Precipitato in mare 12 minuti dopo decollo da Giacarta, un nuovissimo 737 Max 8 con circa 187 persone a bordo
https://airwaysmag.com/industry/lion-ai ... 8-crashes/
Lion: precipita un 737 Max8 di 2 mesi
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Lion: precipita un 737 Max8 di 2 mesi
Malpensa airport user
Re: Lion: precipita un 737 Max8 di 2 mesi
Sbaglio o Lion non è nuova a incidenti...I-Alex ha scritto:Precipitato in mare 12 minuti dopo decollo da Giacarta, un nuovissimo 737 Max 8 con circa 187 persone a bordo
https://airwaysmag.com/industry/lion-ai ... 8-crashes/
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delta.tango
- Messaggi: 46
- Iscritto il: mer 30 mag 2018, 13:30:58
Re: Lion: precipita un 737 Max8 di 2 mesi
RIP, un pensiero a tutte le persone coinvolte.
Non sono esperto ma guardando le info di volo su Flightradar si vede che l’altitudine è sempre stata ballerina, in particolare c’e stata un primo abbassamento di quota appena dopo il decollo (zona cerchiata in rosso).
Non sono esperto ma guardando le info di volo su Flightradar si vede che l’altitudine è sempre stata ballerina, in particolare c’e stata un primo abbassamento di quota appena dopo il decollo (zona cerchiata in rosso).
Non hai i permessi necessari per visualizzare i file allegati in questo messaggio.
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mattaus313
- Messaggi: 1810
- Iscritto il: sab 29 set 2018, 15:51:39
Re: Lion: precipita un 737 Max8 di 2 mesi
Purtroppo ho paura (se non è già stato confermato) che non ci saranno superstiti.
Speriamo comunque che si risalga al più presto alle cause e che non sia un difetto comune a tutti i 737 Max ma un caso isolato.
Speriamo comunque che si risalga al più presto alle cause e che non sia un difetto comune a tutti i 737 Max ma un caso isolato.
"Because you needed a lot of capital in an airline, you needed to be where the financial markets were, and obviously that's New York"
Re: Lion: precipita un 737 Max8 di 2 mesi
https://www.flightglobal.com/news/artic ... an-453062/
Inviato dal mio WAS-LX1A utilizzando Tapatalk
Inviato dal mio WAS-LX1A utilizzando Tapatalk
Re: Lion: precipita un 737 Max8 di 2 mesi
Warning letter in arrivo da Boeing e FAA per i Max...
https://amp.theguardian.com/business/20 ... ets-report
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https://amp.theguardian.com/business/20 ... ets-report
Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk
Re: Lion: precipita un 737 Max8 di 2 mesi
https://www.flightglobal.com/news/artic ... ul-453409/
Inviato dal mio WAS-LX1A utilizzando Tapatalk
Inviato dal mio WAS-LX1A utilizzando Tapatalk
Re: Lion: precipita un 737 Max8 di 2 mesi
Da copia di Flight International in mio possesso:
Queries have been raised over the introduction of a new automated protection system on the Boeing 737 Max which has been linked to the loss of Lion Air flight JT610.
Pilots at US carriers say they were unaware that the airframer had equipped the 737 Max with what it calls the Maneuvring Characteristics Augmentation System.
The Allied Pilots Association, which represents flightcrew at American Airlines, a 737 Max operator, says it is "looking at differences between the Max and the non-Max aircraft" in an effort to understand nuances in stall-prevention and notification systems.
MCAS, which is not present on earlier-generation 737s, automatically trims the aircraft's stabiliser, dropping the nose to avoid stalls.
However, that could cause a dangerous situation to develop if the system is triggered by erroneous angle-of-attack data. Indonesian investigators have suggested a faulty angle-of-attack sensor may have played a role in the Lion Air crash in late October, in which 189 people perished.
The APA says inclusion of the MCAS seems to have been accompanied by slight changes as to how pilots should respond to a runaway stabiliser situation.
Pilots have long been taught that pulling back on a 737's control column can arrest that condition - a fix pilots call a "breakaway", says the APA.
Although American's runaway stabiliser checklist, dated 10 July, gives just that instruction, the APA has since learned that the 737 Max is apparently different.
Inviato dal mio WAS-LX1A utilizzando Tapatalk
Queries have been raised over the introduction of a new automated protection system on the Boeing 737 Max which has been linked to the loss of Lion Air flight JT610.
Pilots at US carriers say they were unaware that the airframer had equipped the 737 Max with what it calls the Maneuvring Characteristics Augmentation System.
The Allied Pilots Association, which represents flightcrew at American Airlines, a 737 Max operator, says it is "looking at differences between the Max and the non-Max aircraft" in an effort to understand nuances in stall-prevention and notification systems.
MCAS, which is not present on earlier-generation 737s, automatically trims the aircraft's stabiliser, dropping the nose to avoid stalls.
However, that could cause a dangerous situation to develop if the system is triggered by erroneous angle-of-attack data. Indonesian investigators have suggested a faulty angle-of-attack sensor may have played a role in the Lion Air crash in late October, in which 189 people perished.
The APA says inclusion of the MCAS seems to have been accompanied by slight changes as to how pilots should respond to a runaway stabiliser situation.
Pilots have long been taught that pulling back on a 737's control column can arrest that condition - a fix pilots call a "breakaway", says the APA.
Although American's runaway stabiliser checklist, dated 10 July, gives just that instruction, the APA has since learned that the 737 Max is apparently different.
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Re: Lion: precipita un 737 Max8 di 2 mesi
https://www.flightglobal.com/news/artic ... f203142969
Non avrebbe neanche dovuto completare il volo precedente...
Inviato dal mio WAS-LX1A utilizzando Tapatalk
Non avrebbe neanche dovuto completare il volo precedente...
Inviato dal mio WAS-LX1A utilizzando Tapatalk
Re: Lion: precipita un 737 Max8 di 2 mesi
Problema più volte ignorato/sottovalutato che ha portato al disastro.
Marco
The engine is the heart of an airplane but the pilot is its soul.
The engine is the heart of an airplane but the pilot is its soul.
Re: Lion: precipita un 737 Max8 di 2 mesi
Da copia di flight international in mio possesso
Investigators have called on Lion Air to improve its safety culture, after a probe into the loss of a Boeing 737 Max 8 found the aircraft was not airworthy for the flight conducted prior to the accident.
That 28 October service from Denpasar to Jakarta - a day before ill-fated flight JT610 - had experienced similar technical issues, says Indonesia's National Transportation Safety Committee (NTSC).
Shortly after take-off, an airspeed disagreement message appeared on the primary flight display. The aircraft's stick-shaker activated and remained active throughout the flight. "This condition is considered un-airworthy and the flight shall not be continued," says the NTSC.
During the 28 October flight, the crew determined there was an issue with the left-hand primary flight display after checks following the airspeed disagreement warning. The crew also noticed that the aircraft would automatically trim nose-down as soon as the trim input was stopped.
After three automatic nose-down occurrences, the first officer said the control column was too heavy to hold back.
The crew turned off the stabiliser trim switches and continued with manual trim. Three non-normal checklists concerning unreliable airspeed, altitude disagreement and runaway stabiliser were performed but none called for the aircraft to land at the nearest suitable airport.
Investigators found the aircraft had experienced speed and altitude issues on four flights prior to the crash, centred on indications on the left primary flight display.
On one of these previous flights the angle-of-attack sensor had been replaced, with a number of other checks undertaken.
Tests were then performed on the ground, with the engineer satisfied that the issued had been resolved before dispatching the jet.
Investigators found that, during the fatal 29 October flight, the pilots reported a "flight control problem" and had to ask air traffic control for the aircraft's altitude and speed. The crew also requested an altitude block spanning 3,000ft above and below the jet, for traffic avoidance.
There was a 20° difference between the left- and right-hand angle-of-attack sensors throughout the flight. The left-hand control column stick-shaker activated and continued for most of the flight.
LOST CONTROL
Flight-data recorder information shows the aircraft automatically pitched nose-down more than two dozen times during the 11min flight, with the pilots pulling the nose up each time. The automatic nose-down trim stopped when the flaps were extended, but continued when they were retracted. The cycle continued before the pilots eventually lost control.
The aircraft's cockpit-voice recorder has not yet been recovered.
Investigators are still to determine the role played by the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS), which uses horizontal stabiliser movements to lower the nose - and avert a stall - if the 737 Max's systems detect high angles of attack. This response would depend on receiving accurate angle-of-attack information.
Uncommanded nose-down responses could be indicative of a runaway stabiliser, where the stabiliser does not stop at the required point - but crews are trained to respond appropriately.
Boeing issued a bulletin to 737 Max operators after the accident, directing them to "existing flightcrew procedures" to address circumstances involving erroneous angle-of-attack information. The airframer has issued assurances that the 737 Max is safe, and notes that while the crew on the prior Denpasar-Jakarta flight ran the runaway stabiliser checklist, the inquiry "does not state [they] communicated that fact" afterwards.
Following the runaway stabiliser checks would disengage the MCAS. Boeing says the inquiry has not stated whether the pilots of flight JT610 performed the correct procedure or used the stabiliser trim cut-out switches.
Inviato dal mio WAS-LX1A utilizzando Tapatalk
Investigators have called on Lion Air to improve its safety culture, after a probe into the loss of a Boeing 737 Max 8 found the aircraft was not airworthy for the flight conducted prior to the accident.
That 28 October service from Denpasar to Jakarta - a day before ill-fated flight JT610 - had experienced similar technical issues, says Indonesia's National Transportation Safety Committee (NTSC).
Shortly after take-off, an airspeed disagreement message appeared on the primary flight display. The aircraft's stick-shaker activated and remained active throughout the flight. "This condition is considered un-airworthy and the flight shall not be continued," says the NTSC.
During the 28 October flight, the crew determined there was an issue with the left-hand primary flight display after checks following the airspeed disagreement warning. The crew also noticed that the aircraft would automatically trim nose-down as soon as the trim input was stopped.
After three automatic nose-down occurrences, the first officer said the control column was too heavy to hold back.
The crew turned off the stabiliser trim switches and continued with manual trim. Three non-normal checklists concerning unreliable airspeed, altitude disagreement and runaway stabiliser were performed but none called for the aircraft to land at the nearest suitable airport.
Investigators found the aircraft had experienced speed and altitude issues on four flights prior to the crash, centred on indications on the left primary flight display.
On one of these previous flights the angle-of-attack sensor had been replaced, with a number of other checks undertaken.
Tests were then performed on the ground, with the engineer satisfied that the issued had been resolved before dispatching the jet.
Investigators found that, during the fatal 29 October flight, the pilots reported a "flight control problem" and had to ask air traffic control for the aircraft's altitude and speed. The crew also requested an altitude block spanning 3,000ft above and below the jet, for traffic avoidance.
There was a 20° difference between the left- and right-hand angle-of-attack sensors throughout the flight. The left-hand control column stick-shaker activated and continued for most of the flight.
LOST CONTROL
Flight-data recorder information shows the aircraft automatically pitched nose-down more than two dozen times during the 11min flight, with the pilots pulling the nose up each time. The automatic nose-down trim stopped when the flaps were extended, but continued when they were retracted. The cycle continued before the pilots eventually lost control.
The aircraft's cockpit-voice recorder has not yet been recovered.
Investigators are still to determine the role played by the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS), which uses horizontal stabiliser movements to lower the nose - and avert a stall - if the 737 Max's systems detect high angles of attack. This response would depend on receiving accurate angle-of-attack information.
Uncommanded nose-down responses could be indicative of a runaway stabiliser, where the stabiliser does not stop at the required point - but crews are trained to respond appropriately.
Boeing issued a bulletin to 737 Max operators after the accident, directing them to "existing flightcrew procedures" to address circumstances involving erroneous angle-of-attack information. The airframer has issued assurances that the 737 Max is safe, and notes that while the crew on the prior Denpasar-Jakarta flight ran the runaway stabiliser checklist, the inquiry "does not state [they] communicated that fact" afterwards.
Following the runaway stabiliser checks would disengage the MCAS. Boeing says the inquiry has not stated whether the pilots of flight JT610 performed the correct procedure or used the stabiliser trim cut-out switches.
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