta certo cambiare il CEO per risanarla, per di più se il nuovo CEO è anche lui uno della finanza.

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malpensante
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Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di ET, conseguenze sul mezzo e sul mercato

Messaggio da leggereda malpensante » ven 10 gen 2020, 23:43:09

Immagine

MXP3000
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Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di ET, conseguenze sul mezzo e sul mercato

Messaggio da leggereda MXP3000 » sab 11 gen 2020, 00:43:46

Dennis Muilenberg con una buonuscita da 62 milioni di $?
Che schifo.
MXP3000... sognando un hub...

romaneeconti
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Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di ET, conseguenze sul mezzo e sul mercato

Messaggio da leggereda romaneeconti » sab 11 gen 2020, 06:28:14

In molti gli augureranno disgrazie….

easyMXP
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Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di ET, conseguenze sul mezzo e sul mercato

Messaggio da leggereda easyMXP » sab 11 gen 2020, 07:33:53

malpensante ha scritto:Immagine
Appunto....

kco
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Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di ET, conseguenze sul mezzo e sul mercato

Messaggio da leggereda kco » sab 11 gen 2020, 16:50:58

https://www.seattletimes.com/business/b ... ssion=true

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malpensante
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Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di ET, conseguenze sul mezzo e sul mercato

Messaggio da leggereda malpensante » sab 11 gen 2020, 18:26:03

È sempre peggio.

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I-Alex
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Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di ET, conseguenze sul mezzo e sul mercato

Messaggio da leggereda I-Alex » dom 12 gen 2020, 09:02:53

Abbastanza eloquente

Immagine
Malpensa airport user

kco
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Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di ET, conseguenze sul mezzo e sul mercato

Messaggio da leggereda kco » dom 12 gen 2020, 12:47:29

https://news.aviation-safety.net/2020/0 ... n-737-max/

Aggiungiamo qualche peccato minore

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kco
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Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di ET, conseguenze sul mezzo e sul mercato

Messaggio da leggereda kco » lun 13 gen 2020, 08:37:09

Da copia di flight international in mio possesso

Boeing is now recommending pilots complete flight simulator training prior to returning to the cockpit of the 737 Max – a volte face for a company that has long insisted computer-based training was sufficient.

The US Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) says it is reviewing Boeing’s recommendation, but has not disclosed what training it will ultimately require when clearing the Max to fly.

But should the FAA mandate simulator time, airlines will face the task of running thousands of pilots through a small number of simulators, which observers have said could take many months, slowing carriers’ ability to return their aircraft back in service.

Boeing says only 34 simulators are currently in existence, and US airlines have said they have only a handful.

“Boeing is recommending 737 Max simulator training in addition to computer-based training for all Max pilots prior to return to service of the 737 Max,” the company says.  “This recommendation takes into account our unstinting commitment to the safe return of service as well as changes to the airplane and test results. Final determination will be established by the regulators.”

The FAA says it “will consider Boeing’s recommendation for flightcrew simulator training” during a forthcoming meeting of the Joint Operations Evaluation Board (JOEB).

The JOEB is composed of pilots from US-based and international 737 Max operators and is tasked with evaluating pilot training on the type. “The flightcrews will be subjected to rigorous validation testing that will help the FAA and other international regulators evaluate proposed flight training and emergency procedures,” says the agency.

As part of the return-to-service process, the JOEB will send information and data to the FAA’s Flight Standardization Board, which will make the administration’s final training recommendations.

“The FAA is following a thorough process, not a set timeline, to ensure that any design modifications to the 737 Max are integrated with appropriate training and procedures,” it says.

Industry quelli have speculated the FAA will lift the Max’s grounding early this year.

Boeing’s interim chief executive Greg Smith says safety is the airframer’s “top priority”.

“Public, customer and stakeholder confidence in the 737 Max is critically important to us and with that focus Boeing has decided to recommend Max simulator training combined with computer-based training for all pilots prior to returning the Max safely to service,” Smith says.

For months Boeing, and even customers like Southwest Airlines, insisted computer-based training was sufficient for pilots transitioning from the 737NG to the Max.

A system new to the Max – the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS) – played a role in two crashes of the twinjet. But Boeing had previously asserted that pilots can address wayward MCAS activation by following established cockpit procedures.

Boeing changed its stance following a series of simulator sessions with US and domestic pilots several weeks ago, according to a source familiar with the manufacturer’s decision, who declined to be identified.

Those sessions were called to review “1302” regulations, which pertain to pilots’ interactions with cockpit systems. They revealed variations in how pilots performed procedures, the source says.

Michel Merluzeau, from aerospace consultancy AIR, calls Boeing’s simulator recommendation a “critically important decision that will go a long way to rebuilding” confidence in the aircraft among pilots and travellers.

“It always has been one of the must-have items to fix on our list,” Merluzeau says, adding he has been surprised Boeing did not make such a “common sense decision” sooner.

Lawmaker Peter DeFazio, chair of the House Transportation Committee and a leading Boeing critic, supports the airframer’s recommendation, but questions why the company took so long to come around.

”It’s remarkable that it took two deadly crashes, numerous investigations and untold public pressure before Boeing arrived at this decision,” DeFazio says. “It will be incumbent upon Boeing to ensure that the recommended simulator training is sufficient to provide all flight crews around the globe with both the proficiency and the information they need to fly the 737 Max safely.”

Boeing says it owns eight of the 34 737 Max flight simulators in existence, with airlines owning the remainder.

Southwest tells FlightGlobal it has three Max simulators “in various stages of software uploads or the certification process with the FAA”. The carrier, which ordered Max simulators from manufacturer CAE, expects to receive another three in late 2020. Dallas-based Southwest, which operates more 737s than any other airline, has a current 9,100 737 pilots, according to regulatory filings.

United Airlines has one operational Max simulator and three on order, with one each of those units to be delivered in January, February and March, the carrier says.

“We have made clear that requiring simulator training for our pilots has been under consideration at United,” the carrier says. “We support the ongoing process and will continue to await the specific training requirements from the FAA.”

American Airlines has previously indicated that it had a single simulator ready to come on line.



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kco
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Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di ET, conseguenze sul mezzo e sul mercato

Messaggio da leggereda kco » lun 13 gen 2020, 08:39:49

Boeing has started temporarily reassigning employees affected by the pending 737 Max production halt, while major supplier Spirit AeroSystems has offered some staff the option to take a “voluntary” lay-off.

Chicago-headquartered Boeing expects the production shutdown, which is to start in mid-January, will affect some 3,000 employees who support the 737 Max programme, the company said in a 6 January memo to staff.

The shutdown will affect workers at Boeing’s 737 production plant in Renton, Washington, and employees elsewhere involved in activities related to fabrication, supply chain, test and technology, it says.

The memo stresses that Boeing does not plan to lay-off or furlough staff. Instead, it will assign 737 workers to different tasks and transfer them to other production sites.

Boeing notified an initial group of employees about transfers on 6 January. Those included Renton workers, some of whom will go to its 767 and 777 production facilities in Everett, Washington. Other Renton employees have been transferred Moses Lake, Washington and Victorville, California, where Boeing has been storing 737 Max aircraft amid the grounding. Those employees will support the storage work, the memo says.

Boeing also notified employees at its South Carolina propulsion site, which makes 737 Max engine nacelle inlets, of transfers to its nearby 787 production site in North Charleston.

Some employees will remain in Renton after production stops, focusing their efforts on improving Boeing’s quality, work processes and kitting of components, the memo says.

“We are committed to making this transition as smooth as possible, and returning all of our teams to their home organisations once production starts again,” says Boeing 737 vice-president and general manager Mark Jenks in the memo.

“No decision has been made on when 737 production will restart due to the uncertainty about the timing and conditions of return to service and global training approvals,” the memo adds. “Once there is a decision, loaned employees will start returning to their regular assignments in a phased approach.”

Also on 6 January, Spirit AeroSystems chief executive Tom Gentile sent staff a letter offering them the opportunity to take what the company calls “voluntary lay-offs”, as spelled out in employment contracts.

Spirit, which makes 737 fuselages at its Wichita site in Kansas, is reviewing its staffing in light of uncertainty about when Boeing will resume production.

“This continued uncertainty has forced us to evaluate all of our options for reducing costs, and means we will likely have to make many difficult decisions in the days and weeks ahead that will involve reductions in the size of our workforce to align to expected lower levels of production when production resumes,” Gentile says.

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kco
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Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di ET, conseguenze sul mezzo e sul mercato

Messaggio da leggereda kco » lun 13 gen 2020, 18:07:24

Consiglio la lettura di quanto sotto. Da una prospettiva storica allo sviluppo del max e del neo.

Back in the 1950s, as the commercial aviation world began what would be a rapid transition from “props” to the Jet Age, the mainstream aircraft manufacturers faced the dilemma over how they should bridge the transition in engine technologies. The options were fairly simple - grab the bull by the horns with a higher-risk pure-jet design, or take the more cautious “propeller-turbine” (turboprop) route.

A decade ago the OEMs faced a similar dilemma when the arrival of new engine technology in the form of the Pratt & Whitney PW1000G geared turbofan (GTF) series promised to shake up the industry.

While it offered re-engining opportunities for Airbus and Boeing, there was also the serious prospect that it could trigger the development of an all-new single-aisle. Bombardier certainly thought so, launching the CSeries in 2008 backed by orders from a blue-chip customer – Lufthansa.

History shows that back in the 1950s Douglas called it right with the DC-8 jetliner, as did Boeing with its 707 – which had far less to lose as it was very much a secondary player in the 1950s commercial aviation scene. The stakes were high for Lockheed. Its iconic Constellation “propliner” was the major rival to Douglas Commercial “DC” series – and Burbank effectively sealed its fate to ultimately exit the commercial sector by deciding against a jet and developing the USA’s only large turboprop – the L-188 Electra.

Fast forward to the late 2000s and the two single-aisle incumbents were pondering how to respond to the arrival of the GTF – and the CSeries. Both had much to lose if they called it wrong. Re-engining was a lower-risk decision of course, but the big prize could lie with the creation of an all-new aircraft. Ultimately Airbus and Boeing both adopted the derivative approach which has proved to be a smart commercial move for the last 10 years, with combined sales exceeding 12,000 aircraft.

“Our own internal modelling of an all-new aeroplane showed it was only going to bring another 3% of performance improvement over the A320neo’s 15%” Tom Williams, former Airbus chief operating officer 

However, the paths to those decisions were not straightforward – and for one of the protagonists, at least, its strategy appears to have come back to haunt it.

Airbus had been taking a close look at the GTF for several years and flight-tested the engine on its A340 development aircraft. It was the first to blink when it launched the re-engined A320neo in late 2010. Power came from the PW1100G along with the new “Leap-X” offering from CFM International.

This was a gamble designed primarily at preventing Bombardier from making deep inroads into the lower end of its market with the CSeries. It also meant that Airbus had rolled the dice, committing to the re-engining route and leaving the path open to its rival possibly launching a clean-sheet programme.

Boeing looked very seriously at the high-stakes option – dubbed the New Single Aisle (NSA) – with service entry slated for the early 2020s. And there was a lot going for the NSA option. For one, a third adaptation of the 737 airframe to accommodate a new engine was more troublesome than it had been for Airbus with the A320. Secondly, the 737’s core technology was arguably at least one generation – if not two – behind that of its European rival.

But the Airbus leadership was fairly confident that Boeing would not be able to make the sums work for the launch of an all-new single-aisle in 2011. And all the time Seattle dithered, the A320neo hoovered up the orders.

“Our own internal modelling of an all-new aeroplane showed it was only going to bring another 3% of performance improvement over the A320neo’s 15%,” says former Airbus chief operating officer Tom Williams, who was executive vice-president programmes at the time of the A320neo launch. “And the unit costs looked horrendous because trying to build in high volume in carbonfibre is not easy and not cheap.”

Speaking to FlightGlobal for our Airbus at 50 supplement in April 2019, Williams said the decision to launch the A320neo – which he admitted was aimed at the CSeries rather than the 737 – was fairly straightforward in the end. Although he conceded the decision came after dispelling early concerns about the philosophy of grafting such large engines onto an existing design: “If we tinker with this product, at what point do we do something that becomes dysfunctional?” he said.

“So it was really an argument that said the all-new single-aisle really needs to wait until the next step of engine technology like a contra-rotating open rotor, and that’s not going to come until the latter part of the next decade. So we should get on and do this re-engining.”

Boeing initially tried to ignore the noise coming out of Toulouse, keeping its sights firmly on the potentially larger long-term prize to be gained with a bold move into an all-new design - much like it had with the launch of the 787. But as the pressure built steadily in Seattle, Boeing began warming to a 737 derivative and just ahead of the 2011 Paris air show it presented a chart claiming that a re-engined “737-800RE” would have 8% lower cash operating costs than the A320neo.

There was pressure building from inside Boeing too, as it continued working to get the delayed 787 development back on track while also needing a succession plan for the 777. With its hands already full, there was arguably insufficient bandwidth to develop another all-new airliner.

Customers were adding to Boeing’s dilemma. Key 737 client American Airlines was looking set to buy big in Toulouse while another – Herb Kelleher, co-founder of all-737 operator Southwest Airlines – urged Boeing to get on with the NSA and be more aggressive with the schedule to ensure service entry before the end of the decade.

The month after June’s Paris air show, Jim Albaugh, the then chief executive of Boeing Commercial Airplanes, gave the green light to a major derivative of the 737 re-engined with the CFM Leap-1B. The strategy stopped American walking away entirely – the Dallas/Fort Worth carrier split its order between the A320neo and the 737RE. And significantly Southwest then signed a major deal for the new 737 at the end of 2011.

“Given the competitive dynamic in 2011… technology readiness would not have allowed Boeing to bring an ‘NSA’ to market sufficiently quickly to block A320neo sales” Rob Morris, global head of consultancy at Ascend

Boeing defied the sceptics who thought the 737 had reached the end of the road, choosing a derivative over a clean-sheet design for its next assault on the single-aisle sector. Its successor to the best-selling 737NG would be dubbed the “737 Max”.

“I continue to believe that [launching] the Max was the right decision at the time. The enabling technologies simply weren’t there to justify the non-recurring costs of a clean-sheet, and customers just wanted new engines,” says Richard Aboulafia, vice-president of analysis at Teal Group.

Analysts at consultancy Ascend by Cirium concur that based on what Boeing knew at the time, a derivative approach was the right decision.

“If Boeing had not launched the Max, Airbus would have had a short-term benefit in market share, as Boeing would have had an uncompetitive product for several years,” says Richard Evans, senior consultant at Ascend. “Boeing was definitely concerned about the ability to ramp up an all-new product, a concern that will still apply to any new single-aisle in the future.”

Rob Morris, who is global head of consultancy at Ascend, believes that Boeing “was left with no option” but to launch a derivative aircraft.

“Given the competitive dynamic in 2011… technology readiness would not have allowed Boeing to bring an ‘NSA’ to market sufficiently quickly to block A320neo sales,” he says. “And airlines would have perceived such risk and uncertainty in NSA that it is unlikely they would have been willing to wait.”

Aboulafia believes Boeing spent the appropriate amount of time developing the 737 Max, but it still was not enough to eliminate a fatal flaw: “It was not a rushed job; six years is a lavish amount of time to allow for a derivative jetliner. The result is a good jet, but one with a problem,” he says.

“The Max wasn’t flawed, but the design and integration of the MCAS [Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System] certainly was. But the two aren’t the same. The Max doesn’t need MCAS, and even if it would be useful for the Max, the three primary fixes envisaged for MCAS are more than enough to make it safe. The only question, of course, is how Boeing got to that point,” says Aboulafia.

“I am sure the 737 Max design was credible, but for sure, execution has caused Boeing to be where it is today,” says Morris.

He adds that while he is confident that Boeing will get on top of the Max issues and the aircraft will become a credible programme, Morris does not expect it to ever be a fully viable rival to the A320neo family: “Boeing will not be able to achieve 50% market share versus A320neo family, because the A321neo is fundamentally a better aircraft than 737 Max 9/10.”

Perhaps that factor alone – with the benefit of hindsight – will be the most significant repercussion of Boeing’s decision to stick with the 737 a decade ago.

“Of course, since then, the upgauging trend at airlines has greatly increased, which makes a new larger single-aisle more appealing,” says Aboulafia.

“But that certainly wasn’t known at the time. And even now, I still think that might need to be a different plane than a family based on a 150-seater anyway.”

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kco
Messaggi: 5426
Iscritto il: sab 05 gen 2008, 09:01:18

Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di ET, conseguenze sul mezzo e sul mercato

Messaggio da leggereda kco » mar 14 gen 2020, 08:43:23

E intanto spirit inizia a mandare a casa gente...

https://www.flightglobal.com/aerospace/ ... 94.article


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KittyHawk
Messaggi: 6505
Iscritto il: mer 11 giu 2008, 23:29:09
Località: Milano

Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di ET, conseguenze sul mezzo e sul mercato

Messaggio da leggereda KittyHawk » mar 14 gen 2020, 16:35:12

Oddio, la soluzione per risolvere il problema ci sarebbe: Boeing chiude definitivamente la linea 737 e si mette a produrre la famiglia A320 su licenza. Spirit del resto già collabora con Airbus. Alla fine tutti contenti, da chi deve ricevere aerei che possano volare a chi non perde il posto di lavoro a chi finalmente sa come sfruttare le fabbriche. :green:


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