Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di ET, conseguenze sul mezzo e sul mercato

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I-GABE
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Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di Ethiopian

Messaggio da leggereda I-GABE » mer 24 lug 2019, 09:06:03

Il 787 è un aereo molto innovativo, inevitabile che ci fossero problemi di dentizione. Completamente diversa la storia del max, che potrebbe essere un ottimo case study su come non fare risk management e sulle bad practices di governance.


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malpensante
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Messaggio da leggereda malpensante » mer 24 lug 2019, 22:08:08

Boeing says it could halt production of 737 Max after grounding

The company lost $2.9bn in the three months to the end of June, compared to a profit of $2.2bn for the same period last year


Boeing said it could halt production of the 737 Max jet on Wednesday as it reported the company’s largest ever quarterly loss following two fatal accidents involving the plane.

The company lost $2.9bn in the three months to the end of June, compared to a profit of $2.2bn for the same period last year. Sales fell 35% to $15.8bn. Chief executive Dennis Muilenburg said production of the plane could be slowed or halted if regulators do not move to lift the ban on the plane.

The 737 Max was Boeing’s best selling aircraft until the fleet was grounded worldwide in March following crashes in Indonesia and Ethiopia. In January Boeing’s executives said the Max was the fastest selling plane in its history and the company expected to deliver between 895 and 905 airplanes this year.

Now it has become the most costly plane in Boeing’s history.

Boeing has predicted that the Max will be flying again by the end of the year, but this month the Wall Street Journal reported that government and industry officials believe a return date of January 2020 is more likely.

On a call with analysts Muilenburg said the company may have to consider slowing or halting production if there are further delays in getting the plane back into the skies.

Boeing is still producing 42 of its 737 jets a month and plans to boost that rate to 57 next year. But if there are further setbacks, Muilenberg said: “We might need to consider possible further rate reductions or other options including a temporary shutdown of the Max production.”

Muilenberg added that Boeing expected to submit its “final certification package” to the Federal Aviation Administration, the US regulator, in September.

Last week Boeing said it would take a $5.6bn charge to cover potential compensation to customers. The company also expects the cost of manufacturing the 737 to rise by $2.7bn due to production slowdowns. A $100m fund is being established to compensate the families and communities affected by the crashes.

“This is a defining moment for Boeing and we remain focused on our enduring values of safety, quality, and integrity in all that we do, as we work to safely return the 737 Max to service,” Muilenburg, said in a statement.

“During these challenging times, teams across our enterprise continue to perform at a high level while delivering on commitments and capturing new opportunities driven by strong, long-term fundamentals.”

Regulators across the world continue to investigate the fatal crashes of a Lion Air Max in Indonesia and an Ethiopian Airlines flight in Ethiopia that claimed a total of 346 lives.

Investigations have centered on the plane’s Manoeuvring Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS) flight control software, which was designed to keep the aircraft stable in flight. In both crashes the pilots appear to have fought in vain to keep the plane’s nose up as the system, triggered by flawed sensor readings, dragged it down. Boeing executives subsequently tried to share some of the blame with the pilots.

Last week a father who lost five family members in the Ethiopian disaster accused the company of “utter prejudice and disrespect” and said Boeing had pursued higher a higher share price and profits “at the expense of the safety of human life”.

The grounding of the 737 Max has had wider consequences for the US aerospace industry. American Airlines, Southwest Airlines and United Airlines all used the Max and have canceled flights into November as a result of the grounding, depressing revenues. Ryanair, another major customer and Europe’s largest short-haul airline, has said late deliveries of the 737 Max will force it to cut routes and shut bases as it curbs expansion plans.


https://www.theguardian.com/business/2019/jul/24/boeing-reports-largest-ever-quarterly-loss-following-737-max-grounding
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I-Alex
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Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di Ethiopian

Messaggio da leggereda I-Alex » gio 25 lug 2019, 07:30:43

del resto chi è causa del suo mal...

...said Boeing had pursued higher a higher share price and profits “at the expense of the safety of human life”.

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malpensante
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Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di Ethiopian

Messaggio da leggereda malpensante » gio 25 lug 2019, 07:48:09

Ci sono da piangere anche centinaia di morti.
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Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di Ethiopian

Messaggio da leggereda kco » gio 25 lug 2019, 08:31:13

https://www.seattletimes.com/business/b ... ssion=true

Anche Seattle times batte la notizia. Io ho la sensazione che stiano facendo pressione psicologica a FAA per sbrigarsi altrimenti mandano gente per strada per quanto per un periodo limitato.

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Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di Ethiopian

Messaggio da leggereda mattaus313 » gio 25 lug 2019, 08:37:04

Fine triste per il 737, ma ancora di più per quelle persone che hanno pagato per le scelte di Boeing ed FAA. 3bn si possono tornare a guadagnare, quelle vite no.

Adesso sarà interessante capire se il programma 737 finisce nel tritadocumenti e Boeing parte da 0 con un nuovo NB e se nel frattempo incrementeranno la produzione di 737NG per non perdere quote di mercato. Vorrei sapere anche come stanno vivendo la situazione a Tolosa, non fosse che oltrepassa il tragico potrei dire che si fanno grosse risate, ma temo che un segnale di quanto la sicurezza debba valere sui profitti sia arrivato anche da quelle parti...
"Because you needed a lot of capital in an airline, you needed to be where the financial markets were, and obviously that's New York"

kco
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Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di Ethiopian

Messaggio da leggereda kco » gio 25 lug 2019, 17:02:19

Anche se Boeing iniziasse ora a pensare a un sostituto del 737 non arriverebbe ad averlo in volo prima di 5 anni. Tra l' altro difficilmente i produttori di motori accetterebbero di creare una variante di motore significativamente migliore di ciò che gira ad oggi.
La tecnologia attuale riesce a migliorare l sfc di circa un punto all' anno, è passato troppo poco tempo dai pure power o dai leap.
Ciò nonostante mi dicono da toulouse che il 737 max non vivrà tanto quanto le versioni precedenti. Ci si aspetta una nuova versione in tempi più brevi di quanto precedentemente preventivato. Quindi Airbus si prepara sul terreno che più probabilmente sarà cruciale. Ovvero fare un nb interamente in carbonio cosa non banale se produci 60 aerei al mese con l'opzione di andare a 100.

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Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di Ethiopian

Messaggio da leggereda kco » ven 26 lug 2019, 18:00:01

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For months, Boeing has framed its 737 Max issues as a temporary, though unfortunate, setback to an aircraft programme that would surely rise again.

After all, demand from airlines for new narrowbodies remains strong, supply remains pinched and Boeing holds orders for some 4,400 of the 737 Max family, enough to keep production humming for years.

As soon as the Federal Aviation Administration approved a flight-control software tweak, all would back on track.

But with each passing month the implications of the crisis have become starker and the narrative more open to question; 2020 is now seen as a likely date for service return.

Every few days, more impacts of the now four-month-old grounding become apparent, whether that is new issues found in testing, wince-inducing financial charges - $5.6 billion! - or a record quarterly loss.

Boeing has also revised its timeline for the Max's return, now estimating the grounding will be lifted early in the fourth quarter.

But with each passing month the implications of the crisis have become starker and the narrative open to question

But it warns that any further delays could lead it to halt 737 Max production, a move that would ripple through the industry, affecting Boeing, its supply chain and employees.

This deluge of bad news does not seem to sit well with Gary Kelly, chief executive of top 737 Max customer Southwest Airlines."We're unhappy that it's taken so long… we're in the dark… on technical matters," Kelly told CNBC on 25 July. "We're muddling through."

That same day, Southwest announced plans to end its service to Newark airport near New York because of a capacity shortfall caused by the Max's grounding.

The Max suspension cost Southwest $175 million in the second quarter alone, and will push down the carrier's 2019 capacity by 1-2% year on year. Its plan actually called for growth this year - based on the arrival of 41 more Max aircraft.

Southwest's troubles are the clearest signal yet of the significant impact the 737 Max crisis is having on the airline industry. Yet the outcome of the situation now seems as unclear as ever. Some analysts even question if long delivery delays could enable carriers to cancel Max orders with minimal penalty.

Still, the fact remains that airlines have few options other than the 737 Max - switching to the Airbus A320neo is an option, but those aircraft will not be available for years.

"Nothing to do but wait," says a research update from JPMorgan, which is cold comfort for Boeing's customers.



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Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di Ethiopian

Messaggio da leggereda malpensante » sab 27 lug 2019, 23:30:50

The New York Times

The Roots of Boeing’s 737 Max Crisis: A Regulator Relaxes Its Oversight



SEATTLE — In the days after the first crash of Boeing’s 737 Max, engineers at the Federal Aviation Administration came to a troubling realization: They didn’t fully understand the automated system that helped send the plane into a nose-dive, killing everyone on board.
Engineers at the agency scoured their files for information about the system designed to help avoid stalls. They didn’t find much. Regulators had never independently assessed the risks of the dangerous software known as MCAS when they approved the plane in 2017.
More than a dozen current and former employees at the F.A.A. and Boeing who spoke with The New York Times described a broken regulatory process that effectively neutered the oversight authority of the agency.
The regulator had been passing off routine tasks to manufacturers for years, with the goal of freeing up specialists to focus on the most important safety concerns. But on the Max, the regulator handed nearly complete control to Boeing, leaving some key agency officials in the dark about important systems like MCAS, according to the current and former employees.
While the agency’s flawed oversight of the Boeing 737 Max has attracted much scrutiny since the first crash in October and a second one in March, a Times investigation revealed previously unreported details about weaknesses in the regulatory process that compromised the safety of the plane.
The company performed its own assessments of the system, which were not stress-tested by the regulator. Turnover at the agency left two relatively inexperienced engineers overseeing Boeing’s early work on the system.
The F.A.A. eventually handed over responsibility for approval of MCAS to the manufacturer. After that, Boeing didn’t have to share the details of the system with the two agency engineers. They weren’t aware of its intricacies, according to two people with knowledge of the matter.
Late in the development of the Max, Boeing decided to expand the use of MCAS, to ensure the plane flew smoothly. The new, riskier version relied on a single sensor and could push down the nose of the plane by a much larger amount.
Boeing did not submit a formal review of MCAS after the overhaul. It wasn’t required by F.A.A. rules. An engineering test pilot at the regulator knew about the changes, according to an agency official. But his job was to evaluate the way the plane flew, not to determine the safety of the system.
The agency ultimately certified the jet as safe, required little training for pilots and allowed the plane to keep flying until a second deadly Max crash, less than five months after the first.
The plane remains grounded as regulators await a fix from Boeing. If the ban persists much longer, Boeing said this past week that it could be forced to halt production.
The F.A.A. and Boeing have defended the plane’s certification, saying they followed proper procedures and adhered to the highest standards.
“The agency’s certification processes are well-established and have consistently produced safe aircraft designs,” the regulator said in a statement Friday. “The 737 Max certification program involved 110,000 hours of work on the part of F.A.A. personnel, including flying or supporting 297 test flights.”
Boeing said “the F.A.A.’s rigor and regulatory leadership has driven ever-increasing levels of safety over the decades,” adding that “the 737 Max met the F.A.A.’s stringent standards and requirements as it was certified through the F.A.A.’s processes.”
Federal prosecutors and lawmakers are now investigating whether the regulatory process is fundamentally flawed. As planes become more technologically advanced, the rules, even when they are followed, may not be enough to ensure safety. The new software played a role in both disasters, involving Lion Air and Ethiopian Airlines, which together killed 346 people.
“Did MCAS get the attention it needed? That’s one of the things we’re looking at,” said Chris Hart, the former chairman of the National Transportation Safety Board, who is now leading a multiagency task force investigating how the Max was approved. “As it evolved from a less robust system to a more powerful system, were the certifiers aware of the changes?”
Boeing needed the approval process on the Max to go swiftly. Months behind its rival Airbus, the company was racing to finish the plane, a more fuel-efficient version of its best-selling 737.
The regulator’s hands-off approach was pivotal. At crucial moments in the Max’s development, the agency operated in the background, mainly monitoring Boeing’s progress and checking paperwork. The nation’s largest aerospace manufacturer, Boeing was treated as a client, with F.A.A. officials making decisions based on the company’s deadlines and budget.
It has long been a cozy relationship. Top agency officials have shuffled between the government and the industry.
During the Max certification, senior leaders at the F.A.A. sometimes overruled their own staff members’ recommendations after Boeing pushed back. For safety reasons, many agency engineers wanted Boeing to redesign a pair of cables, part of a major system unrelated to MCAS. The company resisted, and F.A.A. managers took Boeing’s side, according to internal agency documents.
After the crash of the Lion Air plane last October, F.A.A. engineers were shocked to discover they didn’t have a complete analysis of MCAS. The safety review in their files didn’t mention that the system could aggressively push down the nose of the plane and trigger repeatedly, making it difficult to regain control of the aircraft, as it did on the doomed Lion Air flight.
Despite their hazy understanding of the system, F.A.A. officials decided against grounding the 737 Max. Instead, they published a notice reminding pilots of existing emergency procedures.
The notice didn’t describe how MCAS worked. At the last minute, an F.A.A. manager told agency engineers to remove the only mention of the system, according to internal agency documents and two people with knowledge of the matter. Instead, airlines learned about it from Boeing.

‘He really wanted abdication.’

The F.A.A. department that oversaw the Max development had such a singular focus that it was named after the company: The Boeing Aviation Safety Oversight Office.
Many F.A.A. veterans came to see the department, created in 2009, as a symbol of the agency’s close relationship with the manufacturer. The top official in Seattle at the time, Ali Bahrami, had a tough time persuading employees to join, according to three current and former employees.
Some engineers believed that Mr. Bahrami had installed managers in the office who would defer to Boeing. “He didn’t put enough checks and balances in the system,” Mike McRae, a former F.A.A. engineer, said of Mr. Bahrami. “He really wanted abdication. He didn’t want delegation.”
Before the certification of the Max began, Mr. Bahrami called a group of F.A.A. engineers into his office, the current and former employees said, and asked some of them to join the group. Many didn’t want to change jobs, according to a complaint filed by the National Air Traffic Controllers Association, the union representing F.A.A. engineers.
“I got dragged kicking and screaming,” said Richard Reed, a former systems engineer at the F.A.A. Mr. Reed said he had just left surgery when agency officials called to ask whether he would work in the office. “I always claimed that I was on drugs when I said ‘yes.’”
The F.A.A. said in a statement that Mr. Bahrami “dedicated his career to the advancement of aviation safety in both the private and public sectors.”
For decades, the F.A.A. relied on engineers inside Boeing to help certify aircraft. But after intense lobbying by industry, the agency adopted rules in 2005 that would give manufacturers like Boeing even more control. Previously, the agency selected the company engineers to work on its behalf; under the new regulations, Boeing could choose them.
Many of the agency’s top leaders embraced the approach. It would allow the F.A.A. to certify planes more efficiently and stretch its limited resources. The regulator had also been finding it harder to compete for talented engineers, their government salaries unable to keep up with the going rates in the industry.
For Boeing, the changes meant shedding a layer of bureaucracy. “The process was working well,” said Tom Heineman, a retired Boeing engineer who worked on the Max. “The F.A.A. was delegating more of the work and the review and the oversight to the manufacturers than it used to.”
But some F.A.A. engineers were concerned that they were no longer able to effectively monitor what was happening inside Boeing. In a PowerPoint presentation to agency managers in 2016, union representatives raised concerns about a “brain drain” and the “inability to hire and retain qualified personnel.”
By 2018, the F.A.A. was letting the company certify 96 percent of its own work, according to an agency official.
Nicole Potter, an F.A.A. propulsion and fuel systems engineer who worked on the Max, said supervisors repeatedly asked her to give up the right to approve safety documents. She often had to fight to keep the work.
“Leadership was targeting a high level of delegation,” Ms. Potter said. When F.A.A. employees didn’t have time to approve a critical document, she said, “managers could delegate it back to Boeing.”
It was a process Mr. Bahrami championed to lawmakers. After spending more than two decades at the F.A.A., he left the agency in 2013 and took a job at the Aerospace Industries Association, a trade group that represents Boeing and other manufacturers.
“We urge the F.A.A. to allow maximum use of delegation,” Mr. Bahrami told Congress in his new lobbying role, arguing it would help American manufacturers compete.
In 2017, Mr. Bahrami returned to the F.A.A. as the head of safety.

An internal battle at the F.A.A.

With Boeing taking more control, F.A.A. engineers found they had little power, even when they did raise concerns.
Early on, engineers at the F.A.A. discovered a problem with one of the most important new features of the Max: its engines. The Max, the latest version of the 50-year-old 737, featured more fuel-efficient engines, with a larger fan and a high-pressure turbine. But the bigger, more complex engines could do more damage if they broke apart midair.
The F.A.A. engineers were particularly concerned about pieces hitting the cables that control the rudder, according to five people with knowledge of the matter and internal agency documents. A cable severed during takeoff would make it difficult for pilots to regain control, potentially bringing down the jet.
The F.A.A. engineers suggested a couple solutions, three of the people said. The company could add a second set of cables or install a computerized system for controlling the rudder.
Boeing did not want to make a change, according to internal F.A.A. documents reviewed by The Times. A redesign could have caused delays. Company engineers argued that it was unlikely that an engine would break apart and shrapnel would hit the rudder cable.
Most of the F.A.A. engineers working on the issue insisted the change was necessary for safety reasons, according to internal agency emails and documents. But their supervisors balked. In a July 2015 meeting, Jeff Duven, who replaced Mr. Bahrami as the head of the F.A.A.’s Seattle operation, sided with Boeing, said two current employees at the agency.
F.A.A. managers conceded that the Max “does not meet” agency guidelines “for protecting flight controls,” according to an agency document. But in another document, they added that they had to consider whether any requested changes would interfere with Boeing’s timeline. The managers wrote that it would be “impractical at this late point in the program,” for the company to resolve the issue. Mr. Duven at the F.A.A. also said the decision was based on the safety record of the plane.
Engineers at the agency were demoralized, the two agency employees said. One engineer submitted an anonymous complaint to an internal F.A.A. safety board, which was reviewed by The Times.
“During meetings regarding this issue the cost to Boeing to upgrade the design was discussed,” the engineer wrote. “The comment was made that there may be better places for Boeing to spend their safety dollars.”
An F.A.A. panel investigated the complaint. It found managers siding with Boeing had created “an environment of mistrust that hampers the ability of the agency to work effectively,” the panel said in a 2017 report, which was reviewed by The Times. The panel cautioned against allowing Boeing to handle this kind of approval, saying “the company has a vested interest in minimizing costs and schedule impact.”
By then, the panel’s findings were moot. Managers at the agency had already given Boeing the right to approve the cables, and they were installed on the Max.

Playing down risks

In the middle of the Max’s development, two of the most seasoned engineers in the F.A.A.’s Boeing office left.
The engineers, who had a combined 50 years of experience, had joined the office at its creation, taking on responsibility for flight control systems, including MCAS. But they both grew frustrated with the work, which they saw as mostly paper pushing, according to two people with knowledge of the staff changes.
In their place, the F.A.A. appointed an engineer who had little experience in flight controls, and a new hire who had gotten his master’s degree three years earlier. People who worked with the two engineers said they seemed ill-equipped to identify any problems in a complex system like MCAS.
And Boeing played down the importance of MCAS from the outset.
An early review by the company didn’t consider the system risky, and it didn’t prompt additional scrutiny from the F.A.A. engineers, according to two agency officials. The review described a system that would activate only in rare situations, when a plane was making a sharp turn at high speeds.
The F.A.A. engineers who had been overseeing MCAS never received another safety assessment. As Boeing raced to finish the Max in 2016, agency managers gave the company the power to approve a batch of safety assessments — some of the most important documents in any certification. They believed the issues were low risk.
One of the managers, Julie Alger, delegated the review of MCAS. Previously, the F.A.A. had the final say over the system.
The F.A.A. said that decision reflected the consensus of the team.
Boeing was in the middle of overhauling MCAS. To help pilots control the plane and avoid a stall, the company allowed MCAS to trigger at low speeds, rather than just at high speeds. The overhauled version would move the stabilizer by as much as 2.5 degrees each time it triggered, significantly pushing down the nose of the plane. The earlier version moved the stabilizer by 0.6 degrees.
When company engineers analyzed the change, they figured that the system had not become any riskier, according to two people familiar with Boeing’s discussions on the matter. They assumed that pilots would respond to a malfunction in three seconds, quickly bringing the nose of the plane back up. In their view, any problems would be less dangerous at low speeds.
So the company never submitted an updated safety assessment of those changes to the agency. In several briefings in 2016, an F.A.A. test pilot learned the details of the system from Boeing. But the two F.A.A. engineers didn’t understand that MCAS could move the tail as much as 2.5 degrees, according to two people familiar with their thinking.
Under the impression the system was insignificant, officials didn’t require Boeing to tell pilots about MCAS. When the company asked to remove mention of MCAS from the pilot’s manual, the agency agreed. The F.A.A. also did not mention the software in 30 pages of detailed descriptions noting differences between the Max and the previous iteration of the 737.
Days after the Lion Air crash, the agency invited Boeing executives to the F.A.A.’s Seattle headquarters, according to two people with knowledge of the matter. The officials sat incredulous as Boeing executives explained details about the system that they didn’t know.
In the middle of the conversation, an F.A.A. employee, one of the people said, interrupted to ask a question on the minds of several agency engineers: Why hadn’t Boeing updated the safety analysis of a system that had become so dangerous?


The reporters on this article can be reached at Natalie.Kitroeff@nytimes.com, David.Gelles@nytimes.com and Jack.Nicas@nytimes.com.

Natalie Kitroeff and Jack Nicas reported
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Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di Ethiopian

Messaggio da leggereda kco » lun 29 lug 2019, 08:36:36

Da copia di flight international in mio possesso

Beleaguered Boeing is battling trouble on two fronts, with its 737 Max still grounded - and potentially facing a production shutdown - while engine issues are threatening the schedule of its vital 777X programme.

The latest woes - on top of the 18 July announcement of a $5.6 billion charge related to the Max grounding - were revealed as the manufacturer released a painful set of second-quarter results on 24 July.

Although the Chicago-headquartered airframer is working under the assumption that regulators will begin lifting the grounding of the embattled 737 Max in the fourth quarter of 2019, should this schedule slip, then more drastic action could be required.

"Should our estimate of the anticipated return to service change, we might need to consider possible further rate reductions and other options, including a temporary shutdown of the Max production," said Boeing chief executive Dennis Muilenburg during a second-quarter earnings call.

REVENUE HIT

The grounding has hammered Boeing's financial performance: the $5.6 billion charge against revenue reflects the expected impact, over several years, of concessions the airframer will make to customers in respect of 737 Max delivery delays.

Boeing has also tacked on $2.7 billion to the 737 Max's programme cost, with that amount to be spread over deliveries of 3,100 aircraft, Muilenburg says.

On the back of the charge, second-quarter revenue sank 35% year on year, to $15.8 billion, resulting in a net loss of $2.9 billion - its largest ever quarterly loss - against a net profit of $2.2 billion in the same period in 2018.

Boeing Commercial Airplanes posted an operating loss of $4.9 billion, reversing a $1.8 billion operating profit for the same period last year. Commercial aircraft revenue showed a 66% year-on-year fall, to $4.7 billion.

Although Boeing's services and defence units turned in robust performances - combined operating profit stood at $1.66 billion - these were dwarfed by the repercussions of the Max grounding.

Boeing says it had hoped regulators would have already lifted the flight suspension, which took effect in March following the fatal crash of a 737-8 operated by Ethiopian Airlines.

But in June, the US Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) announced that it had discovered a data-processing issue in the 737 Max's flight computer, creating further delays to the resumption of flights.

Boeing now expects to complete certification flights and deliver a final software package to regulators in the "September timeframe", says Muilenburg.

Regulators will then likely need several weeks to review the data, resulting in a "return to service early in the fourth quarter", he says. "If that timeline changes significantly, we will have to evaluate these other scenarios."

Boeing has already reduced 737 production following the grounding, from 52 to 42 aircraft per month, and it hopes to maintain the 42-per-month rate until the suspension lifts, increasing production again to 57 aircraft per month in 2020. But doubts have already surfaced over whether the Max will be flying again before next year.

"We might need to consider possible further rate reductions and other options" Dennis Muilenburg, chief executive, Boeing

In addition, Muilenburg suggests some regulators may mandate pilots to complete 737 Max simulator training, a requirement some observers suggest could create further delays owing to the limited number of such training devices.

"There will likely be some selective use of simulator training," says Muilenburg. "Some airlines will use simulator training as part of their recurring training. Some may want training up front before they fully return the fleet to service."

Additionally, Boeing has developed a "comprehensive set of computer-based training modules", Muilenburg says.

But the company's current troubles do not end with the 737 Max: after maintaining that development difficulties with the GE Aviation GE9X engine would not prevent a maiden sortie of the 777X this year, that milestone has now shifted into 2020.

"The GE9X engine remains the pacing item as we work toward first flight," Muilenburg says. "GE is working through some challenges with the engine that are putting risk on the overall test schedule."

Boeing is still holding to its target of deliveries beginning in 2020, but analysts have doubts that can be achieved.

"This seems highly unlikely," says a 24 July report from JPMorgan. "We are not surprised to see the 777X slip."

In response to the 777X delay, Muilenburg says Boeing intends in 2020 to produce more current-generation 777 Freighters.

LAUNCH STUDIES 

Meanwhile, Boeing's conceptual New Mid-market Airplane (NMA) remains under study but secondary to the 737 Max effort.

"We continue to have a dedicated team that's working on NMA," Muilenburg says. "In terms of real priorities, it's clear that our top priority is getting the 737 Max returned to service safely."

The decision to launch the NMA will rest partly on Boeing's ability to squeeze more cost out of its production system, Muilenburg says. To that end, the airframer is spending on technologies such as "model-based engineering" - systems that help to better integrate development teams and the entire development process.

"We are investing significantly in improving development programme performance," Muilenburg says. "Our confidence in… those new tools and the ability to implement them at scale on a development programme will be part of the decision process."



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Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di Ethiopian

Messaggio da leggereda kco » lun 29 lug 2019, 08:39:43

Ciò è quello che pensa PW su una nuova generazione di NB

we are going to continue to invest in the GTF technology so that we are ready for the next-generation single-aisle, which we don't really think will get launched until probably 2025

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Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di Ethiopian

Messaggio da leggereda kco » lun 29 lug 2019, 20:59:14

https://www.flightglobal.com/news/artic ... f216589936

Mol si scalda

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kco
Messaggi: 4552
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Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di Ethiopian

Messaggio da leggereda kco » ven 02 ago 2019, 20:44:04

https://www.seattletimes.com/business/b ... ssion=true

Non l ho ancora letto ma mi sembrava significativo

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easyMXP
Messaggi: 4217
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Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di Ethiopian

Messaggio da leggereda easyMXP » ven 02 ago 2019, 21:44:31

kco ha scritto:https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/newly-stringent-faa-tests-spur-a-fundamental-software-redesign-of-737-max-flight-controls/?amp=1&utm_source=twitter&utm_medium=social&utm_campaign=article_inset_1.1&__twitter_impression=true

Non l ho ancora letto ma mi sembrava significativo

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Molto interessante.

Sono passati da un eccesso all'altro, dal minimizzare i rischi a provare scenari teorici non credibili per verificare di tutto e di più.

Con un cambio così profondo della logica di controllo non vedo probabile un ritorno al volo quest'anno, per la quantità di scenari da provare per verificare che fail-safe sia veramente fail-safe, e relativi report da controllare da parte di una dozzina di agenzie in giro per il mondo.

kco
Messaggi: 4552
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Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di Ethiopian

Messaggio da leggereda kco » lun 05 ago 2019, 09:13:08

https://www.postandcourier.com/business ... d055e.html

Altre grane per Boeing

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malpensante
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Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di Ethiopian

Messaggio da leggereda malpensante » lun 05 ago 2019, 12:11:58

Brutta storia.
And Malpensa is going to be our Hub

kco
Messaggi: 4552
Iscritto il: sab 05 gen 2008, 09:01:18

Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di Ethiopian

Messaggio da leggereda kco » mar 06 ago 2019, 20:40:27

https://www.flightglobal.com/news/artic ... im-460071/

Un'idea sull' impatto del grounding del max su una relativamente piccola compagnia

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kco
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Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di Ethiopian

Messaggio da leggereda kco » ven 09 ago 2019, 19:15:54

Da copia di flight international in mio possesso


Boeing's chief executive has reiterated his expectation that the company will deliver the 737 Max's updated software to the US Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) next month, which should enable regulators to lift the grounding by year-end.

"We are working through a software update," Dennis Muilenburg told investors on 7 August. "We still anticipate submitting that certification package to the FAA in the September timeframe... and are working toward a return to service of the Max in the fourth quarter."

Muilenburg's comments came nearly three weeks after the Chicago company disclosed that timeline, which led several airlines to again re-evaluate the anticipated service-return date for the Max: some do not expect to restart scheduled flying before January.

Muilenburg stresses that approval remains in the regulators' hands. But he sought to reassure investors that Boeing is doing all it can to achieve that timeline and to ensure that, when the grounding is lifted, the aircraft returns to operation as smoothly as possible.

In addition to tweaking the 737 Max's flight-control software, Boeing has been holding meetings, including simulator sessions, with customers for the re-engined twinjet, Muilenburg says.

The company has also been developing new training materials and completing "preservation" work intended to help ensure stored 737s are ready for quick deployment into airline flying.

Regulators initially grounded the 737 Max due to concerns over the role that the aircraft's Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System played in two crashes.

But in June the FAA discovered a data processing issue that required Boeing to complete additional rework.



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C-ALEX
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Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di Ethiopian

Messaggio da leggereda C-ALEX » mar 13 ago 2019, 18:35:49

cercavo news sul 737 MAX ed ho trovato che è stato nominato nuovo amministratore FAA che ribadisce che non c'è la data di rientro in servizio del 737 MAX.
A settembre Boeing rilascia il pacchetto software per correggere il problema del "speed trim" (cosa è ?)


New FAA administrator says there is no timeline for the 737 MAX's return to service

https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/faa-adm ... d=64932657

la notizia è riportata da varie testate americane

kco
Messaggi: 4552
Iscritto il: sab 05 gen 2008, 09:01:18

Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di Ethiopian

Messaggio da leggereda kco » ven 23 ago 2019, 17:59:55

https://www.seattletimes.com/business/b ... ssion=true

Forse ci avviciniamo al rientro

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I-GABE
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Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di Ethiopian

Messaggio da leggereda I-GABE » ven 23 ago 2019, 18:29:40

Chissa' se a questo punto IG li rimettera' in servizio o no...
Una volta avuto il via libera dalla FAA, sara' difficile per le varie aerolinee e per le societa' di leasing rifiutare le consegne, mi sa.

kco
Messaggi: 4552
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Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di Ethiopian

Messaggio da leggereda kco » gio 05 set 2019, 16:59:20

https://www.seattletimes.com/business/b ... ssion=true

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Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di Ethiopian

Messaggio da leggereda malpensante » gio 05 set 2019, 18:30:14

Campa cavallo
And Malpensa is going to be our Hub

kco
Messaggi: 4552
Iscritto il: sab 05 gen 2008, 09:01:18

Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di Ethiopian

Messaggio da leggereda kco » lun 09 set 2019, 08:39:02

Da copia di flight international in mio possesso

An international panel of safety technicians will take additional time in its review of how the US Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) granted airworthiness for the Boeing 737 Max, including the agency's decision to allow the airframer to oversee parts of its own certification.

The Joint Authorities Technical Review (JATR) panel "expects to submit its observations, findings and recommendations in the coming weeks", the FAA confirmed on 30 August. "The JATR's focus on the certification of the aircraft is separate from the ongoing efforts to safely return the aircraft to flight," it adds.

RULE CHANGE

The panel's recommendations could affect the future of how the FAA conducts safety certification, and potentially also influence how soon regulators from other nations will return the aircraft to service once a global grounding order in place since March is lifted.

New FAA certification of the Max does not require the panel to first finish its review and Boeing is still aiming for the agency to clear the aircraft to resume operations during the fourth quarter.

Boeing is co-ordinating with the FAA on software modifications and safety training for pilots related to the automated flight controls unique compared with the earlier-generation 737NG, known as the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS). FAA safety technicians in June discovered a data processing issue with the aircraft separate from MCAS.

"Work is progressing on software to address the additional requirement identified by the FAA on 26 June, which will be submitted for certification with the main MCAS software package that is already complete," Boeing says.

The consistent message from the FAA during the review period since March is that it "is following a thorough process, not a prescribed timeline, for returning the 737 Max to passenger service".

ONGOING DISRUPTION

Most operators have extended cancellations of originally planned flights with the 737 Max until the end of 2019, with United Airlines on 30 August pushing its schedule for services involving the type back by a further six weeks, until 19 December.

Formed after two fatal crashes of 737 Max 8s spurred a worldwide grounding, the JATR panel includes safety technicians from nine nations, along with representatives from the FAA and NASA. Its chairman is Christopher Hart, the former chair of the US National Transportation Safety Board.

Safety research by the panel has included discussions about the 737 Max design, certification, regulations, compliance and training, and activities of the FAA's Organisation Designation Authorisation certification process.

Lawmakers and families of the 346 people killed in the crashes have questioned the FAA process that gave Boeing authority to oversee part of its own safety certification for the Max.

"While the agency's certification processes are well established and have consistently produced safe aircraft designs, we welcome the scrutiny from these experts and look forward to their findings," the FAA says.

Investigations into the losses of Lion Air flight 610 and Ethiopian Airlines flight 302 are ongoing, but evidence indicates that the MCAS automatically trimmed the aircraft into uncontrollable dives.



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kco
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Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di Ethiopian

Messaggio da leggereda kco » mar 10 set 2019, 13:10:36

https://samchui.com/2019/09/09/former-b ... XeEdB6pU0N

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