Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di ET, conseguenze sul mezzo e sul mercato

tutto quello che riguarda i vettori
kco
Messaggi: 4695
Iscritto il: sab 05 gen 2008, 09:01:18

Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di ET, conseguenze sul mezzo e sul mercato

Messaggio da leggereda kco » mar 14 gen 2020, 17:30:28

Oddio, la soluzione per risolvere il problema ci sarebbe: Boeing chiude definitivamente la linea 737 e si mette a produrre la famiglia A320 su licenza. Spirit del resto già collabora con Airbus. Alla fine tutti contenti, da chi deve ricevere aerei che possano volare a chi non perde il posto di lavoro a chi finalmente sa come sfruttare le fabbriche. :green:
Così per scherzare ma ci avevo pensato pure io... :-)

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kco
Messaggi: 4695
Iscritto il: sab 05 gen 2008, 09:01:18

Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di ET, conseguenze sul mezzo e sul mercato

Messaggio da leggereda kco » mer 15 gen 2020, 17:50:00

Da copia di flight international in mio possesso


Boeing’s updates to its troubled 737 Max have largely addressed concerns about the aircraft’s flight-control system, but broader risks involving pilot training and aircraft maintenance remain unresolved, say aviation safety specialists and commercial pilots.

Sources interviewed by Flight International over several months say these significant operational risks were highlighted by the 737 Max accidents, but overshadowed by intense scrutiny of Boeing and its faults.

“There is a pilot training issue to the point that now the base foundation of pilot training is getting flawed,” says Chinar Shah, a 737 Max captain and training captain at Jet Airways, which stopped operations this year amid financial problems.

“[Airlines] are churning out pilots because of the [crew] shortage. The training footprints are becoming shorter and shorter,” says Shah.

Indeed, two former US National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) experts think Indonesia’s report into the crash of Lion Air flight 610 glosses over critical facts about the carrier’s operation, driving an incomplete narrative.

“I think they have selectively filtered a lot of the information that should be in here,” says former NTSB senior air safety investigator Greg Feith on his Flight Safety Detectives podcast, which he hosts with former NTSB member John Goglia.

“Maintenance… is where this whole accident sequence starts, two days before the accident,” Feith says.

Many pilots declined to talk on the record about the two 737 Max crashes due to the sensitive nature of the tragedies and ongoing investigations.

But, without downplaying Boeing’s responsibility, some say proper training should have prepared flightcrews to address errant activation of the Max’s Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS), which contributed to both accidents.

Others disagree, saying the crash scenarios would challenge any aviator. Pilots should not be expected to face the confusing circumstances that faulty MCAS activation can create. Accident investigators in Indonesia and the NTSB have faulted Boeing’s MCAS design and the US Federal Aviation Administration’s oversight. Investigators have also called for more study of pilot-automation interaction.

“If the automation fails, and we know that it sometimes does, pilots must have the experience, training, and technical ability to instantly take over and safely fly the aircraft” Chinar Shah, 737 Max captain

Boeing equipped the Max with MCAS to comply with regulations requiring opposing column force to increase linearly as pilots pull back on the column. The Max’s CFM International Leap-1B engines can make it pitch nose-up in certain high angle-of-attack scenarios, translating into relatively less column force. MCAS solves that problem by pitching the nose down when needed.

Triggered by faulty angle-of-attack data, MCAS put the Lion Air and Ethiopian Airlines aircraft, both 737 Max 8s, into dives from which the pilots did not recover. Lion Air flight 610 crashed in October 2018 and Ethiopian flight 302 crashed in March 2019, killing a combined 346 people.

“While I firmly believe both accident aircraft were recoverable without loss of life, it was the very design of the Max’s MCAS system that unnecessarily put passenger and crew lives at risk,” says Michael Gerzanics, a 737 Max captain with a US airline, former US Air Force test pilot and Flight International test pilot. 

Boeing took criticism for not initially telling pilots more about MCAS, a decision it defended on the grounds that MCAS failures appear like a runaway stabiliser, which pilots should address via the runaway stabiliser checklist.

Shah thinks an introductory MCAS course would have been useful. But she understands Boeing’s logic, calling knowledge of MCAS “good to know”, not “need to know”.

“The action required by the flightcrew is the same as for the runaway stabiliser, which is taught to us from day one,” Shah says. “You would still do the same memory items… you follow the checklist.”

The Lion Air crash report, released in October by Indonesia’s National Transportation Safety Committee (NTSC), pins significant responsibility on Boeing.

It faults Boeing’s MCAS design, including reliance on a single angle-of-attack sensor, its assumptions about pilot responses and its lack of guidance to pilots. The NTSC urges the FAA to review certification processes, and it concludes that Florida company Xtra Aerospace improperly calibrated the sensor that triggered MCAS.

It cites Lion Air maintenance concerns and crew co-ordination and cockpit management issues, which it attributes partly to cockpit warnings and other distractions.

Additionally, the report says the pilots of the flight prior to flight 610 filed an incomplete maintenance report following a similar inadvertent MCAS activation.

Goglia thinks the NTSC’s conclusions paint an incomplete picture – one partly at odds with facts within the report.

“If you look at the factual data, it doesn’t line up with what the conclusions are,” he tells Flight International; Goglia has previously described the conclusions as “grossly favourable” to Lion Air.

The 737 Max in the Lion Air crash had air data system problems as far back as 9 October, several weeks before the 29 October crash, according to the NTSC.

It then had repeated speed and altitude indication problems from 26 October until the crash, which engineers at various stations took steps to fix.

On 27 October, an engineer in Manado, Indonesia, worked to address the speed and altitude indication problems. The next morning, the engineer met with the crew who were to fly the aircraft to Denpasar, Indonesia, that day. The crew “requested more be done to rectify the problem”, which they said occurred several times. The engineer suggested the problem might be better addressed in Denpasar.

On 28 October, in Denpasar, an engineer with Lion subsidiary Batam Aero Technic replaced the Max’s left angle-of-attack sensor. That sensor, which had a 21° error, trigged MCAS on two flights, the last being flight 610.

The NTSC says the engineer told it he had tested the sensor after installation, and that it passed. But proof does not exist because, contrary to Batam procedures, the engineer did not record test values, the report says.

The engineer gave investigators photographs to prove the test was completed. But investigators rejected the photos after determining they did not show the accident aircraft or were taken before the replacement sensor arrived.

Following the sensor replacement, Lion Air dispatched the Max on a flight from Denpasar to Jakarta, during which those pilots experienced numerous caution lights and MCAS activation. They eventually switched off MCAS using the runaway stabiliser procedure, and continued to Jakarta, the report says.

Upon arriving, the captain reported airspeed and altitude warnings in a maintenance log, but did not mention the stick shaker, the runaway stabiliser procedure, or having to manually trim the aircraft, the report says. The incompleteness of the maintenance log violated requirements intended to ensure proper maintenance, says the NTSC.

The aircraft “never should have been in the air”, says Goglia. It simply had too many problems and Lion Air should have grounded it days before the crash, he says.

“I’m not letting Boeing off the hook, because they have dirty hands too,” Goglia adds.

“There was a continuing, cascading effect of problems with the airplane,” Feith says. He describes engineers as “trying to milk this airplane to one of their larger maintenance bases”.

“It’s crazy that this airplane would… be returned to service like this,” Feith states.

Lion Air flight 610 lifted off from Jakarta on 29 October, bound for the Indonesian city of Pangkal Pinang, with the captain at the controls. The crew immediately received indicated airspeed disagree and altitude disagree warnings. The stick shaker activated.

Before MCAS even activated, the captain told the first officer to complete memory items for unreliable airspeed. Those steps are in the “non-normal checklist” in the pilots’ quick-reference handbook, according to the NTSC. Memory items should be performed as soon as possible, even before pilots consult the actual checklist.

The first officer did not respond to the captain’s initial request. The captain again asked the first officer to complete “memory item”.

The first officer, who had 5,175h of flight time, said he “was unable to locate the airspeed unreliable checklist”. About a minute later he found the checklist, but never completed it.

The airspeed unreliable checklist would not itself have addressed an MCAS activation, but the first officer’s difficultly shows he was “not familiar” with the non-normal checklist, concludes the NTSC. “The unfinished [checklist] made it difficult for the flightcrew… to understand the aircraft problem and how to mitigate the problem.”

The report shows the first officer struggled with checklists during training. On one occasion he “missed identifying the non-normal checklist”. Other training notes cite “lack of situational awareness or judgement” and issues with workload management and focus, the report says.

“The reappearance of difficulty in aircraft handling, identified during training in the accident flight, indicated that the Lion Air training rehearsal was not effective,” the NTSC concludes.

Goglia says the crew demonstrated significant “knowledge and discipline” problems. Qualified pilots should be able to complete memory items quickly he says; such deficiencies, left uncorrected, would disqualify pilots in the USA.

Several minutes after take-off, flight 610’s MCAS started activating. “This report actually shows that MCAS didn’t get involved in the accident sequence until late in the flight,” Feith says in his podcast.

For more than 5min the captain successfully countered MCAS by commanding nose-up trim with switches on the column. Neither pilot completed the runaway stabiliser checklist.

About 1min before the crash the captain passed control to the first officer. But in the hand-off the captain did not mention his use of nose-up trim.

“The captain did not verbalise to the [first officer] the difficulty in controlling the aircraft and the need for repeated aircraft nose-up trim,” the report notes.

After taking control, the first officer trimmed up several times, but not enough to counteract MCAS. Flight 610 crashed in the Java Sea, killing 189 people.

“As an industry, we have all become overly dependent on automation and technology,” says training captain Shah, who remains employed with Jet Airways and works for Washington DC aviation training and consulting company GHS Aviation Group.

“The prevalent perception is that the flightdeck automation is there to do the job for you, rather than to assist,” she says. “If the automation fails, and we know that it sometimes does, pilots must have the experience, training, and technical ability to instantly take over and safely fly the aircraft.”

Jet Airways was expanding before its shutdown. The carrier’s 737 fleet increased from about 50 to 80 aircraft between 2010 and early 2019, when it began winding down. The fleet included several 737 Max aircraft, and it had orders for roughly 130 additional Max jets.

Amid that expansion, the training time allocated to the carrier’s pilots for the purpose of meeting government-set minimum performance standards was “notably reduced”, Shah says.

Newly hired pilots, depending on proficiency, were given 11 or 12 simulator sessions, down from about 14 previously, she says. Meanwhile, pilot wash-out rates “significantly declined”. Shah says other Asian carriers face identical pressure to train more pilots as fleets expand – conditions highlighting a global pilot shortage.

A 2019 Boeing report projects that by 2038 airlines will need 645,000 new pilots, including 244,000 in the Asia-Pacific, almost double any other region. Pilots and experts fear less training and more automation have left many pilots lacking adequate hand-flying skills and unprepared for failures.

Some quelli have concerns about ICAO’s low-hour multi-crew pilot licence (MPL). The MPL requires no minimum flight time, but holders need a private licence and 240h of time in either an aircraft or simulator.

By comparison, US regulations require transport pilots to have 1,500h of flight time, with exceptions. Those regulations have proved controversial, with US regional airlines saying they worsened a pilot shortage without improving pilot qualifications.

MPLs allow pilots with a few hundred hours of time to sit in the right seat of a large jet. Critics warn that may be insufficient to prepare pilots for real world situations.

Ethiopian is among airlines to embrace the MPL, according to its flight school’s website.

The preliminary report into the 10 March crash of Ethiopian flight 302 says the first officer had 361h of “flight experience”, including 207h on 737s.

It does not specify the licence the first officer held, and the airline has not responded to requests for additional information.

“I am not convinced 361h in aircraft and simulators combined is enough to develop a level of airmanship needed to deal with unscripted emergency situations,” says Gerzanics.

The accident report into Ethiopian flight 302 is yet to be finalised, but the preliminary findings reveal a similar scenario involving incorrect angle-of-attack values and MCAS activation shortly after take-off. The aircraft crashed outside Addis Ababa, killing 157 people.

Those pilots disengaged MCAS using the runaway stabiliser procedure, then switched electric trim back on after struggling with manual trim.

They left the throttles at 94% thrust throughout the flight. Overspeed warnings sounded and the aircraft crashed at high speed – one airspeed indicator recorded 458kt (848km/h), while the other showed 500kt.

Observers suspect the pilots turned the electric trim back on because they could no longer manually trim the aircraft, likely due to the tremendous forces exerted on the jet by its high speed and resulting aerodynamic pressure on the control surfaces.

Without detracting from the role played by MCAS, pilots and safety experts say the aircraft should never have been allowed to reach such speed.

Goglia thinks both accidents display a “failure to fly the airplane” when automated systems fail, and he is not alone.

In October, the USA and several other countries urged ICAO to review pilot training, warning that flying skills may be degrading amid an increased reliance on automation.

“While I firmly believe both accident aircraft were recoverable without loss of life, it was the very design of the Max’s MCAS system that unnecessarily put passenger and crew lives at risk” Michael Gerzanics, 737 Max captain and Flight International test pilot

ICAO’s member states and its technical commission “roundly endorsed” forming a panel to complete the review, ICAO says. Early this year, ICAO’s Air Navigation Commission, its main technical body, intends to review the panel’s “objectives and composition”. ICAO does not say when it expects the pilot training review will be complete.

Training concerns aside, Boeing has made updates to the Max that experts believe solve the aircraft’s problems.

“Boeing nailed the fixes on the Max,” says Goglia, who attended Max simulator demonstrations at the airframer’s facility in early December. He paid his own expenses and does not work in any capacity for Boeing. “If there is any [angle-of-attack] disagreement, in less than a second it will shut down the MCAS.”

The flight-control system now compares data from both Max angle-of-attack sensors and prevents MCAS from activating if readings differ by more than 5.5°, according to Boeing. Previously, MCAS took data from only one sensor.

MCAS will additionally only operate once per “each elevated angle-of-attack event”, meaning it will not provide multiple nose-down inputs, as occurred during the accident flights. And MCAS no longer commands more nose-down trim than pilots can counteract by pulling the column, Boeing says.

Boeing also gave the computer “mid-value select”, which generates a third angle-of-attack input for the purpose of identifying angle-of-attack faults. The computer disables nose-down trim upon determining one sensor is faulty, Matt Kiefer, a member of an FAA-convened technical advisory board, told Congress in December 2019.

Additionally, new “software monitors” cross-check trim commands, and the computer will disable commands upon finding differences, Kiefer adds.

“We were able to experience the accident scenarios and able to observe the aircraft behaviour with MCAS operating properly, as well as how the aircraft handles with MCAS disabled,” Kiefer said.

The technical advisory board, an independent panel formed by the FAA to evaluate Boeing’s MCAS fix, still has work outstanding. But Kiefer says the “team feels that the changes made to the flight control system of the 737 Max should vastly approve the safety of the aircraft”.

The FAA has set no timeline for clearing the Max, beyond 2020.

Before the jet is cleared, a joint operations evaluation board must complete a pilot training analysis, the FAA must review its findings, and the FAA and technical advisory board will review final documents, FAA administrator Steve Dickson told Congress in December 2019.

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malpensante
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Messaggio da leggereda malpensante » ven 17 gen 2020, 23:50:04

Aerospace Analysts See Growing 737 MAX Costs For Boeing

Michael Bruno January 17, 2020


Boeing stakeholders may find out more information about the costs of the 737 MAX fiasco during the company’s Jan. 29 report on 2019 financial results. While Boeing previously identified $5.6 billion in pretax customer compensation for aircraft operators, and added $3.6 billion to the 737’s program accounting block-cost, financial analysts, consultants and others see those figures as just a beginning.

For starters, new costs such as flight simulator training, already are known but have yet to be publicly explained by Boeing. “Simulator training likely will add almost $5 billion to the cost of the grounding, using Southwest [Airlines] as a benchmark for the 4,543 [737 MAXs] in backlog at the third quarter of 2019 and the 385 in existing fleets, all of which were sold before the grounding,” Bloomberg analysts George Ferguson and Francois Duflot said Jan. 9.

Similarly, aviation economist Chris Tarry said in a new report this month that Boeing faced a bill of more than $8 billion in compensation for airlines alone. In December, when Boeing announced the MAX production halt, Jefferies analysts Sheila Kahyaoglu and Greg Konrad surmised that customer concessions alone could reach $11.7 through the end of the first quarter of 2020.

Then there are costs for carrying the inventory of roughly 400 MAXs parked by Boeing, as well as potential further changes to the 3,100-aircraft program accounting block basis. The Jefferies team said the ongoing delay in aircraft certification and change in production cadence could generate another $3.6 billion charge to Boeing’s earnings.

Several industry analysts and consultants also believe Boeing will have to support its supply chain financially to some degree, so providers are able to ramp-up MAX production rates again as efficiently as possible. Moody’s Investors Service analysts said in a Jan. 10 report they expect Boeing to be supportive of suppliers on an individual, as-needed basis. But costs were not quantifiable yet.

“There will be a particular focus on weakly positioned companies and/or those that have sole-sourced products,” Moody’s suggested. “The exact nature of any support arrangements could take multiple forms, including certain suppliers maintaining some level of production (and continuing to get paid), advance payments, more favorable (i.e., quicker) payment terms, inventory assumption and/or the facilitation of access to vendor financing.”

Other costs loom, too, such as final compensation to victims’ families through legal action. Similarly, shareholder lawsuits may emerge that require spending to litigate. Last but not least, there will be additional costs from taking on more debt, which Boeing is expected to do rather than cut shareholder dividends.

Altogether, it could take years before the full costs of the MAX debacle are known. In mid-October 2019—when Boeing still saw a MAX return to service before the end of last year—Bank of America Merrill Lynch analyst Ron Epstein already had expected it would not occur before the first quarter of 2020. He forecast costs for the 737 MAX to total $17.2 billion in 2019-23. On Jan. 16, Epstein told CNBC the total cost of the grounding could reach $20 billion—excluding any settlements from lawsuits from crash victims’ families—if the aircraft return by June or July.


https://aviationweek.com/air-transport/ ... 1e091f625e

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wrth
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Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di ET, conseguenze sul mezzo e sul mercato

Messaggio da leggereda wrth » sab 18 gen 2020, 10:26:23

Un bel casino...

kco
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Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di ET, conseguenze sul mezzo e sul mercato

Messaggio da leggereda kco » lun 20 gen 2020, 08:39:48

Da copia di flight international in mio possesso

Boeing has released more than 100 pages of documents to the US Congress, including ­internal text messages and emails that mock airline ­customers, the ­Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and other regulators, which were sent as the airframer navigated the ­certification ­process of the now-grounded 737 Max.

The messages, which contain foul language and disparaging remarks, were immediately criticised by Peter DeFazio, chair of the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure.

“These newly released emails are incredibly damning,” DeFazio said on 9 January. “They paint a deeply disturbing picture of the lengths Boeing was apparently willing to go to in order to evade scrutiny from regulators, flightcrews and the flying public, even as its own employees were sounding alarms internally.”

Boeing responded with an apology for the language used and the sentiments expressed.

“These communications contain provocative language, and, in certain instances, raise questions about Boeing’s interactions with the FAA in connection with the simulator qualification process,” says the airframer. “These communications do not reflect the company we are and need to be, and they are ­completely unacceptable.”

NOTHING NEW

However, Boeing can at least take minor comfort that the emails do not contain anything new related to the safety of the 737 Max itself. The FAA says that its experts “determined that nothing in the submission pointed to any safety risks that were not already identified as part of the ongoing review of proposed modifications to the aircraft”.

“While the tone and content of some of the language contained in the documents is disappointing, the FAA remains focused on following a thorough process for returning the Boeing 737 Max to passenger service,” the agency says. “We continue to work with other international aviation safety regulators to review the proposed changes to the aircraft. Our first priority is safety, and we have set no timeframe for when the work will be completed.”

The documents, released to the media on 9 January, were redacted, with names of the conversation participants blanked out.

In one conversation, dated 28 March 2017, a Boeing employee identified only as “737 chief technical pilot” wrote to a colleague that the company would reject any regulator’s requirement for simulator training when transitioning from the 737NG to the 737 Max.

Pilot Mark Forkner had been identified in previous email correspondence as “737 chief technical pilot”. However, it is unclear whether he also authored these emails. Forkner now works for Southwest Airlines.

“I want to stress the importance of holding firm that there will not be any type of simulator training required to transition from NG to Max. Boeing will not allow that to happen. We’ll go face-to-face with any regulator who tries to make that a requirement,” the pilot writes.

NO SIMULATOR

Later, on 6 June 2017, the “737 chief technical pilot” wrote to an airline customer that no simulator training should be required when pilots transfer from the NG to the Max.

That airline, which appears to have been based in Indonesia, intended to have its pilots complete simulator training and classroom computer-based training before transitioning, messages show. The emails mention “Jakarta time” and “DGCA”, the acronym of Indonesia’s Directorate General of Civil Aviation.

“There is absolutely no reason to require your pilots to require a Max simulator to begin flying the Max,” Boeing’s chief technical pilot writes. “Once the engines are started, there is only one difference between NG and Max procedurally, and that is that there is no OFF position of the gear handle. Boeing does not understand what is to be gained by a 3h simulator session, when the procedures are essentially the same.”

In a related email, the chief technical pilot says simulator time would create “a difficult and unnecessary training burden for your airline, as well as potentially establish a precedent in your region for other Max customers”.

After the airline confirmed it would not require additional simulator training, on 7 June, the Boeing pilot wrote to a colleague, “Looks like my Jedi mind trick worked again!”

The colleague responded: “Haha, I’ll send you to negotiate piece [sic] in the Middle East next.”

In the meantime, following two fatal accidents and the aircraft’s grounding, now in its 10th month, Boeing recently advised that pilots should complete flight simulator training before returning to the cockpit of the 737 Max.

In another conversation, dated 12 December 2017, one employee refers to India’s civil aviation authority as “even stupider”. The same employee says later in the conversation: “I’m drinking, obviously”.

On 8 February 2018, one colleague asks another: “Would you put your family on a Max simulator-trained aircraft? I wouldn’t.” The colleague answers: “No”.

In other messages, the correspondents complain about the FAA’s “whining”, and internal processes that slowed development of the twinjet.

In messages from 2013, Boeing employees discuss the comp­any’s decision to refer to the 737 Max’s Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS) as part of the Max’s speed-trim system.

Framing MCAS, which was new to the Max, as part of an existing system would avoid “driving additional work due to training impacts and maintenance manual expansions”, the messages say.

MCAS is the automated flight control software that contributed to two fatal crashes of 737 Max 8s in October 2018 and March 2019, respectively flown by Lion Air and Ethiopian Airlines.

In another email on 1 June 2018, a Boeing employee describes the airframer’s culture as corrupted by a leadership team obsessed with meeting project deadlines. “It’s systemic. It’s culture,” the employee writes to a colleague. “It’s the fact that we have a senior leadership team that understand very little about the business and yet are driving us to certain objectives.”

On 20 September 2016, one writer says of the 737 Max: “This is a joke,” and “this airplane is ridiculous”.

A few months later, on 24 April the following year, an employee wrote, “this airplane is designed by clowns who in turn are supervised by monkeys.” They call the design of the aircraft “piss poor”.

In May 2018, an employee tells another that they still “haven’t been forgiven by God for the covering up [that] I did last year”.

They add: “Can’t do it one more time. The Pearly Gates will be closed…” The colleague ­responds: “I just received a shovel to start my journey to the ­hotter place...”

PUBLICLY RELEASED

Boeing says it “proactively” gave the communications to the FAA in December, and provided copies to House and Senate ­committees. Boeing released the documents publicly “at the encouragement of” DeFazio and Senator Roger Wicker, chairman of the Senate Committee on Science, Commerce and ­Transportation.

“We regret the content of these communications, and apologise to the FAA, Congress, our airline customers, and to the flying public,” Boeing says, adding it has responded with an internal reorganisation, among other changes, aimed at improving safety.

“The language used in these communications, and some of the sentiments they express, are inconsistent with Boeing values, and the company is taking appropriate action in response. This will ultimately include disciplinary or other personnel action, once the necessary reviews are completed.”

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KittyHawk
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Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di ET, conseguenze sul mezzo e sul mercato

Messaggio da leggereda KittyHawk » lun 20 gen 2020, 10:05:30

FAA: “We continue to work with other international aviation safety regulators to review the proposed changes to the aircraft. Our first priority is safety, and we have set no timeframe for when the work will be completed.”
In pratica, non c'è certezza di quando il MAX rientrerà, se rientrerà, in servizio. Come ricorda la saggezza popolare, chi si è scottato con l'acqua calda ha paura anche dell'acqua fredda.

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cesare.caldi
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Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di ET, conseguenze sul mezzo e sul mercato

Messaggio da leggereda cesare.caldi » lun 20 gen 2020, 16:31:09

FAA: “We continue to work with other international aviation safety regulators to review the proposed changes to the aircraft. Our first priority is safety, and we have set no timeframe for when the work will be completed.”
Fossi una compagnia aerea che ha ordinato il MAX chiederei un maxi risarcimento danni a Boeing e mi metterei subito in coda da Airbus per comprare gli A320 family. Sul futuro del MAX non c'è certezza, ammesso che abbia un futuro...

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mattaus313
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Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di ET, conseguenze sul mezzo e sul mercato

Messaggio da leggereda mattaus313 » lun 20 gen 2020, 16:34:40

Secondo me (e da un pò) non tornerà più in aria.

Qui lo dico, nella speranza di sbagliarmi.
"Because you needed a lot of capital in an airline, you needed to be where the financial markets were, and obviously that's New York"

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mattaus313
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Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di ET, conseguenze sul mezzo e sul mercato

Messaggio da leggereda mattaus313 » lun 20 gen 2020, 23:36:47

Avranno il tasso zero anche lì

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-boei ... SKBN1ZJ27T


Boeing seeks to borrow $10 billion or more amid 737 MAX crisis: source
David Shepardson
WASHINGTON (Reuters) - Boeing Co (BA.N) is in talks with banks about borrowing $10 billion or more amid rising costs for the U.S. planemaker after two crashes involving its 737 MAX jetliner, a source told Reuters on Monday.
"Because you needed a lot of capital in an airline, you needed to be where the financial markets were, and obviously that's New York"

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wrth
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Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di ET, conseguenze sul mezzo e sul mercato

Messaggio da leggereda wrth » mer 22 gen 2020, 07:48:55

Avranno il tasso zero anche lì

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-boei ... SKBN1ZJ27T


Boeing seeks to borrow $10 billion or more amid 737 MAX crisis: source
David Shepardson
WASHINGTON (Reuters) - Boeing Co (BA.N) is in talks with banks about borrowing $10 billion or more amid rising costs for the U.S. planemaker after two crashes involving its 737 MAX jetliner, a source told Reuters on Monday.
In una situazione del genere dove non si intravede la fine basteranno le banche a salvare Boeing?
Io ho qualche esperto da proporre in caso di salvataggio... una bella bad company con tutti i debiti, i progetti del del max e relativi ordini inevasi, bloccati e aerei accantonati a terra. Poi una bella newco (dove il contribuente americano potrà dare la sua quota) con la parte buona di Boeing... finalmente possiamo insegnare qualcosa a qualcuno...

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Tropicalista
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Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di ET, conseguenze sul mezzo e sul mercato

Messaggio da leggereda Tropicalista » mer 22 gen 2020, 09:33:56


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mattaus313
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Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di ET, conseguenze sul mezzo e sul mercato

Messaggio da leggereda mattaus313 » mer 22 gen 2020, 10:53:32


In una situazione del genere dove non si intravede la fine basteranno le banche a salvare Boeing?
Io ho qualche esperto da proporre in caso di salvataggio... una bella bad company con tutti i debiti, i progetti del del max e relativi ordini inevasi, bloccati e aerei accantonati a terra. Poi una bella newco (dove il contribuente americano potrà dare la sua quota) con la parte buona di Boeing... finalmente possiamo insegnare qualcosa a qualcuno...


Scherzi ma neanche troppo!

E' una bella somma, senza dubbio, e questo mi fa pensare che serve a tirare in piedi un nuovo programma per un NB, dato che come ordine di grandezza si avvicina e potrebbe essere. Se poi è vero che questo grounding possa arrivare a costargli - inclusi danni, varie&eventuali ed altro - quasi 20 miliardi.

Mi permetto di aggiungere un punto, per un eventuale nuovo programma dato che Boeing collabora molto con aziende italiane a quanto ho capito sarebbe bello se - ad esempio - i due miliardi buttati in Alitalia nei due anni di A.S. fossero stati stanziati in incentivi per aiutare Boeing a portare qui uno stabilimento.
"Because you needed a lot of capital in an airline, you needed to be where the financial markets were, and obviously that's New York"

I-GABE
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Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di ET, conseguenze sul mezzo e sul mercato

Messaggio da leggereda I-GABE » mer 22 gen 2020, 20:40:10

Ma quale bad company, un bel chapter 11 e passa la paura.


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kco
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Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di ET, conseguenze sul mezzo e sul mercato

Messaggio da leggereda kco » gio 23 gen 2020, 08:41:45

Ricordarsi che Boeing fattura 80-100bn all anno e ha un ritorno sull investimento del 6-7%

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malpensante
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Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di ET, conseguenze sul mezzo e sul mercato

Messaggio da leggereda malpensante » gio 23 gen 2020, 10:42:00

E può permettersi di perdere decine di miliardi di dollari senza rischiare di fallire.
Ne prenderà a prestito dieci per continuare a pagare dividendi nei prossimi anni.

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wrth
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Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di ET, conseguenze sul mezzo e sul mercato

Messaggio da leggereda wrth » gio 23 gen 2020, 11:08:35

Ma quale bad company, un bel chapter 11 e passa la paura.


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Magari anche qualche commessa dai militari...

Max
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Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di ET, conseguenze sul mezzo e sul mercato

Messaggio da leggereda Max » gio 23 gen 2020, 15:54:19

Buongiorno a tutti
mi rivolgo agli esperti,
(da vecchio progettista meccanico ) ma è così complicato ridisegnare i carrelli d'atterraggio
per alzarlo da terra e riportare i motori nella posizione come la seri 800?

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malpensante
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Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di ET, conseguenze sul mezzo e sul mercato

Messaggio da leggereda malpensante » gio 23 gen 2020, 16:02:44

No, ma chiudendoli non ci starebbero.

Max
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Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di ET, conseguenze sul mezzo e sul mercato

Messaggio da leggereda Max » gio 23 gen 2020, 16:23:05

chiaramente modificando gli alloggi

kco
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Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di ET, conseguenze sul mezzo e sul mercato

Messaggio da leggereda kco » gio 23 gen 2020, 16:40:59

chiaramente modificando gli alloggi
Ovvero vuoi rifare l'ala... Direi che costa come rifare mezzo aereo e 3 anni di progettazione.

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Max
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Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di ET, conseguenze sul mezzo e sul mercato

Messaggio da leggereda Max » gio 23 gen 2020, 17:08:45

E non ci sono più i progettisti di una volta :lol: :lol: :lol:

robygun
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Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di ET, conseguenze sul mezzo e sul mercato

Messaggio da leggereda robygun » gio 23 gen 2020, 17:22:50

Credo che l'ala sia la parte più complessa e costosa da progettare, non credo valga la pena metterci mano per una fusoliera di 60 anni.. parti direttamente con un progetto nuovo, è più sensato..

kco
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Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di ET, conseguenze sul mezzo e sul mercato

Messaggio da leggereda kco » gio 23 gen 2020, 17:35:08

La clearence da terra serve soprattutto durante la rotazione al decollo. Motivo per il quale il max 10 e il 787-10 hanno una specie di carrello estendibile che di compatta in fase di retrazione.
Per dire che i margini se li dono già mangiati tutti.
Per completezza la clearence dei motori e invece determinata dal poter atterrare con un angolo di rollio che mi pare sia 5 gradi a memoria.

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wrth
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Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di ET, conseguenze sul mezzo e sul mercato

Messaggio da leggereda wrth » gio 23 gen 2020, 21:12:52

Credo che l'ala sia la parte più complessa e costosa da progettare, non credo valga la pena metterci mano per una fusoliera di 60 anni.. parti direttamente con un progetto nuovo, è più sensato..
Riprogettare i carrelli principali, vuol dire metter mano alle ali, ma bisogna riprogettare anche il carrello anteriore. Sicuramente è meno complicato rispetto a quello principale. ma come dice robygun, ha e aveva più senso partire da un progetto nuovo. La scorciatoia adottata dettata da motivi commerciali e di contenimento dei costi di progettazione, al momento si è trasformata in un boomerang.

KittyHawk
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Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di ET, conseguenze sul mezzo e sul mercato

Messaggio da leggereda KittyHawk » gio 23 gen 2020, 23:31:44

Boeing farebbe bene progettare una nuova famiglia di aerei partendo da zero. Una fusoliera di sezione simile a quella dell'A320 e di varie lunghezze, due ali ottimizzate (una per brevi voli, l'altra per quelli lunghi, quest'ultima magari parzialmente ripieghevole, se necessario, per poter utilizzare senza problemi le piazzole in aeroporto), un paio di tipologie di carrello per MTOW diversi, un paio di derive per ottimizzare le versioni lunghe e corte di fusoliera. Chiaramente tenendo in conto le dimensioni dei motori attuali e di quelli che si potrebbero avere in futuro. Fly-by-wire, attuatori elettrici, nuovi materiali dove servono o offrono dei vantaggi etc. etc.
Un aereo modulare, dove la combinazione dei vari pezzi identici porta a velivoli con prestazioni e finalità diverse.
Costi e tempi non sono banali, ma se progettato con criterio potrebbe essere il bread and butter di Boeing per i prossimi 50 anni.


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