Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di ET, conseguenze sul mezzo e sul mercato

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kco
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Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di ET, conseguenze sul mezzo e sul mercato

Messaggio da leggereda kco » mar 17 dic 2019, 07:46:11

Boeing si è ritagliata il ruolo di gregario sui nb per i prossimi 5-7 anni. Il max tornerà a volare ma non raggiungerà mai la parità con il neo. E secondo me nessuna mega compagnia, tipo southwest o FR, d ora in poi si affiderà solo al max.

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mattaus313
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Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di ET, conseguenze sul mezzo e sul mercato

Messaggio da leggereda mattaus313 » mar 17 dic 2019, 11:52:26

Ma il 737 NG non è più in produzione? Non potrebbero, per ora, sopperire tutto questo ritornando a produrre il 737 NG rivendendolo a prezzi "stracciati" per rimanere nel mercato (occidentale) dei NB?
"Because you needed a lot of capital in an airline, you needed to be where the financial markets were, and obviously that's New York"

kco
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Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di ET, conseguenze sul mezzo e sul mercato

Messaggio da leggereda kco » mar 17 dic 2019, 11:57:16

mattaus313 ha scritto:Ma il 737 NG non è più in produzione? Non potrebbero, per ora, sopperire tutto questo ritornando a produrre il 737 NG rivendendolo a prezzi "stracciati" per rimanere nel mercato (occidentale) dei NB?
No, non c è più una supply chain per quell aereo.

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malpensante
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Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di ET, conseguenze sul mezzo e sul mercato

Messaggio da leggereda malpensante » mar 17 dic 2019, 11:57:17

Produrre ancora NG non avrebbe senso. Le pezze al MAX sono state trovate e implementate, adesso è in corso il lungo iter della FAA per verificare che vada tutto bene.
Il MAX avrà vita breve, perché Boeing deve mettersi subito a progettare il sostegno, ma non c’è nessun bisogno di tornare alla versione NG.

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mattaus313
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Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di ET, conseguenze sul mezzo e sul mercato

Messaggio da leggereda mattaus313 » mar 17 dic 2019, 12:04:40

Nemmeno per mantenere il mercato e fornire "qualcosa" agli sventurati acquirenti?

Questo scherzetto alla Boeing non è costato poco e probabilmente continuerà a costare, a conti fatti tra danno d'immagine e perdite vere a bilancio io credo che sia una buona pezza. Se fosse morto e non hanno già iniziato a lavorare ad altro ci vuole qualche anno prima di avere qualcosa di nuovo, e nel mentre ogni nuovo ordine finirebbe ad Airbus.
Con un NG, facendo leva sul prezzo, si potrebbe almeno mettere una piccola pezza, facendosi buone tutte quelle compagnie che probabilmente per via del basso utilizzo (o riempimento) potrebbero avere interesse nell'avere un aereo dove il canone di leasing incida meno del consumo di carburante sul costo operativo.
"Because you needed a lot of capital in an airline, you needed to be where the financial markets were, and obviously that's New York"

kco
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Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di ET, conseguenze sul mezzo e sul mercato

Messaggio da leggereda kco » mar 17 dic 2019, 12:30:05

mattaus313 ha scritto:Nemmeno per mantenere il mercato e fornire "qualcosa" agli sventurati acquirenti?

Questo scherzetto alla Boeing non è costato poco e probabilmente continuerà a costare, a conti fatti tra danno d'immagine e perdite vere a bilancio io credo che sia una buona pezza. Se fosse morto e non hanno già iniziato a lavorare ad altro ci vuole qualche anno prima di avere qualcosa di nuovo, e nel mentre ogni nuovo ordine finirebbe ad Airbus.
Con un NG, facendo leva sul prezzo, si potrebbe almeno mettere una piccola pezza, facendosi buone tutte quelle compagnie che probabilmente per via del basso utilizzo (o riempimento) potrebbero avere interesse nell'avere un aereo dove il canone di leasing incida meno del consumo di carburante sul costo operativo.
Per rimettere in piedi la produzione del NG ci vorrebbero anni. Per metà anno il max torna a volare e, come detto da Malpensante, poi si lavorerà al successore. Non ci sarà, probabilmente, nessun NMA, ma un nuovo nb.

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mattaus313
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Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di ET, conseguenze sul mezzo e sul mercato

Messaggio da leggereda mattaus313 » mar 17 dic 2019, 12:36:25

kco ha scritto: Per metà anno il max torna a volare
Io non ci metterei la mano sul fuoco.
"Because you needed a lot of capital in an airline, you needed to be where the financial markets were, and obviously that's New York"

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malpensante
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Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di ET, conseguenze sul mezzo e sul mercato

Messaggio da leggereda malpensante » mar 17 dic 2019, 12:37:09

Non ci sono abbastanza risorse per sviluppare insieme NMA e il sostituto del 737.

kco
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Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di ET, conseguenze sul mezzo e sul mercato

Messaggio da leggereda kco » mer 18 dic 2019, 08:29:22

Da copia di flight international in mio possesso. Direi che la cosa più pesante è il TARAM...
Boeing has been dealt a fresh blow in its ambition to have the 737 Max recertificated this year, after the head of the US ­Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) admitted the milestone would not be reached until 2020.

FAA Administrator Steve ­Dickson confirmed the 2020 date on the same day he laid out the ­remaining steps that the agency will take before lifting the Max grounding order.

“We are not on any timeline,” Dickson told CNBC’s Squawk Box. “There are about 10 or 11 milestones left to complete.

“Each one of those processes is going to take some time,” Dickson adds. “If you simply do the math, it is going to extend into 2020.”

Until recently, Boeing was ­insisting that it expected the FAA would approve the Max to fly ­before year-end.

In response to Dickson’s comments, Boeing says: “We continue to work closely with the FAA and global regulators towards certification and the safe return to service of the Max.”

US airlines have removed the aircraft from their flight schedules until early March 2020.

Dickson further addressed the Max’s certification during an 11 December hearing of the US House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure.

CONTROL SYSTEMS

“We are currently looking at how the software has been developed, along with our international partners,” he told lawmakers. ­Dickson adds that the FAA is auditing information related to the 737 Max’s flight-control software ahead of a certification flight.

Steps remaining include: ­completion of a pilot training evaluation being performed by the multinational Joint Operations Evaluation Board (JOEB); completion of a certification flight; a submission from the FAA’s Flight Standardisation Board, which will be made public for review and comment; and a reviewed continued airworthiness notification, followed by an airworthiness directive, in which the agency will specify required actions.

Dickson declines to address what specific pilot training the agency may require as part of its Max certification.

Boeing had earlier in December reiterated that achieving consensus among national aviation ­regulators would be key to ensuring a successful return to service for the 737 Max, which has been grounded since March 2019.

“If we do not co-ordinate this [return to service] we may see some disaggregation, and I don’t think that’s a future any of us wants to see,” says Dennis Muilenburg, Boeing chief executive, speaking to media in Seattle.

The 737 Max was grounded in the wake of fatal crashes in October 2018 and March 2019.

In both cases, the twinjet’s Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS) seems to have been erroneously triggered by faulty or damaged angle-of-attack (AoA) sensors, repeatedly pushing the nose of the aircraft down until the crews lost control.

Muilenburg says he is confident that the combined hardware and software changes Boeing has developed for the MCAS will ­satisfy the FAA and the JOEB.

Boeing test pilot Craig Bomben has co-ordinated development on the type since the ­accidents and says the proposed solution is “an intelligent ­system” against the original “very simple” iteration.

Bomben says the new system will draw data from two AoA sensors rather than one, and if their readings differ by 5.5° or more, MCAS is not triggered.

But if it is correctly triggered, the system memorises how much stabiliser displacement has taken place each time. Therefore if it is activated more than once, it takes account of existing displacement and sets a safe absolute cumulative limit.

Additional reporting by David Learmount in Seattle

REPORT

Regulator knew of deadly MCAS risk but allowed jet to fly on

A Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) analysis completed months before the second 737 Max crash found that the twinjet’s flight-­control system, if unchanged, could cause 15 fatal accidents over the service life of the aircraft.

The US House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure released a copy of the document on 11 December.

The FAA undertook the analysis, called a “Transport Aircraft Risk Assessment Methodology” (TARAM), in response to the first 737 Max crash, a Lion Air aircraft, which killed 189 in October 2018.

In response to that crash, the agency issued an airworthiness directive (AD) on 7 November 2018, and completed the TARAM on 3 December 2018.

It did not ground the Max until 13 March 2019 – three days after the crash of an Ethiopian Airlines 737 Max 8, which killed another 157 passengers and crew.

“Shortly after the issuance of the airworthiness directive, the FAA performed an analysis that concluded that, if left uncorrected, the [Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System] MCAS design flaw in the 737 Max could result in as many as 15 future fatal crashes over the life of the fleet,” says the transportation committee.

The report shows the FAA based its accident prediction on the estimate that 4,800 737 Max aircraft will fly over the programme’s life.

The committee says the FAA’s analysis assumed 1% of flightcrews would not successfully comply with the AD.

That directive warned that faulty angle-of-attack indicators could make the horizontal ­stabilisers pitch the aircraft’s nose down. The order required airlines to make pilots aware of trim ­recovery procedures, but made no mention of the MCAS ­software which was behind the stabiliser movement.

Boeing has declined to ­comment about the December 2018 TARAM.




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I-GABE
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Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di ET, conseguenze sul mezzo e sul mercato

Messaggio da leggereda I-GABE » sab 21 dic 2019, 17:15:12

Non ha a che fare con i Max, ma certo che a Boeing non ne va bene una quest'anno!
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles ... ium-europe
(fonte: Bloomberg)

kco
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Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di ET, conseguenze sul mezzo e sul mercato

Messaggio da leggereda kco » sab 21 dic 2019, 19:15:19

I-GABE ha scritto:Non ha a che fare con i Max, ma certo che a Boeing non ne va bene una quest'anno!
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles ... ium-europe
(fonte: Bloomberg)
Sbagliare in ambito spaziale è un piu facile...

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malpensante
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Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di ET, conseguenze sul mezzo e sul mercato

Messaggio da leggereda malpensante » lun 23 dic 2019, 01:50:33

At Boeing, C.E.O.’s Stumbles Deepen a Crisis

Dennis Muilenburg’s handling of the 737 Max grounding after two fatal crashes has angered lawmakers, airlines, regulators and victims’ families.

By Natalie Kitroeff and David Gelles
Dec. 22, 2019
Updated 10:09 a.m. ET


In a tense, private meeting last week in Washington, the head of the Federal Aviation Administration reprimanded Boeing’s chief executive for putting pressure on the agency to move faster in approving the return of the company’s 737 Max jet.

This was the first face-to-face encounter between the F.A.A. chief, Stephen Dickson, and the executive, Dennis A. Muilenburg, and Mr. Dickson told him not to ask for any favors during the discussion. He said Boeing should focus on providing all the documents needed to fully describe the plane’s software changes according to two people briefed on the meeting.

It was a rare dressing-down for the leader of one of the world’s biggest companies, and a sign of the deteriorating relationship between Mr. Muilenburg and the regulator that will determine when Boeing’s most important plane will fly again.

The global grounding of the 737 Max has entered its 10th month, after two crashes that killed 346 people, and the most significant crisis in Boeing’s history has no end in sight. Mr. Muilenburg is under immense pressure to achieve two distinct goals. He wants to return the Max to service as soon as possible, relieving the pressure on Boeing, airlines and suppliers. Yet the company and regulators must fix an automated system known as MCAS found to have played a role in both crashes, ensuring the Max is certified safely and transparently. Caught in the middle, Mr. Muilenburg has found himself promising more than he can deliver.

After the crashes, but before the plane was grounded, Mr. Muilenburg called President Trump and expressed confidence in the safety of the Max. He has repeatedly made overly optimistic projections about how quickly the plane would return to service, pushing for speedy approval from regulators. The constantly shifting timeline has created chaos for airlines, which have had to cancel thousands of flights and sacrifice billions of dollars in sales.

In his few public appearances, Mr. Muilenburg’s attempts to offer a sincere apology for the accidents have been clumsy, prolonging Boeing’s reputational pain. His performance has left lawmakers irate. The families of crash victims, convinced the company does not care about their loss, have repeatedly confronted him with posters of the dead.

The missteps led Boeing to one of the most consequential decisions in its 103-year history, when it announced on Monday that it was temporarily shutting down the 737 factory, a move that has already begun rippling through the national economy.

The Max is Boeing’s best seller, with tens of billions of dollars in future sales at stake. Boeing stock has fallen by 22 percent in this crisis, costing the company more than $8 billion and spreading pain throughout a supply chain that extends to 8,000 companies. On Friday, Spirit AeroSystems, which makes the Max fuselage, said it would stop production of the part next month.

“Throughout this process our No. 1 priority has been safety,” Gordon Johndroe, a Boeing spokesman, said in a statement. “We have learned a lot this year and our company is changing.”
Last week, when Mr. Trump called Mr. Muilenburg to discuss Boeing’s problems, the chief executive assured the president that a production shutdown would only be temporary.

But Boeing still faces serious hurdles. The company has not delivered a complete software package to the F.A.A. for approval. In recent simulator tests, pilots did not use the correct emergency procedures, raising new questions about whether regulators will require more extensive training for pilots to fly the plane or whether the procedures needed to be changed, according to two people briefed on the matter.

And on Friday, a new space capsule Boeing designed for NASA failed to reach the correct orbit, another blow to company morale and a setback for the United States space program.

“If it was my call to make, Muilenburg would’ve been fired long ago,” Rep. Peter DeFazio, Democrat of Oregon and the chairman of the House Transportation Committee investigating Boeing, said in an email. “Boeing could send a strong signal that it is truly serious about safety by holding its top decision-maker accountable.”

From the earliest days of the grounding in March, shortly after the crash of Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 and months after the first Max crash, off Indonesia, Mr. Muilenburg tried to put the episode behind him as swiftly as possible, telling airlines it would last just weeks.

“By the time April rolled around, Boeing was telling us next week, next month,” Gary Kelly, the chief executive of Southwest Airlines, said in an interview. “We were a week away, weeks away, three weeks away.”

That misplaced optimism made it impossible for airlines including Southwest, which is Boeing’s biggest 737 customer, to reliably plan their routes. “It was really creating havoc,” Mr. Kelly said.

In August, regulators from Europe, Canada and Brazil flew to Seattle and joined F.A.A. officials for a meeting with Boeing. They were expecting to review reams of documentation describing the software update for the Max. Instead, the Boeing representatives offered a brief PowerPoint presentation, in line with what they had done in the past. The regulators left the meeting early.

“We were looking for a lot more rigor in the presentation of the materials,” said Earl Lawrence, the head of the F.A.A.’s aircraft certification office. “They were not ready.”

With delays mounting, Mr. Muilenburg missed a chance to smooth things over with key customers. In September, he attended a gathering of a club of aviation executives called Conquistadores del Cielo at a ranch in Wyoming, according to two people familiar with the trip. As the group bonded while throwing knives and drinking beers, Mr. Muilenburg took long bike rides by himself. It was typical behavior for Mr. Muilenburg, an introverted engineer who prefers Diet Mountain Dew to alcohol, but it left other executives baffled.

October brought a string of bad news for Mr. Muilenburg. The board stripped him of his title as chairman, a stinging rebuke of his leadership. The decision, the board said, would allow him to focus on the single most important job at the company: bringing the Max back to service.
About two weeks before Mr. Muilenburg testified in front of Congress for the first time, the company disclosed to lawmakers instant messages from 2016 in which a Boeing pilot complained that the system known as MCAS, which was new to the plane, was acting unpredictably in a flight simulator. Boeing discovered the instant messages in January, but Mr. Muilenburg did not read them at the time, instead telling the company’s legal team to handle them.

The messages included the pilot saying he “basically lied to the regulators (unknowingly).”

When Mr. Dickson learned of the messages in October, he sent a one-paragraph letter to Mr. Muilenburg demanding an explanation for “Boeing’s delay in disclosing the document to its safety regulator.”

Mr. Muilenburg and Mr. Dickson, who took over the F.A.A. this summer, spoke for the first time later that day. Mr. Muilenburg said Boeing hadn’t told the F.A.A. about the messages out of concern that doing so would interfere with a criminal investigation being conducted by the Justice Department, according to two people briefed on the call.

Mr. Dickson said the lack of transparency would only increase the regulator’s scrutiny of the company.

Still, Mr. Muilenburg continued to project confidence, telling investors on an earnings call in October that he expected regulators to begin approving the Max by the end of the year. The company had just fired Kevin McAllister, the chief executive of Boeing’s commercial division who had been overseeing work on the Max.

Despite Mr. Muilenburg’s assurances, airline discontent was growing. The next day, American Airlines joined a chorus of Boeing customers complaining about the growing costs of the Max crisis. Doug Parker, American’s chief executive, said on a call with investors that he was working to “ensure that American is compensated for the lost revenue that the Max grounding has caused, the missed deadlines and extended grounding.”
“We’re working to ensure that Boeing shareholders bear the cost of Boeing’s failures,” Mr. Parker added. “Not American Airlines’ shareholders.”

In two days of congressional hearings at the end of October, Mr. Muilenburg faced withering criticism from lawmakers, who told him to resign or take a pay cut. Mr. Muilenburg said it was up to the board to make decisions about his multimillion-dollar compensation. He invoked his upbringing on an Iowa farm so many times that he elicited jeers from family members of crash victims who were present.

In an interview on CNBC after the hearings, the chairman of Boeing’s board, David Calhoun, said the board was confident in its chief executive.

“From the vantage point of our board, Dennis has done everything right,” Mr. Calhoun said. “If we successfully get from where he started to where we need to end up, I would view that as a very significant milestone and something that speaks to his leadership and his courage and his ability to execute and get us through this.”

Mr. Muilenburg continued to press the F.A.A. In early November, he called Mr. Dickson to ask whether he would consider allowing the company to begin delivering airplanes before they were cleared to fly. The administrator said he would look into it but made no commitments, according to an F.A.A. spokesman.

In an apparent misunderstanding, Mr. Muilenburg took the call as a green light. The next Monday, the company put out a statement saying it could have the plane to customers by the end of the year.

Mr. Dickson told colleagues that he had not agreed to that timeline and felt as though he was being manipulated, according to a person familiar with the matter. That week, he put out a memo and a video urging employees to resist pressure to move quickly on the Max approval.

This month, anxiety levels rose at Boeing’s factory in Renton, Wash. Several key tests had not yet been completed, and European regulators would soon leave work for the holidays and not return until the beginning of January. In calls with F.A.A. officials, Boeing engineers began to float an idea for speeding the process: Perhaps the company should ask the agency to break with its foreign counterparts and approve the Max alone?

The suggestion alarmed some F.A.A. officials, who worried that approving the Max without agreement from other regulators would be untenable, according to two people familiar with the matter. When they called Mr. Dickson to tell him of Boeing’s plans, he balked at the suggestion and eventually the company backed down.

A week later, Mr. Dickson brought Mr. Muilenburg into the agency’s Washington headquarters for their first in-person meeting.

There, Mr. Dickson said he had done the math, and there was no way the Max could fly by the end of the year.

When Mr. Muilenburg brought up the logistics of delivering Max jets to customers, Mr. Dickson would not discuss the issue, two people familiar with the matter said. Boeing’s representatives said they might need to consider temporarily shutting down production. Mr. Dickson told them to do what they needed to do, saying the agency was focused on conducting a thorough review.

Four days later, Boeing announced it would bring the 737 factory to a halt. There was no discussion of removing Mr. Muilenburg as chief executive at last week’s board meeting in Chicago where the shutdown was debated, according to three people briefed on the meeting.
The challenges facing Mr. Muilenburg extend beyond returning the Max to service and the botched space capsule launch on Friday. The F.A.A. is aware of more potentially damaging messages from Boeing employees that the company has not turned over to the agency. Other important planes are behind schedule. New defects have been found on older models of the 737. Boeing lost two major pieces of business to Airbus, its European rival, this month.

“This hasn’t been their best and finest hour,” said Mr. Kelly, the Southwest Airlines chief executive. “There’s mistakes made and they need to address those.”

With the first anniversary of the Ethiopian accident approaching in March, Boeing recently asked a representative for the families of crash victims if it would be appropriate for Mr. Muilenburg to attend the memorial. They said no.

“He is not welcome there,” said Zipporah Kuria, whose father, Joseph Waithaka, was killed in the second crash. “Whenever his name is said, people’s eyes are flooded with tears.”


https://nyti.ms/34Lkm5t

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wrth
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Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di ET, conseguenze sul mezzo e sul mercato

Messaggio da leggereda wrth » lun 23 dic 2019, 10:31:35

Certo che l'efficienza e l'organizzazione americana non ne escono bene da questa faccenda. Ciò mi ricorda una mia recentissima esperienza con un fornitore Americano che rappresento in Italia... :tilegno: Sarà solo una coincidenza...

I-GABE
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Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di ET, conseguenze sul mezzo e sul mercato

Messaggio da leggereda I-GABE » lun 23 dic 2019, 11:28:22

Non mi risulta che abbiano mai brillato per efficienza ed organizzazione, a dire il vero.

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malpensante
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Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di ET, conseguenze sul mezzo e sul mercato

Messaggio da leggereda malpensante » lun 23 dic 2019, 16:44:01

Il CEO di Boeing si è finalmente dimesso.

https://www.google.it/amp/s/amp.cnn.com ... index.html

Boeing, going, gone

KittyHawk
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Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di ET, conseguenze sul mezzo e sul mercato

Messaggio da leggereda KittyHawk » lun 23 dic 2019, 18:11:59

Due ipotesi dietro le dimissioni: la situazione tecnica del MAX è molto più grave di ciò che si voleva fare apparire, oppure il livello di credibilità di Boeing è ridotto al lumicino, visto il continuo slittamento del rientro in servizio dei MAX, e occorreva dare l'impressione di un cambiamento.
Per quello che può valere, il valore delle azioni di Boeing è salito rispetto a ieri.

kco
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Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di ET, conseguenze sul mezzo e sul mercato

Messaggio da leggereda kco » lun 23 dic 2019, 22:13:20

KittyHawk ha scritto:Due ipotesi dietro le dimissioni: la situazione tecnica del MAX è molto più grave di ciò che si voleva fare apparire, oppure il livello di credibilità di Boeing è ridotto al lumicino, visto il continuo slittamento del rientro in servizio dei MAX, e occorreva dare l'impressione di un cambiamento.
Per quello che può valere, il valore delle azioni di Boeing è salito rispetto a ieri.
Secondo me sono due aspetti separati: uno è come sia stato possibile arrivare a progettare un aereo con un single point of failure, il secondo come sia possibile non essere stati in grado di sistemare ancora il software. In ambo i casi però mi pare che il problema principale sia la governance di Boeing che ha seri problemi e si è visto praticamente dovunque. Dai fod sui 767 aerocisterna, al max, all'esplosione della fusoliera di un 777x durante un test di sovrapressurizzazione fino all'ultimo problema con un timer sulla capsula lanciata qualche giorno fa.

Boeing non è sacrificabile per gli usa ma il ceo si...

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MXP3000
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Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di ET, conseguenze sul mezzo e sul mercato

Messaggio da leggereda MXP3000 » lun 23 dic 2019, 23:42:00

malpensante ha scritto:Il CEO di Boeing si è finalmente dimesso.
Alleluja.
Uno dei peggiori esempi di attaccamento alla poltrona da parte di un manager dal migliore track-record di danni fatti.
Re Mida alla rovescia.
MXP3000... sognando un hub...

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D960
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Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di ET, conseguenze sul mezzo e sul mercato

Messaggio da leggereda D960 » lun 23 dic 2019, 23:45:35

Oggi in aereo stavo pensando: ''Ma non hanno ancora licenziato nessuno?''

Poi milmxp mi manda un messaggio in chat e leggo la notizia. Onestamente era ora ed è avvenuto anche troppo tardi...
AHO-BLQ-BGY-CAG-DUB-FCO-GOA-GRO-KBP-LIN-MXP-MUC-OLB-PMF-PSA-STN-TBS-TPS-TRN-TRS-TSF-VCE

A Milén si va a Linate per i nazionali, a Bergamo per gli internazionali e a Malpensa per gli intercontinentali e i charter

kco
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Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di ET, conseguenze sul mezzo e sul mercato

Messaggio da leggereda kco » mer 25 dic 2019, 11:37:06

https://www.flightglobal.com/airframers ... 22.article

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kco
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Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di ET, conseguenze sul mezzo e sul mercato

Messaggio da leggereda kco » dom 29 dic 2019, 21:19:02

https://www.seattletimes.com/business/b ... ssion=true

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kco
Messaggi: 4696
Iscritto il: sab 05 gen 2008, 09:01:18

Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di ET, conseguenze sul mezzo e sul mercato

Messaggio da leggereda kco » sab 04 gen 2020, 11:08:40

Da copia di flight international in mio possesso

Dennis Muilenburg took the Boeing helm in the summer of 2015 during a relatively benign period for the manufacturer.

But as he departs, there is a very different atmosphere at the firm’s Chicago headquarters, where the ongoing 737 Max crisis still has many more questions than answers.

Whether his sudden – albeit not unexpected – resignation just as 2019 closed will be sufficient to draw a line under the Max saga remains to be seen. But it is clear that Muilenburg’s – likely temporary – successor, David Calhoun, must corral the Boeing team to quickly make progress on the grounded jet.

Muilenburg’s predecessor Jim McNerney’s mission when he arrived in 2005 was to quickly steady the ship and end a ­series of leadership crises. These had blown up shortly after the merger with McDonnell Douglas, when first Phil Condit and then Harry Stonecipher were forced out in corporate and ethical scandals.

Muilenburg was hand picked by McNerney after an already stellar Boeing career and his promotion to president and chief operating officer in December 2013 placed Muilenburg in the perfect parking orbit at the Chicago headquarters to ultimately succeed him.

McNerney had broadly turned Boeing into a success story. The 787 crisis had been ­resolved and the Max was moving ahead strongly as a successor to the best-selling 737. On the defence side, sales were sluggish, but nonetheless Muilenburg was handed a business that did not require too much fixing.

A key early decision was the unprecedented move to appoint an outsider to ­replace the retiring Boeing lifer Ray Conner at Commercial Airplanes, when Muilenburg chose former GE Aviation Services chief ­executive Kevin McAllister in late 2016.

At the same time, Muilenburg made a big statement of intent, calling for the new Boeing Global Services to become a $50 billion business within a decade, holding one-fifth of the market. The largest player, GE Aviation, had only half that share, and Boeing was effectively declaring war on key supply partners and customers such as Lufthansa.

Muilenburg’s departure should stop the seemingly endless headlines criticising the embattled executive’s handling of the Max crisis. It should also send the right signals to those who suspect the company has been in a state of denial over its predicament.

But the most pressing challenge is delivering concrete progress towards returning the Max to the air. Then there is the similarly daunting task of finding a willing and ­capable successor to lead Boeing out of the biggest crisis since its birth.



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kco
Messaggi: 4696
Iscritto il: sab 05 gen 2008, 09:01:18

Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di ET, conseguenze sul mezzo e sul mercato

Messaggio da leggereda kco » sab 04 gen 2020, 23:43:47

Da copia di flight international in mio possesso

Boeing begins 2020 still stuck in crisis mode, with chief executive Dennis Muilenburg having been forced out on 23 December, shortly after the airframer announced it was suspending 737 Max production while the narrowbody remains grounded.

Muilenburg has been roundly criticised in recent months for not adequately admitting to Boeing’s role in two 737 Max crashes, and for giving overly rosy projections of when regulators would clear the Max to fly again.

Boeing has named board chair David Calhoun to succeed Muilenburg from 13 January, with finance chief Greg Smith taking the post on an interim basis.

“The board of directors decided that a change in leadership was necessary to restore confidence in the company moving forward as it works to repair relationships with regulators, customers and all other stakeholders,” Boeing says.

“Under the company’s new leadership, Boeing will operate with a renewed commitment to full transparency, including effective and proactive communication with the FAA, other global regulators and its customers.”

Calhoun has been a Boeing board member since 2009 and is senior managing director at private equity firm Blackstone Group. However, he will step away from his “non-Boeing commitments” before becoming chief executive, the airframer says.

MIXED REACTION

“It’s not at all a big shock,” says Teal Group aerospace analyst Richard Aboulafia. “Muilenburg wasn’t exactly inspiring confidence, and the production line shutdown wasn’t handled very well at all.

“Calhoun is well respected and should provide short-term stability, although given his private equity background he might be the wrong person as the long-term manager of an engineering company,” he says.

“We are surprised by the timing, as we expected Boeing to maintain its current leadership structure until the Max had successfully returned to service,” says a research note from Canaccord Genuity.

“However, the move points to the depth of communication issues and credibility Boeing currently has with regulators, customers, and politicians.”

Muilenburg’s departure came seven weeks after Calhoun defended the embattled chief executive, describing him as “an asset” who “didn’t create” the 737 Max problem.

But in the weeks since, Boeing’s situation seemingly became more critical, with Steven Dickson, the head of the US Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), criticising the company’s 737 Max certification timeline as unrealistically optimistic.

That damning opinion accompanied the FAA’s view that the Max will not return to service until later this year – considerably after Boeing’s forecast of late 2019.

Faced with a slower pace of regulatory approval, Boeing announced on 17 December that it would suspend production of the twinjet from January. Output had since April been running at a ­reduced rate of 42 aircraft per month. It is unclear how long the production suspension will last, however.

WATCHING BRIEF

Boeing says that the move follows continuous evaluation of its production plans “should the Max grounding continue longer than we expected”. It will instead “prioritise the delivery of stored aircraft”, of which there are around 400 examples.

The move will be “the least disruptive to maintaining long-term production system and supply-chain health”, says Boeing.

Production workers will ­“continue 737-related work or be temporarily assigned to other teams in Puget Sound”, the airframer adds.

“It’s going to be a painful couple of months, for everybody involved,” says Aboulafia. “It isn’t a huge surprise, but I would’ve thought they would lower the production rate rather than suspend output.”

Analyst Michel Merluzeau from consultancy AIR says Boeing can still recover if the Max is back in the air early in 2020, but cautions that a longer delay would significantly deepen the crisis. “Everything depends on a positive Max outcome,” he says.

As a result of Boeing’s decision, fuselage supplier Spirit AeroSystems has already also been forced to cut output.

Spirit has suspended production of 737 fuselages at its Wichita facility, a work package that “represents more than 50% of Spirit’s annual revenue”, it says, warning of an “adverse” financial impact from the move.

The company says it is “evaluating all potential actions to align its cost base with lower production levels expected in 2020. ­Decisions will be guided by a focus on what is best for the long-term interests of Spirit’s stockholders and other stakeholders, including employees.”

Spirit had been producing 52 737 airframes per month – effectively the rate immediately prior to the grounding – in an effort by Boeing to reduce the financial impact of the Max crisis on its supply chain.

CFM International, which provides the Max’s Leap-1B engines, has yet to detail how it will deal with the production halt.




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kco
Messaggi: 4696
Iscritto il: sab 05 gen 2008, 09:01:18

Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di ET, conseguenze sul mezzo e sul mercato

Messaggio da leggereda kco » lun 06 gen 2020, 20:43:26

https://samchui.com/2020/01/06/investig ... hONZGTcmDZ

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kco
Messaggi: 4696
Iscritto il: sab 05 gen 2008, 09:01:18

Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di ET, conseguenze sul mezzo e sul mercato

Messaggio da leggereda kco » mar 07 gen 2020, 07:39:42

https://mobile.reuters.com/article/amp/ ... ssion=true

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