Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di ET, conseguenze sul mezzo e sul mercato

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KittyHawk
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Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di ET, conseguenze sul mezzo e sul mercato

Messaggio da leggereda KittyHawk » mar 08 ott 2019, 14:02:15

Per chi fosse interessato, è disponibile in rete la querela dei piloti di Southwest contro Boeing per ottenere un risarcimento dei danni da loro subiti a causa della messa a terra del MAX. Tralasciando la parte economica, di secondaria importanza, è invece interessante l'intera disanima dei motivi per cui Boeing è colpevole e dovrebbe essere condannata (progetto, false informazioni etc.).

https://swaparesources.s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/assets/pdf/Communication/Complaint_Against_Boeing_(2).pdf

kco
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Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di ET, conseguenze sul mezzo e sul mercato

Messaggio da leggereda kco » mar 08 ott 2019, 18:03:34

Da copia di flight international in mio possesso

Potential implications of the Boeing 737 Max grounding on future values of the aircraft topped the agenda for the appraiser panel at the ISTAT EMEA conference in Berlin on 25 September. 

The consensus was that it would be premature to draw any conclusions about the potential long-term effects of the grounding, which has so far lasted six months.

Olga Razzhivina, senior ISTAT appraiser with aviation consultancy Oriel, argues that, prior to the grounding, the value perception of the Max was already less rosy than that of its predecessor, the market-leading 737-800.

Razzhivina says the Max is “not exactly a mirror image” of the 737NG, and the changes Boeing had to make to integrate the CFM International Leap-1B engines, in her view, “compromised” the re‑engined variant. 

“And we did not have as strong a view of Max 8 [values] as a 737-800 to start with,” says Razzhivina. “However, there is no other choice for Max operators so they will have to stick with it.

“The big question is whether the ensuing technical fixes and regulatory uncertainty have pushed Boeing far enough to curtail the Max and develop an all‑new single-aisle, which obviously wouldn’t help the value retention of the aircraft.”



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kco
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Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di ET, conseguenze sul mezzo e sul mercato

Messaggio da leggereda kco » mar 08 ott 2019, 18:07:35

https://www.flightglobal.com/news/artic ... es-461325/


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malpensante
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Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di ET, conseguenze sul mezzo e sul mercato

Messaggio da leggereda malpensante » sab 12 ott 2019, 11:21:51

Boeing and F.A.A. Faulted in Damning Report on 737 Max Certification


A breakdown in the nation’s regulatory system and poor communication from Boeing compromised the safety of the 737 Max jet before it crashed twice in five months and killed 346 people, according to a damning report released Friday.
Boeing did not adequately explain to federal regulators how a crucial new system on the plane worked, the report says. That system was found to have played a role in the accidents in Indonesia last October and Ethiopia in March.
The Federal Aviation Administration relied heavily on Boeing employees to vouch for the safety of the Max and lacked the ability to effectively analyze much of what Boeing did share about the new plane, according to the report by a multiagency task force. The system of delegation is now being scrutinized by lawmakers in the wake of the tragedies.
Boeing employees who worked on behalf of the F.A.A. faced “undue pressures” at times during the plane’s development because of “conflicting priorities,” according to the report.
“This report confirms our very worst fears about a broken system,” Senator Richard Blumenthal, Democrat of Connecticut, said in an interview. “To put the fox in charge of the henhouse never made any sense, and now we see the deeply tragic consequences.”
Hours after the report was released, Boeing’s board stripped the company’s chief executive, Dennis A. Muilenburg, of his chairman title. The move was the most direct response yet from a board that has resisted shaking up the management team before the Max is flying again, even as pressure mounted inside Boeing to hold someone accountable. The Max has been grounded for more than seven months.
Removing Mr. Muilenburg from his seat as chairman will give the board more independence from management. The board elevated David L. Calhoun, the lead independent director, to serve as chairman. Mr. Calhoun said in a statement that “the board has full confidence in Dennis as C.E.O.”
Friday’s report, which was put together by representatives of the Federal Aviation Administration, NASA and nine international regulators, provided the first official detailed account of how federal regulators certified the Max. Lawmakers and federal investigators are still conducting their own inquiries into the design and approval of the jet.
The review scrutinized the F.A.A.’s certification of the Max’s flight control system, including the new automated system, MCAS, which played a role in both crashes.
The report found that while the F.A.A. had been made aware of MCAS, “the information and discussions about MCAS were so fragmented and were delivered to disconnected groups” that it “was difficult to recognize the impacts and implications of this system.”
The task force said it believed that if F.A.A. technical staff had been fully aware of the details of MCAS, the agency would probably have required additional scrutiny of the system that might have identified its flaws.
In each crash, pilots struggled as a single damaged sensor sent the plane into an irrecoverable nose-dive within minutes of takeoff. Regulators around the world grounded the Max after the second accident. Boeing is working on a software fix, and there is no timetable for when regulators will allow the aircraft to return to service.
The task force recommended that the F.A.A. review staffing levels at its Boeing office in Seattle and review the Boeing office that allows company employees to perform certification work.
Boeing is now updating the system to make it less powerful, and it says it will install a modified version when the Max returns to service.
The F.A.A.’s administrator, Steve Dickson, said in a statement that he would “review every recommendation and take appropriate action.”
“We welcome this scrutiny and are confident that our openness to these efforts will further bolster aviation safety worldwide,” he added.
In a statement, the Boeing spokesman Gordon Johndroe said, “Safety is a core value for everyone at Boeing.” The company, he added, “is committed to working with the F.A.A. in reviewing the recommendations and helping to continuously improve the process and approach used to validate and certify airplanes going forward.”
The Joint Authorities Technical Review, which produced the report, was led by Chris Hart, a former chairman of the National Transportation Safety Board, and included aviation regulators from Europe, China, Brazil and other countries. To conduct the review, Mr. Hart and his team were briefed by F.A.A. officials and Boeing executives, and they scrutinized extensive documentation on the certification of the Max.
A broad theme of the report is that the F.A.A. was too focused on the specifics of the new system and did not put sufficient effort into understanding its overall impact on the plane. In certification documents that Boeing submitted to the F.A.A., MCAS was not evaluated as “a complete and integrated function.”
The report also said Boeing had failed to inform the F.A.A. as the design of MCAS changed during the plane’s development. A New York Times investigation revealed that the system changed significantly during that process, making MCAS riskier and more powerful, and that key F.A.A. officials in charge of reviewing it were inexperienced or unaware of the overhaul.
The task force said the certification documents that Boeing had provided to the F.A.A. “were not updated during the certification program to reflect the changes” made to MCAS. It added that two critical documents that describe the potential dangers of a system like MCAS, the system safety assessment and the functional hazard assessment, “were not consistently updated.”
Boeing also failed to thoroughly stress-test the design of MCAS, according to the report, which found that “the design assumptions were not adequately reviewed, updated or validated.”
In addition, the report criticized Boeing for not adequately assessing the extra effort that pilots might have to make to deal with MCAS, and it noted that Boeing had removed mention of MCAS from a draft of the pilot’s manual. As a result of that decision, some key F.A.A. officials were not fully aware of MCAS and were “not in a position to adequately assess training needs,” the report found.
To address some of these shortcomings, the report recommends that the F.A.A. update the certification process to allow the agency to be more involved early on.
The Max was certified in 2017 as the latest version of the 737 family. Because it was based on a well-known design, the F.A.A. allowed it to undergo a less thorough certification process than if it were an entirely new plane.
“Some elements of the design and certification remain rooted in the original 1967 certification of the B737-100,” the review found. But while some modern safety tools have been incorporated into new versions of the 737, others were not included in the Max because they were deemed “impractical,” the review found.
Over all, the report found fault with the process for certifying a new plane based on an old design, saying it “lacks an adequate assessment of how proposed design changes integrate with existing systems.”
It recommended that the F.A.A. confirm that the Max is in fact compliant with regulations having to do with the plane’s flight guidance system, flight manual and stall demonstration.
Those recommendations, which could affect whether the plane is allowed back into service, have already been addressed by the F.A.A., according to a person familiar with the process. The effort to address those issues has contributed to the prolonged grounding of the Max.
In both of the flights that crashed, the pilots had a hard time identifying the cause of the problems and were unable to bring the planes under control.
The review found that the F.A.A. certification process had failed to adequately consider “pilot recognition time and pilot reaction time to failures.” In particular, the review suggested that the F.A.A. question Boeing’s assumption that pilots could react to a malfunction similar to the one caused by MCAS in just four seconds.
One source of the problems with the certification of the Max was the F.A.A. office in Seattle that oversees Boeing, according to the report. It found that the Boeing office had “limited experience and knowledge of key technical aspects” of the Max.
In the end, the F.A.A. was simply unable to effectively assess MCAS, the review found.
“The F.A.A. had inadequate awareness of the MCAS function,” which meant that the agency could not adequately assess Boeing’s certification of the system, the report found.


https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/11/busi ... 7-max.html
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kco
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Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di ET, conseguenze sul mezzo e sul mercato

Messaggio da leggereda kco » sab 12 ott 2019, 17:44:31

Forse per ET è troppo ritornare con il 737max.

https://airlinegeeks.com/2019/10/09/eth ... place-max/


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Mattia
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Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di ET, conseguenze sul mezzo e sul mercato

Messaggio da leggereda Mattia » mar 15 ott 2019, 17:42:55

Non c’entra col Max ma con gli A220. Swiss mette a terrà tutti gli A220 per problemi al motore, torneranno a volare dopo approfondita ispezione.

https://www.cdt.ch/svizzera/cronaca/swi ... -GK1914091

kco
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Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di ET, conseguenze sul mezzo e sul mercato

Messaggio da leggereda kco » lun 21 ott 2019, 18:00:37

https://www.seattletimes.com/business/b ... ssion=true

Ulteriori polemiche infuriano

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kco
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Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di ET, conseguenze sul mezzo e sul mercato

Messaggio da leggereda kco » lun 21 ott 2019, 18:04:08

https://www.flightglobal.com/news/artic ... ai-461602/

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kco
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Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di ET, conseguenze sul mezzo e sul mercato

Messaggio da leggereda kco » lun 21 ott 2019, 18:22:51

E siamo a febbraio...

https://www.flightglobal.com/news/artic ... ry-461568/

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malpensante
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Messaggio da leggereda malpensante » mer 23 ott 2019, 00:49:59

Kevin McAllister ousted as boss of Boeing
Commercial Airplanes as 737 MAX crisis continues

Oct. 22, 2019 at 1:20 pm Updated Oct. 22, 2019 at 3:24 pm

By Dominic Gates and Steve Miletich

The first Boeing executive head to roll as a result of the ongoing 737 MAX crisis is that of Kevin McAllister. The Boeing board decided to fire him as boss of Boeing Commercial Airplanes at a board meeting Monday in San Antonio.

McAllister was replaced immediately by Stan Deal, chief executive of Boeing’s services division and formerly a longtime executive within the Seattle-area commercial jet division. On Tuesday at the division’s headquarters at Longacres, where the move came as a surprise, Deal was already installed.

A senior Boeing executive with knowledge of the deliberations, who asked for anonymity because of the sensitivity of the issues, said the reason for McAllister’s firing was not the MAX alone but a combination of a lot of negative developments “on his watch.”

These included the 777X engine problems that have pushed first flight into next year and the recent blowout of a door that happened during ground testing of that jet. Another factor, the senior executive said, was this month’s discovery in older 737s of cracks in the so-called “pickle fork” structure connecting the wings to the fuselage. And the shrinking backlog of the 787 Dreamliner is also a concern.

But the major issue has been the grounding of the 737 MAX and the constant pushing out of its return to service as Boeing has struggled to meet the demands of international regulators. As a result, Boeing stock has lost one fifth of its value since the second MAX crash in March.

When McAllister arrived at Boeing exactly three years ago, his immediate priority was to work toward the launch of the jetmaker’s next all-new airplane that was to become the 797. On the drawing board was a concept called the New Midmarket Airplane (NMA), a jet with a size and range in between the single-aisle 737 and the twin-aisle 787 Dreamliner.

Also of prime importance was to get the new 777X in the air, flight tested and delivered to customers.

Those ambitions are derailed. The 777X is delayed. Sales of the smaller model, the 777-8X, have not materialized and production of that model has been pushed out. Meanwhile, it’s possible launch customer Emirates may cancel some of its large 777X order next month at the Dubai Air Show.

The MAX crisis has also pushed the NMA decision into the future and Deal may have to radically revise that product strategy after the MAX crisis ends.

McAllister, 56, originally a materials engineer, joined Boeing in 2016 after he’d spent 28 years at GE. He was the first outsider appointed to lead Boeing’s commercial jet division. Boeing executives who had worked with him at GE knew him as less a people person than “a math guy” who made decisions after carefully running the numbers.

Since the crash of a Lion Air 737 MAX a year ago initiated the crisis that led in March to the grounding of the worldwide fleet, McAllister’s boss in Chicago, Dennis Muilenburg, has taken the lead on all public statements about the MAX and McAllister has said remarkably little in public.

One of his few comments came in an email to the Seattle Times ahead of the Paris Air Show in June, when he said he was going through “the most trying time I have encountered in 30-plus years in this industry.”

On Tuesday, Muilenburg said in a statement, “We’re grateful to Kevin for his dedicated and tireless service to Boeing, its customers and its communities during a challenging time, and for his commitment to support this transition.”

And David Calhoun, who took over as Boeing chairman when the board stripped Muilenburg of that role this month, said “the Boeing board fully supports these leadership moves.”

“Boeing will emerge stronger than ever from its current challenges and the changes we’re making throughout Boeing will benefit the flying public well into the future,” Calhoun said.

In a parting message in the press release, McAllister said, “Boeing is a great company with a commitment to safety I have seen firsthand.”

Ted Colbert, who was Boeing’s chief information officer and led the company’s IT infrastructure, takes over from Deal as head of Boeing Global Services. Vishwa Uddanwadiker was appointed to Colbert’s former role as interim chief information officer.

In Boeing’s annual financial filing listing executive compensation in March, McAllister, though head of the division that pulled in two thirds of total company profits, did not make the top five of the most highly paid executives and so his compensation was not listed.

A filing at the end of February showed McAllister then owned 125,595 Boeing shares, worth today more than $42 million. However, 100,000 of those shares awarded to him when he joined the company are not yet vested. Boeing did not disclose the financial terms of his departure or whether he would retain those shares.

McAllister’s may not be the last Boeing head to roll as a result of the MAX crisis. CEO Muilenburg is under intense scrutiny and the senior executive said his performance when he testifies before Congress on Oct. 30 will be pivotal in determining his future.

In that testimony, Muilenburg expects to affirm the MAX’s return to service before year end, the executive said.


https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/kevin-mcallister-ousted-as-boss-of-boeing-commercial-airplanes-as-737-max-crisis-continues/
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mattaus313
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Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di ET, conseguenze sul mezzo e sul mercato

Messaggio da leggereda mattaus313 » mer 23 ott 2019, 08:28:22

Iniziano a saltare teste importanti? Libero, se parlasse di aviazione, l'avrebbe intitolato "mamma ho perso gli aerei"
"Because you needed a lot of capital in an airline, you needed to be where the financial markets were, and obviously that's New York"

kco
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Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di ET, conseguenze sul mezzo e sul mercato

Messaggio da leggereda kco » lun 28 ott 2019, 08:35:29

https://www.seattletimes.com/business/b ... ssion=true

IL sistema delle deleghe finisce sotto inchiesta

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kco
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Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di ET, conseguenze sul mezzo e sul mercato

Messaggio da leggereda kco » mar 29 ott 2019, 07:44:21

https://www.flightglobal.com/news/artic ... fe-461836/

E Icelandair non prevede il ritorno del max prima di marzo...

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mxp98
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Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di ET, conseguenze sul mezzo e sul mercato

Messaggio da leggereda mxp98 » mar 29 ott 2019, 14:26:08

Marco
Linate è comodo però Malpensa è utile
The engine is the heart of an airplane but the pilot is its soul.

kco
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Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di ET, conseguenze sul mezzo e sul mercato

Messaggio da leggereda kco » mer 30 ott 2019, 17:34:58

https://www.seattletimes.com/business/b ... ssion=true

Muilenburg passa in senato...

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Leoo
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Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di ET, conseguenze sul mezzo e sul mercato

Messaggio da leggereda Leoo » ven 01 nov 2019, 11:15:57


kco
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Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di ET, conseguenze sul mezzo e sul mercato

Messaggio da leggereda kco » sab 02 nov 2019, 11:22:44

Da copia di flight international in mio possesso

Hours after the Indonesian inquiry into Lion Air's fatal Boeing 737 Max crash published its sobering findings, the US Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) reassured that it was reviewing the proposed changes to the embattled twinjet's design.

"The aircraft will return to service only after the FAA determines it is safe," insisted the regulator, omitting any reference to the fact that it was supposed to have ensured this very thing before the aircraft was ever delivered to Lion Air or, for that matter, Ethiopian Airlines.

Quite what the FAA means by “safe” – given that safe is not an absolute, but rather a highly-subjective, term – is open to interpretation. The FAA was the last authority to ground the 737 Max, precisely because such a drastic decision immediately left it vulnerable to the charge that it had no faith in its own certification processes.

The overriding conclusion from the Lion Air investigation is not that Boeing built an unsafe aircraft, but rather that safety is not a fixed and clearly-defined characteristic, and is instead subject to caveats, qualification, and small print.

Two fatal Max accidents inevitably cast Boeing in the role of insensitive corporate villain, and social media commentators have not been kind to those who might dare to suggest that, as with most accidents, this view is too simplistic.

The inquiry has highlighted the complexity of the situation, criticising – quite reasonably – Boeing's methodology, procedures and design philosophy.

“The overriding conclusion from the Lion Air investigation is not that Boeing built an unsafe aircraft, but rather that safety is not a fixed and clearly-defined characteristic”

But it also questions whether assumptions over pilot competence and skill are over-optimistic, which needs to be taken in the context of an industry already worried about erosion of pilots' capabilities and whether rapidly-expanding airlines are hiring crews with sufficient experience.

Two crews of the same airline, flying the same aircraft, reacting to the same flaw, experienced vastly different outcomes. While scrutiny of the controversial Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS) has, justifiably and understandably, taken up much of the column-inches, the inquiry detailed a series of dropped catches that, like it or not, was not exclusively confined to Seattle.

The investigation into the Ethiopian accident is likely to throw up many of the same findings as the Lion Air probe, but will need to explain whether there were opportunities, on all sides, in the aftermath of the Lion crash, to prevent a repetition.

Boeing's revision of the 737 Max design will doubtless address some of the weaknesses in the aircraft. But MCAS is only one part of the system. Certification processes are the closest thing the air transport industry has to a way of defining “safe”, but the term is nevertheless misleading. Safety remains a relative concept.



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kco
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Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di ET, conseguenze sul mezzo e sul mercato

Messaggio da leggereda kco » dom 03 nov 2019, 12:03:44

Da copia di flight international in mio possesso

Indonesian accident investigators have uncovered numerous failings relating to the design and operation of the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS) on the Boeing 737 Max, as well as operational deficiencies at Lion Air, which contributed to the 29 October 2018 fatal crash of the re-engined narrowbody.

A total of 189 passengers and crew died when the 737-8 (PK-LQP), operating as Lion Air flight 610, plunged into the Java Sea off Jakarta after a faulty angle-of-attack sensor caused erroneous activation of MCAS, repeatedly pushing the aircraft’s nose down. Incorrect pilot responses to the issue eventually resulted in a loss of control of the aircraft, with it ultimately descending at a rate of 10,000ft/min.

Investigators from Indonesia’s National Transportation Safety Committee (NTSC) found that:

Boeing’s testing and development of MCAS was based on a flawed conception of how pilots would respond to an uncommanded activation. 

Airframer incorrectly predicted how flightcrew would deal with the issue in a real-world situation. 

In addition, the system repeatedly operated, contrary to Boeing’s expectations based on its believed crew response.

The crew of the ill-fated flight were not informed that the pilots of the inbound flight to Jakarta had experienced severe control issues with the aircraft. 

Although a faulty angle-of-attack sensor had been replaced the day before the accident, it was unclear whether adequate testing of the new unit was carried out prior to the 737-8 being cleared for service.  

And while the new left-hand sensor was misaligned by 21°, the pilots would not have known about the sensor disagreement as Lion Air had not specified an optional angle-of-attack indicator on the jet. 

Additionally, the flightcrew were not aware of the existence of MCAS and how it operated.

“Without understanding of MCAS and reactivation after release the electric trim, the flightcrew was running out of time to find a solution before the repetitive MCAS activations without fully retrimming the aircraft placed the aircraft into in an extreme nose-down attitude that the flightcrew was unable to recover from,” says the NTSC.

Analysis of the flight-data revealed that during the final phase of the flight recorder as the “aircraft descended and could not be controlled” the pilots pulled back on the control column with forces exceeding 100lb (45kg) – more than the 75lb limit. 

“Pulling back on the column normally interrupts any electric stabiliser aircraft nose-down command, but for the 737-8 with MCAS operating, that control column cutout function is disabled,” says the report. 

Subsequently, the US Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) revoked the repair station licence held by Xtra Aerospace, the Florida firm that previously repaired the angle-of-attack sensor installed on the aircraft. 

The FAA ordered that the repair shop's licence be pulled on 25 October. Although the move came in the wake of the NTSC report which concluded that the sensor was “most likely improperly calibrated at Xtra”, the licence revocation is not directly linked to the Lion Air crash. 

"The FAA’s enforcement action is separate from the [NTSC's] investigation and report of the Lion Air Boeing 737 Max accident and is not an indication that Xtra was responsible for the accident," the maintenance firm adds.

Xtra repaired the sensor in October 2017, returning it for service the following month. 

The FAA says it started investigating Xtra in November 2018, looking "specifically at the company's compliance with regulatory requirements… and records and work orders for aircraft parts it approved for return to service".



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kco
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Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di ET, conseguenze sul mezzo e sul mercato

Messaggio da leggereda kco » dom 03 nov 2019, 12:41:06

Post-crash analysis of the fatal Lion Air Boeing 737 Max flight from Jakarta sharply illustrated the contrast between a real-world cockpit and the scenario Boeing used when testing crew response to the aircraft's Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS).

Indonesia’s NTSC investigation authority says Boeing's preliminary hazard assessment of MCAS, carried out on a full-flight simulator in 2012, examined crew responses to uncommanded MCAS activation "regardless of underlying cause".

This focus on the pilots' response to MCAS – rather than the reason MCAS might be triggered – meant that specific failure modes "were not simulated", says the inquiry, and therefore neither were the cockpit effects of those failure modes.

NTSC says a failure such as erroneous angle-of-attack sensor data, leading to unreliable airspeed alerts, stick-shaker activation, and other alarms in the cockpit were not part of the simulation.

Boeing concentrated on two particular uncommanded MCAS hazards: operation to MCAS's maximum authority of 0.6° nose-down stabiliser, and an MCAS activation which equated to a 3s stabiliser trim runaway.

It simulated the MCAS function by inducing stabiliser movement, which created increased control-column forces, indications of nose-down movement, and activation of the stabiliser trim wheel – enabling Boeing to study how pilots would react.

Additional cockpit effects were not simulated, says the inquiry, and were not documented in safety assessment reports reviewed by the US National Transportation Safety Board.

As the 737 Max evolved, Boeing opted to revise MCAS in 2016 to improve characteristics in certain configurations at low speed.

This revision enabled MCAS to command incremental stabiliser movement to a maximum of 0.65° at high Mach numbers but as much as 2.5° at low Mach.

Boeing used the full-flight simulator and engineering analysis to re-evaluate its earlier hazard assessment of MCAS, and determined that the risk classification had "not changed" as a result of this increase in MCAS authority.

The risk associated with uncommanded MCAS activation remained classified as 'major' – and therefore did not require further in-depth analysis – because Boeing believed unintended movement of the stabiliser would be "readily recognised", and that the crew would be quickly able to return the aircraft to level flight, either with elevator and trim or by using stabiliser runaway procedures.

But a simulation exercise conducted in December 2018, a few weeks after the Lion Air crash in October, revealed that the pilots were dealing not just with uncommanded MCAS activation – for which they were not prepared – but also the impact of additional cockpit effects associated with the same false angle-of-attack data that had triggered MCAS.

The simulations tested several scenarios to examine the aircraft's behaviour as well as theoretical crew responses.

But the exercise also replicated the likely cockpit conditions which emerged during the accident sequence.

Pilots participating in the simulation were instructed to clean the aircraft configuration after take-off, start carrying out non-normal checklists, and respond to air traffic control requests.

This exercise found that crews could not maintain altitude with control column force alone if short activation of electric trim resulted in an accumulating mis-trim from the MCAS nose-down commands.

"Repeated MCAS activations increased the flightcrew workload and required more attention to counter it," says the inquiry. Communicating with air traffic control was "distracting", it adds, and crews found the non-normal checklist "hard to get through".

The crew of the ill-fated Lion Air aircraft attempted to run through the non-normal checklists while trying to maintain altitude against repetitive MCAS nose-down commands.

But the inquiry says execution of the checklists was "unable to be completed" owing to increased workload and distraction from air traffic communications. "The unfinished [checklists] made it difficult for the flight crew [of the Lion 737 Max] to understand the aircraft problem and how to mitigate the problem," it adds.

The issue was exacerbated by Boeing’s incorrectly predicting how 737 Max pilots would respond to the activation of MCAS.

It assumed they would initially pull back on the control column and then trim out the force to maintain level flight.

But the NTSC investigation revealed that assumption to be wrong.

Activation of MCAS on the Lion Air jet did lead the crews to respond initially by pulling on the control column, says the NTSC.

"However, they did not consistently trim out the resulting column forces as had been assumed," it states. "The Boeing assumption was different from the flightcrew behaviour in responding to MCAS activation."

Failure to re-trim the aircraft during a series of repeated MCAS activations would result in the stabiliser gradually shifting to its maximum deflection, with the crew attempting to keep the nose up with increasing force on the control column.

When the 737 Max was being developed, simulator testing during functional hazard assessment "never considered" the scenario of repetitive MCAS activation incrementally driving the stabiliser to its maximum limit.

Boeing had believed repetitive MCAS activations to be "no worse" than a single activation, because of its assumption that the pilots would trim out the forces each time, says the inquiry. It had also assumed that the crew would respond correctly, and within 3s.

But an absence of this trimming would "escalate the flightcrew workload", the inquiry states, and the effects of this failure to trim after each MCAS activation "should have been reconsidered".

Boeing had reasoned that unintended stabiliser deflection, triggered by MCAS, could be addressed by the use of elevator alone – through the crew's pulling on the control column.

But the Lion Air accident showed that, in an extreme case, repeated MCAS deflections without sufficient trim would result in a cumulative out-of-trim situation which "could not be countered" just with the elevator, says the inquiry.

This scenario was "contrary to the Boeing assumption" during the airframer's functional hazard assessment process, it adds.

"Any out-of-trim condition which is not properly corrected would lead the flightcrew into a situation that makes it more difficult for them to maintain desired attitude of the aircraft," says the inquiry.

"The flightcrews in both the accident flight and the previous flight had difficulty maintaining flightpath during multiple MCAS activations."

Boeing's functional hazard assessment played down the potential impact of unintended MCAS stabiliser deflection, classifying it as a 'major' failure condition rather than 'hazardous' or 'catastrophic' – which meant the company was not required to analyse this scenario more rigorously.

The NTSC also calls on commercial aircraft designers to rethink fundamental assumptions that pilots have sufficient knowledge, training and skill to cope with failures.

Boeing had used flight-test pilots to demonstrate regulatory compliance during the certification of the 737 Max.

But the NTSC says such pilots "normally have exceptional skill and experience", and more knowledge of design characteristics than regular line pilots.

"This level of competence usually cannot be translated to most pilots," it adds.

Investigators believe a rethink by commercial aircraft designers, as well as regulators, is necessary to revise suppositions on the likely competence of airline customers' crews.

NTSC says the US Federal Aviation Administration and manufacturers should "re-evaluate their assumptions" as to what constitutes an "average flightcrew's basic skill" as well as the presumed level of knowledge that a "properly-trained average flightcrew" possesses when confronted with system failures.

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kco
Messaggi: 4431
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Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di ET, conseguenze sul mezzo e sul mercato

Messaggio da leggereda kco » dom 03 nov 2019, 12:48:11

Pilots of the Lion Air Boeing 737 Max which crashed shortly after departing Jakarta last October had been unaware of the control problems experienced by the crew of the same aircraft on the inbound service, investigators have disclosed.

This inbound service – from Denpasar – had taken place after the aircraft underwent replacement of an angle-of-attack sensor. Its crew had known about the rectification, and Indonesia’s National Transportation Safety Committee (NTSC) investigation authority says this awareness of the aircraft's condition "may have helped" when the pilots encountered control problems after take-off from Denpasar.

As it lifted off, the stick-shaker activated owing to misalignment of the replacement angle-of-attack sensor and the aircraft automatically started repeatedly trimming nose-down.

NTSC says the crew carried out non-normal checklists, including those for unreliable airspeed and runaway stabiliser, and activated the stabiliser trim cut-out to regain control of the jet.

Despite a continuing stick-shaker activation, and the indications of a runaway stabiliser, the captain chose to continue the flight to Jakarta – a decision which the inquiry says was "highly unusual".

After the aircraft arrived and parked in Jakarta, it adds, the captain made entries into the maintenance log referring to three particular problems experienced during the flight, but "did not mention" the activation of the stick-shaker, as he believed this was a symptom of the other issues.

Nor did the captain report the runaway stabiliser or the activation of the stabiliser trim cut-out. The crew had returned the cut-out switches to their normal position after landing.

Finding the cut-out switches engaged, says the inquiry, would have provided "additional information" to the maintenance engineers.

It says the captain's lack of understanding of the relationship between the system failures and their effects meant his maintenance log report was "incomplete", and points out that full reporting is "critical" for engineers to maintain aircraft airworthiness.

Failure to record information may have been crucial, because one of the next crew's responsibilities is to examine the maintenance log and inquire about the technical status of the aircraft before flight.

NTSC says an "absence" of discussion by the next crew regarding the problems that had affected the inbound flight suggests the pilots might not have been aware of the issues, and the possibility of recurrence.

This lack of awareness – particularly of the stick-shaker activation and the uncommanded nose-down trim – would have lessened the ability of the crew to predict, and prepare to mitigate, similar problems.

No information about the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS) – the source of the automatic nose-down trimming – was contained in the flightcrew manuals. Crew training did not include MCAS, says the inquiry, and there were no procedures for responding to erroneous angle-of-attack data.

When the aircraft took off again from Jakarta, the stick-shaker and MCAS activated repeatedly, similarly to the way they had behaved on the inbound flight.

But the pilots, caught by surprise, were far less effective than the previous crew at diagnosing and dealing with the problem.

Non-normal checklists were not completed, says the inquiry, and the crew was distracted by numerous air traffic control communications, multiple alerts, and repetitive MCAS activation, resulting in poor crew resource management and loss of control of the aircraft.

The cause of the erroneous MCAS activation was identified as a malfunctioning angle-of-attack sensor, but investigators have been unable to conclude whether the component was properly tested after being fitted to the Lion Air jet.

The sensor had been replaced in Denpasar on 28 October, after the aircraft had experienced repetitive air data problems on previous flights, including speed and altitude flags on the captain's primary instrument display.

No spare sensor had been available in Denpasar, so the engineer ordered one from Batam Aero Technic, located in Batam, and the aircraft was grounded in the meantime.

Once the replacement sensor was fitted, the maintenance manual required an installation test using one of two methods.

The recommended method involves using a specific piece of test equipment which was unavailable in Denpasar, says the inquiry.

It states that the engineer resorted to the alternative test method which involves deflecting the angle-of-attack vane to various positions – fully up, centre, and fully down – while verifying indications on the built-in test equipment module of the stall management yaw damper computer.

But the inquiry says the engineer "did not record" the angle-of-attack values shown on the computer during the installation test – despite this being required by Batam Aero Technic procedures.

The engineer in Denpasar claimed the test result was "satisfactory", says the inquiry, and released the aircraft for flight, believing the problems had been resolved.

But the NTSC says investigators could not conclude whether the installation test had been successful, pointing out that the sensor was subsequently found to have a 21° bias.

Boeing and the US National Transportation Safety Board carried out a sensor installation test, using the same alternative method employed in Denpasar, with a sensor which had been deliberately misaligned by 33° before fitting.

"The test result indicated that a misaligned [sensor] would not pass the installation test as the [angle-of-attack] values shown on the [stall management yaw damper] computer were out of tolerance," says the inquiry.

This out-of-tolerance situation resulted in a “sensor invalid” message on the test equipment module, it adds, verifying that this alternative testing method "should have" identified a 21° misalignment on the Lion Air jet's sensor.

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kco
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Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di ET, conseguenze sul mezzo e sul mercato

Messaggio da leggereda kco » dom 03 nov 2019, 12:52:18

Pilots of the Lion Air Boeing 737 Max 8 which crashed after take-off from Jakarta last year would not have received an alert regarding the disagreement between the angle-of-attack sensors, because the carrier had not selected an optional angle-of-attack indicator for its aircraft.

Boeing analysis, carried out after the accident, showed that some 20% of airlines had opted to have the indicator installed on the type. The safety equipment will now be mandatory on all Max aircraft, the airframer has subsequently announced.

Aircraft fitted with the indicator also generate a 'disagree' message if the values of the left- and right-hand angle-of-attack sensors, transmitted by the air data computers, differ by at least 10° for 10s.

The ill-fated Lion Air aircraft had departed Jakarta on 29 October last year with sensors misaligned by 21°.

Boeing initially implemented angle-of-attack 'disagree' warning messages on the previous evolution of the 737 – the 737NG family – and this feature was installed on all newly-manufactured aircraft from 2006, with an option to retrofit. It was then carried over to the 737 Max.

But Indonesia’s National Transportation Safety Committee (NTSC) says that, in 2017, a few months after 737 Max deliveries began, Boeing found that the Max display software "did not correctly implement" the 'disagree' alert.

Although the 737 Max display system requirements initially called for the angle-of-attack 'disagree' alert to be a standard feature, the software delivered to Boeing linked this alert to the angle-of-attack position indicator – which was only an optional feature on the 737 Max.

"Accordingly, the software activated the [angle-of-attack 'disagree'] alert only if an airline opted for the [angle-of-attack] indicator," says the inquiry.

It points out that pilots who had been trained on earlier versions of the 737 would have been aware of the possibility of a 'disagree' alert, but would not necessarily be aware that the warning would not appear on the Max.

"This would contribute to [pilots] being denied valid information about abnormal conditions being faced and lead to a significant reduction in situational awareness," says the inquiry.

Lack of the 'disagree' message "did not match" the Boeing system description that served as the basis for certifying the 737 Max, it adds.

Boeing considered that the absence of the 'disagree' alert "did not adversely impact aircraft safety", the inquiry states, because the stick-shaker and pitch-limit indicator served as primary alerts for the crew at excessive angles of attack – whereas the 'disagree' warning amounted to supplementary information.

Although Boeing planned to revert to the originally-intended functionality – through a display system software upgrade scheduled for the third quarter of 2020 – it felt that the optional status for the angle-of-attack indicator, and therefore the 'disagree' alert, was acceptable in the interim.

Lion Air had not chosen the optional indicator, which meant the crew of the crashed aircraft did not receive a 'disagree' alert despite the conditions for such a warning being met.

Boeing convened a review board to examine, in the aftermath of the crash, whether the absence of the 'disagree' warning amounted to a safety issue – but concluded that it did not, and the airframer also chose not to accelerate the planned software update.

But it has since advised that new software, incorporating the 'disagree' alert, will be available before the 737 Max returns to service following the type's worldwide grounding.

"All customers with previously delivered [737 Max] aircraft will have the ability to activate the ['disagree'] alert [through] a service bulletin to airlines," the inquiry says.

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kco
Messaggi: 4431
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Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di ET, conseguenze sul mezzo e sul mercato

Messaggio da leggereda kco » ven 08 nov 2019, 08:37:38

https://www.seattletimes.com/business/b ... ssion=true

Adesso ogni bega, piccola o grande esce. Non vorrei essere nei panni di quello che dovrà firmare il ritorno al volo del max.

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malpensante
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Località: Milano Linate

Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di ET, conseguenze sul mezzo e sul mercato

Messaggio da leggereda malpensante » ven 08 nov 2019, 10:04:47

Roba da matti.
And Malpensa is going to be our Hub

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D960
Messaggi: 867
Iscritto il: mer 17 ago 2016, 10:53:17

Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di ET, conseguenze sul mezzo e sul mercato

Messaggio da leggereda D960 » ven 08 nov 2019, 10:42:41

''Airbus non sa costruire gli aerei, Boeing è migliore!'' Cit.

Quoto Malpensante, assurdo che accadano situaioni del genere nel 2019 quando il mercato è in espansione ed è più propenso a volare.
BLQ-BGY-CAG-DUB-FCO-GOA-GRO-KBP-MXP-MUC-OLB-PMF-PSA-STN-TBS-TPS-TRN-TRS-TSF-VCE

A Milén si va a Linate per i nazionali, a Bergamo per gli internazionali e a Malpensa per gli intercontinentali e i charter

kco
Messaggi: 4431
Iscritto il: sab 05 gen 2008, 09:01:18

Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di ET, conseguenze sul mezzo e sul mercato

Messaggio da leggereda kco » sab 09 nov 2019, 19:15:28

Da copia di flight international in mio possesso

The newly appointed chair of Boeing’s board of directors has conceded that US aircraft ­certification processes need to change, though industry analysts remain uncertain what might be in store for the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).

“Reform will happen. Reform has to happen,” Dave Calhoun told CNBC on 5 November. “The system let everybody down.”

Calhoun made his statements in an interview during which he also threw his support behind embattled Boeing chief executive Dennis Muilenburg, who last week faced a grilling by US lawmakers during House and Senate hearings. Calhoun was selected to replace Muilenburg in the role of chair on 11 October.

Calhoun says Muilenburg has agreed to forgo much of his salary until the 737 Max returns to service, and insists the company stands behind the chief executive.

“Dennis didn’t create this problem… He is an asset,” Calhoun says. “From the beginning, he knew [the] MCAS [Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System] should and could be done better. He has led a programme to rewrite MCAS… He has done that incredibly well.”

Calhoun declines to say how long Muilenburg might remain at Boeing’s helm, but says, “To date… he has our full confidence.”

Speculation is rife that Muilenburg’s time with Boeing might be short, considering the company has already replaced the head of its commercial aircraft division.

But in suggesting that the US aircraft certification process needs reform, Calhoun has waded into a controversial discussion.

The FAA certificates aircraft via a delegation process under which it appoints manufacturers and their employees to oversee some aspects of the approval process.

Boeing and other aerospace manufacturers have defended that process as helping new technology, including safety features, gain approval. They say company engineers best understand the technology and are therefore uniquely suited to ensure it meets certification standards.

“Delegation of authority, over a fairly lengthy period of time, has delivered incredibly strong results. The safety record shows that,” Calhoun says.



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