Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di ET, conseguenze sul mezzo e sul mercato
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Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di Ethiopian
https://www.flightglobal.com/news/artic ... pe-457282/
Mano a mano i dettagli stanno venendo fuori. I piloti hanno correttamente disabilitato in prima battuta l MCAS ma si sono trovati in difficoltà a trimmare l' aereo ad alta velocità. Resta da chiarire la posizione del trim switch poco prima dello schianto.
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Mano a mano i dettagli stanno venendo fuori. I piloti hanno correttamente disabilitato in prima battuta l MCAS ma si sono trovati in difficoltà a trimmare l' aereo ad alta velocità. Resta da chiarire la posizione del trim switch poco prima dello schianto.
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Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di Ethiopian
Ulteriori articoli
https://aviationanalyst.co.uk/2019/04/1 ... ssion=true
https://www.flightglobal.com/news/artic ... f210840628
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https://aviationanalyst.co.uk/2019/04/1 ... ssion=true
https://www.flightglobal.com/news/artic ... f210840628
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- malpensante
- Messaggi: 18627
- Iscritto il: mar 20 nov 2007, 18:05:14
- Località: Milano
Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di Ethiopian
Che disastro! Il caso 737 MAX entrerà nei manuali di management.
Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di Ethiopian
https://twitter.com/leonard_berberi/sta ... 72356?s=19
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Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di Ethiopian
Di per sé il problema MCAS si può sistemare relativamente in fretta, ma penso che in Boeing stiano rivedendo molto attentamente tutto il design dell'aereo.
Il 737 Max non può cadere un'altra volta per colpa dell'aereo, se succede è morto definitivamente.
Il 737 Max non può cadere un'altra volta per colpa dell'aereo, se succede è morto definitivamente.
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- Messaggi: 2819
- Iscritto il: sab 12 set 2015, 00:14:48
Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di Ethiopian
...senza bisogno di "tirargliela", la Boeing e' gia' KO adesso con 7M8. Su questo non si riprendera' piu' se non fra una decina d'anni forse. Gli ordini verranno progressivamente cancellati e quelli gia' in flotta le Compagnie cercheranno di trovare soluzioni di vario tipo, perché l'impatto emotivo nei prossimi anni sara' ancora molto forte. E' bene che incomincino a "pensare" a un altra macchina.
Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di Ethiopian
Dubito a un impatto così forte, banalmente Airbus non riesce ad aumentare la produzione nel breve. Comunque in ambiente Airbus circola la voce che Boeing potrebbe anticipare il prossimo aereo a corto raggio, di fatto questo accelera gli studi preliminari di Airbus per poter rispondere in tempi brevi.romaneeconti ha scritto:...senza bisogno di "tirargliela", la Boeing e' gia' KO adesso con 7M8. Su questo non si riprendera' piu' se non fra una decina d'anni forse. Gli ordini verranno progressivamente cancellati e quelli gia' in flotta le Compagnie cercheranno di trovare soluzioni di vario tipo, perché l'impatto emotivo nei prossimi anni sara' ancora molto forte. E' bene che incomincino a "pensare" a un altra macchina.
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-
- Messaggi: 2819
- Iscritto il: sab 12 set 2015, 00:14:48
Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di Ethiopian
Concordo anche con la tua "moderazione" e puo' essere che io abbia accentuato non poco l'effetto emozionale per quanto accaduto. Vero che il business e' regolato da "menti" non emozionali (mi riferisco all'eventuale impatto che sull'onda appunto emozionale potrebbero avere le cancellazioni progressive sugli ordini dei 7M8), ma non abbiamo certezze. A mio parere in un caso o nell'altro, si potranno dedurre le conseguenze di quanto accaduto tra qualche anno. E il mercato non puo' attendere cosi' a lungo... qaulche decisione andra' pur presa.kco ha scritto:Dubito a un impatto così forte, banalmente Airbus non riesce ad aumentare la produzione nel breve. Comunque in ambiente Airbus circola la voce che Boeing potrebbe anticipare il prossimo aereo a corto raggio, di fatto questo accelera gli studi preliminari di Airbus per poter rispondere in tempi brevi.romaneeconti ha scritto:...senza bisogno di "tirargliela", la Boeing e' gia' KO adesso con 7M8. Su questo non si riprendera' piu' se non fra una decina d'anni forse. Gli ordini verranno progressivamente cancellati e quelli gia' in flotta le Compagnie cercheranno di trovare soluzioni di vario tipo, perché l'impatto emotivo nei prossimi anni sara' ancora molto forte. E' bene che incomincino a "pensare" a un altra macchina.
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Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di Ethiopian
M sembrano affermazioni un po' affrettate
Malpensa airport user
Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di Ethiopian
Da copia di flight International in mio possesso
The Boeing 737 Max grounding is an evolving and multi-faceted story. This makes it extremely hard to predict how it will be resolved, and the extent to which Boeing, its customers and the global supply chain will be affected.
The short-term outlook is certainly difficult, and there is a crisis-management challenge for the public relations teams from Boeing and the airlines, the like of which is unprecedented in modern times.
Not only does it seem to be open season to take pot shots at Boeing, but the spotlight has also swung onto the reputation of the USA's certification authority. Both will also need to rebuild faith in their safety cultures.
The Max suspension is unlike any other high-profile grounding in modern times - and of course faces the glare of intense social-media scrutiny. It is difficult to judge how much reputational damage was suffered by the McDonnell Douglas DC-10, grounded following the 1979 crash of an American Airlines aircraft after an engine pylon failed.
The Max suspension is unlike any of the other groundings - and takes place in the glare of intense social-media scrutiny
Any impact the grounding has on the 737 Max orderbook - both current and future - will be determined by Boeing's response to the investigations, both in words and deeds. The smart money says order will prevail and that sooner, rather than later, the 737 Max will be flying again, allowing the delicate Airbus/Boeing single-aisle ecosystem to be restored. Given that the industry had - prior to the grounding - expected to induct more than 1,300 single-aisles in 2019, alternative scenarios would make for worrisome reading.
A 1979 Flight International opinion piece around the DC-10 grounding stated the simple decision-making process needed to return the aircraft to flight.
Paraphrasing that article, which was titled "inspecting the inspectors", it could equally apply to the 737 Max situation: "The decision rests on affirmative answers to two questions: is the cause of the accidents understood to the satisfaction of the most qualified experts? And do all proposed new procedures satisfy the same experts?"
The article went on to say that the DC-10's engine mountings would "surely be the safest flying" after the scrutiny of the investigation. The same of course must be true of 737 Max systems and training once the required changes are implemented.
But that is probably the easier challenge. A harder one will be convincing the world
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The Boeing 737 Max grounding is an evolving and multi-faceted story. This makes it extremely hard to predict how it will be resolved, and the extent to which Boeing, its customers and the global supply chain will be affected.
The short-term outlook is certainly difficult, and there is a crisis-management challenge for the public relations teams from Boeing and the airlines, the like of which is unprecedented in modern times.
Not only does it seem to be open season to take pot shots at Boeing, but the spotlight has also swung onto the reputation of the USA's certification authority. Both will also need to rebuild faith in their safety cultures.
The Max suspension is unlike any other high-profile grounding in modern times - and of course faces the glare of intense social-media scrutiny. It is difficult to judge how much reputational damage was suffered by the McDonnell Douglas DC-10, grounded following the 1979 crash of an American Airlines aircraft after an engine pylon failed.
The Max suspension is unlike any of the other groundings - and takes place in the glare of intense social-media scrutiny
Any impact the grounding has on the 737 Max orderbook - both current and future - will be determined by Boeing's response to the investigations, both in words and deeds. The smart money says order will prevail and that sooner, rather than later, the 737 Max will be flying again, allowing the delicate Airbus/Boeing single-aisle ecosystem to be restored. Given that the industry had - prior to the grounding - expected to induct more than 1,300 single-aisles in 2019, alternative scenarios would make for worrisome reading.
A 1979 Flight International opinion piece around the DC-10 grounding stated the simple decision-making process needed to return the aircraft to flight.
Paraphrasing that article, which was titled "inspecting the inspectors", it could equally apply to the 737 Max situation: "The decision rests on affirmative answers to two questions: is the cause of the accidents understood to the satisfaction of the most qualified experts? And do all proposed new procedures satisfy the same experts?"
The article went on to say that the DC-10's engine mountings would "surely be the safest flying" after the scrutiny of the investigation. The same of course must be true of 737 Max systems and training once the required changes are implemented.
But that is probably the easier challenge. A harder one will be convincing the world
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Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di Ethiopian
Da copia di flight international in mio possesso
Boeing will cut monthly production of its 737 by almost one-fifth - from 52 to 42 units - amid the ongoing grounding of its Max series, while chief executive Dennis Muilenburg has announced that an internal committee will review how the company designs and builds aircraft.
The 19% reduction to the 737's final assembly rate, effective from mid-April, was confirmed almost one month into a worldwide Max grounding introduced following the crash of Ethiopian Airlines flight ET302 on 10 March.
"I've asked the Boeing board of directors to establish a committee to review our company-wide policies and processes for the design and development of the airplanes we build," Muilenburg said on 5 April. "The committee will confirm the effectiveness of our policies and processes for assuring the highest level of safety on the 737 Max programme, as well as our other programmes, and recommend improvements to our policies and procedures," he adds.
"As we continue to work through these steps, we're adjusting the 737 production system temporarily to accommodate the pause in Max deliveries, allowing us to prioritise additional resources to focus on software certification and returning the Max to flight," Muilenburg says.
Boeing is currently working to complete and certificate a fix to the aircraft's Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System, and is also creating updated pilot training practices for the re-engined narrowbody.
"We're adjusting the 737 production system to prioritise software certification" Dennis Muilenburg, chief executive, Boeing
"We are co-ordinating closely with our customers as we work through plans to mitigate the impact of this adjustment. We will also work directly with our suppliers on their production plans to minimise disruption and financial impact," Muilenburg adds. The rate change will not affect Boeing's employment levels.
STORED SHIPSETS
Spirit AeroSystems confirms it will not be cutting its production rate for the 737's fuselage, and "will maintain" its 52-unit output, storing accumulated shipsets at its facilities in Wichita, Kansas.
Chief executive Tom Gentile says the situation is "challenging" for Spirit, but adds: "This staggered production approach allows us and our supply base to better prepare for and support 737 production."
Prior to the Ethiopian crash and 13 March global grounding action, Boeing had been on a path towards raising monthly output of the 737 family to 57 aircraft.
As the disruption persists, financial institutions are warning of a potentially extended period of instability for the programme.
JP Morgan analysts believe that the Max could remain out of action until September, noting: "Boeing's 737 production cut reflects rising uncertainty about the length of the grounding. Prospects for a quick end to the grounding faded throughout last week," the company added, following Muilenburg's rate reduction announcement.
Canadian financial services company Canaccord Genuity says the production rate fall "reflects greater regulatory uncertainty and pressure around the timing of the grounding, and potentially more complexity associated with the software fix", referring to scrutiny from the US Federal Aviation Administration during the process.
Canaccord analysts estimate that the issue will cost Boeing around $1.2 billion monthly, including lost revenue and potential compensation paid to carriers unable to operate the type as expected.
JP Morgan estimates lost revenue and costs associated with maintaining reduced production without delivering aircraft could hit $1.5 billion monthly, while investment bank Cowen says a three-month grounding could have a $5 billion impact.
Meanwhile, the grounding is impacting numerous carriers.
American Airlines has removed the Max from its schedules through 5 June. The Fort Worth, Texas-based carrier has cancelled roughly 90 flights per day that were scheduled to be flown using its 24-strong fleet of 737-8s.
CAPACITY GAP
Cirium's Fleets Analyzer shows that the new model's sudden absence has left around 50 carriers with a capacity gap, as many head into their peak summer seasons. Data shows at least 10 of these airlines were wet-leasing previous-generation 737s or Airbus A320-family aircraft as of early April.
The global Max fleet totalled 368 aircraft on 9 March. Southwest Airlines was the lead operator with 34, followed by Air Canada, American and China Southern Airlines - all with 24 each.
In terms of the carriers with the greatest reliance on the Max, Fleets Analyzer shows that Cayman Airlines' two examples were providing 46% of its total seats on 9 March. Others with the greatest apparent exposure were Smartwings (24%), Mauritania Airlines (23%), SpiceJet (22%), Flydubai (21%) and Air Italy (20%).
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Boeing will cut monthly production of its 737 by almost one-fifth - from 52 to 42 units - amid the ongoing grounding of its Max series, while chief executive Dennis Muilenburg has announced that an internal committee will review how the company designs and builds aircraft.
The 19% reduction to the 737's final assembly rate, effective from mid-April, was confirmed almost one month into a worldwide Max grounding introduced following the crash of Ethiopian Airlines flight ET302 on 10 March.
"I've asked the Boeing board of directors to establish a committee to review our company-wide policies and processes for the design and development of the airplanes we build," Muilenburg said on 5 April. "The committee will confirm the effectiveness of our policies and processes for assuring the highest level of safety on the 737 Max programme, as well as our other programmes, and recommend improvements to our policies and procedures," he adds.
"As we continue to work through these steps, we're adjusting the 737 production system temporarily to accommodate the pause in Max deliveries, allowing us to prioritise additional resources to focus on software certification and returning the Max to flight," Muilenburg says.
Boeing is currently working to complete and certificate a fix to the aircraft's Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System, and is also creating updated pilot training practices for the re-engined narrowbody.
"We're adjusting the 737 production system to prioritise software certification" Dennis Muilenburg, chief executive, Boeing
"We are co-ordinating closely with our customers as we work through plans to mitigate the impact of this adjustment. We will also work directly with our suppliers on their production plans to minimise disruption and financial impact," Muilenburg adds. The rate change will not affect Boeing's employment levels.
STORED SHIPSETS
Spirit AeroSystems confirms it will not be cutting its production rate for the 737's fuselage, and "will maintain" its 52-unit output, storing accumulated shipsets at its facilities in Wichita, Kansas.
Chief executive Tom Gentile says the situation is "challenging" for Spirit, but adds: "This staggered production approach allows us and our supply base to better prepare for and support 737 production."
Prior to the Ethiopian crash and 13 March global grounding action, Boeing had been on a path towards raising monthly output of the 737 family to 57 aircraft.
As the disruption persists, financial institutions are warning of a potentially extended period of instability for the programme.
JP Morgan analysts believe that the Max could remain out of action until September, noting: "Boeing's 737 production cut reflects rising uncertainty about the length of the grounding. Prospects for a quick end to the grounding faded throughout last week," the company added, following Muilenburg's rate reduction announcement.
Canadian financial services company Canaccord Genuity says the production rate fall "reflects greater regulatory uncertainty and pressure around the timing of the grounding, and potentially more complexity associated with the software fix", referring to scrutiny from the US Federal Aviation Administration during the process.
Canaccord analysts estimate that the issue will cost Boeing around $1.2 billion monthly, including lost revenue and potential compensation paid to carriers unable to operate the type as expected.
JP Morgan estimates lost revenue and costs associated with maintaining reduced production without delivering aircraft could hit $1.5 billion monthly, while investment bank Cowen says a three-month grounding could have a $5 billion impact.
Meanwhile, the grounding is impacting numerous carriers.
American Airlines has removed the Max from its schedules through 5 June. The Fort Worth, Texas-based carrier has cancelled roughly 90 flights per day that were scheduled to be flown using its 24-strong fleet of 737-8s.
CAPACITY GAP
Cirium's Fleets Analyzer shows that the new model's sudden absence has left around 50 carriers with a capacity gap, as many head into their peak summer seasons. Data shows at least 10 of these airlines were wet-leasing previous-generation 737s or Airbus A320-family aircraft as of early April.
The global Max fleet totalled 368 aircraft on 9 March. Southwest Airlines was the lead operator with 34, followed by Air Canada, American and China Southern Airlines - all with 24 each.
In terms of the carriers with the greatest reliance on the Max, Fleets Analyzer shows that Cayman Airlines' two examples were providing 46% of its total seats on 9 March. Others with the greatest apparent exposure were Smartwings (24%), Mauritania Airlines (23%), SpiceJet (22%), Flydubai (21%) and Air Italy (20%).
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- mattaus313
- Messaggi: 1810
- Iscritto il: sab 29 set 2018, 15:51:39
Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di Ethiopian
Situazione brutta per Seattle. In più leggevo che potrebbero a complicare le cose potrebbe esserci la guerra commerciale USA-UE che coinvolgerebbe anche Airbus e Boeing.
"Because you needed a lot of capital in an airline, you needed to be where the financial markets were, and obviously that's New York"
Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di Ethiopian
Da copia di flight international in mio possesso
A preliminary report into the Ethiopian Airlines Boeing 737 Max 8 accident of 10 March has resolved some of the mystery behind flight ET302's loss, but also raised new questions.
FlightGlobal test pilot Michael Gerzanics - who flies the type for a major operator - provides his thoughts on the initial findings:
Firstly, the 737 Max family's Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS) is not a "stall-prevention" or"safety" feature. It is present to augment handling in certain parts of the flight envelope. Boeing certificated the re-engined twinjet with the feature, which I understand was not needed for compliance, but to make the re-engined model fly more like its earlier 737NG.
After reviewing the Ethiopian report, several issues arise.
The left stick-shaker activated after take-off. It seems the crew realised the warning was false, but the noise and column vibration no doubt created a distraction.
The master caution "anti-ice" and overhead panel "L alpha vane" was called out twice. In retrospect, this provides an indication of the faulty angle-of-attack vane - but at the time it would have been a further distraction.
The report states that "At 05:43:20, approximately 5s after the last manual electric trim input, an AND [aircraft nose-down] automatic trim command occurred and the stabiliser moved in the AND direction from 2.3 to 1.0 unit in approximately 5s."
This was the stabiliser movement that placed the 737-8 into its fatal dive, but why was it commanded? MCAS could not have trimmed the stabiliser if the trim cut-out switches were still in cut-out. Had they been repositioned to "normal" by a crew member, allowing MCAS to re-engage? If so, the action was not announced.
Notably, the 737's manual trim system is purely mechanical, and manual rotation of the stabiliser trim wheel at high speed would be very difficult with the elevator loaded up. It might even be necessary to relax the back pressure on the yoke - or even push it forward - in order to rotate the trim wheel.
The report also states: "The left overspeed warning activated and was active intermittently until the end of the recording."
Proper response to an overspeed would be to retard the thrust levers and adjust pitch attitude. The crew was trying to raise the nose, yet thrust remained at 94% N1. Retarding the thrust levers and extending the speed brakes would have slowed the aircraft, and may have allowed the descent to be arrested by the elevator alone.
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A preliminary report into the Ethiopian Airlines Boeing 737 Max 8 accident of 10 March has resolved some of the mystery behind flight ET302's loss, but also raised new questions.
FlightGlobal test pilot Michael Gerzanics - who flies the type for a major operator - provides his thoughts on the initial findings:
Firstly, the 737 Max family's Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS) is not a "stall-prevention" or"safety" feature. It is present to augment handling in certain parts of the flight envelope. Boeing certificated the re-engined twinjet with the feature, which I understand was not needed for compliance, but to make the re-engined model fly more like its earlier 737NG.
After reviewing the Ethiopian report, several issues arise.
The left stick-shaker activated after take-off. It seems the crew realised the warning was false, but the noise and column vibration no doubt created a distraction.
The master caution "anti-ice" and overhead panel "L alpha vane" was called out twice. In retrospect, this provides an indication of the faulty angle-of-attack vane - but at the time it would have been a further distraction.
The report states that "At 05:43:20, approximately 5s after the last manual electric trim input, an AND [aircraft nose-down] automatic trim command occurred and the stabiliser moved in the AND direction from 2.3 to 1.0 unit in approximately 5s."
This was the stabiliser movement that placed the 737-8 into its fatal dive, but why was it commanded? MCAS could not have trimmed the stabiliser if the trim cut-out switches were still in cut-out. Had they been repositioned to "normal" by a crew member, allowing MCAS to re-engage? If so, the action was not announced.
Notably, the 737's manual trim system is purely mechanical, and manual rotation of the stabiliser trim wheel at high speed would be very difficult with the elevator loaded up. It might even be necessary to relax the back pressure on the yoke - or even push it forward - in order to rotate the trim wheel.
The report also states: "The left overspeed warning activated and was active intermittently until the end of the recording."
Proper response to an overspeed would be to retard the thrust levers and adjust pitch attitude. The crew was trying to raise the nose, yet thrust remained at 94% N1. Retarding the thrust levers and extending the speed brakes would have slowed the aircraft, and may have allowed the descent to be arrested by the elevator alone.
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Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di Ethiopian
https://www.seattletimes.com/business/c ... ssion=true
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Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di Ethiopian
Da copia di flight international in mio possesso
Boeing has completed the final test fight for the updated software on its 737 Max, paving the way to begin certification of the revised system.
Nonetheless, although Boeing chief executive Dennis Muilenburg says the airframer is "making steady progress towards certification" he gives no timeframe to achieve the required regulatory approvals.
Muilenburg says that Boeing pilots have completed 120 test flights using the updated Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS) software, which has been implicated into two recent crashes of the 737 Max.
This amounts to more than 203h of flight time, Muilenburg says.
He adds that more than 85% of the 737 Max's customers worldwide have had exposure to the updated software through a series of simulator sessions.
Muilenburg was aboard a previous 737 Max demonstration flight, where he "saw first-hand this software in its final form, operating as designed, across a range of flight conditions".
Muilenburg's comments came a day after the US Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) updated pilot training standards to ensure that 737 Max crews understand how MCAS works.
"The purpose of this revision is to add the [737 Max's] manoeuvring characteristics augmentation system," says the FAA. Its preliminary report into the system was released on 16 April and remains open for comment until 30 April.
Under a section titled "special emphasis areas" for pilot training, the report says that "MCAS ground training must address system description, functionality, associated failure conditions and flightcrew alerting.
"These items must be included in initial, upgrade, transition, differences and recurrent training," it says.
The FAA has also briefed airline and pilot representatives on the state of the 737 Max grounding.
"Boeing will, and should, continue to face scrutiny of the ill-designed MCAS and initial non-disclosure of the new flight-control logic" Jon Weaks, president, Southwest Airlines Pilots Association
The 3h meeting in Washington DC on 12 April reviewed three items: preliminary reports into the two 737 Max crashes; Boeing's anticipated update to the 737 Max's flight-control software; and pilot training, says the agency.
In addition, the meeting also gave FAA acting administrator Daniel Elwell the opportunity to "hear from the participants for a fuller understanding of the safety issues presented by the Boeing 737 Max".
Attendees included representatives from three US-based 737 Max operators - American Airlines, Southwest Airlines and United Airlines - as well as their unions.
"Elwell said that he wanted to know what operators and pilots of the 737 Max think as the agency evaluates what needs to be done before the FAA makes a decision to return the aircraft to service," the FAA says.
"Elwell said that the participants' operational perspective is critical input as the agency welcomes scrutiny on how it can do better."
The meeting left some sources with the impression that FAA officials feel optimistic about Boeing's response to the grounding.
The discussions raised questions about pilot training, the actions of the pilots in the 10 March Ethiopian Airlines crash, and the regulatory system that certificated MCAS, say sources who spoke on condition of anonymity.
"Geopolitical issues continue in their complexity and they will intertwine with everything from crew training and experience to the pilot supply/demand equation, to codeshare agreements and subsidies, and much more," Southwest Airlines Pilots Association (SWAPA) president Jon Weaks says in a letter distributed to union members immediately after the meeting.
"The FAA flight safety board is continuing to evaluate Boeing's proposed software changes, and the FAA, as well as SWAPA, are still waiting on a final proposed training product from Boeing," says Weaks. "Boeing will, and should, continue to face scrutiny of the ill-designed MCAS and initial non-disclosure of the new flight-control logic."
Boeing recently announced that it would cut production of the 737 Max from 52 to 42 aircraft per month amid the continued grounding. However, fuselage manufacturer Spirit AeroSystems intends to maintain output at the higher rate, storing completed assemblies at its facilities.
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Boeing has completed the final test fight for the updated software on its 737 Max, paving the way to begin certification of the revised system.
Nonetheless, although Boeing chief executive Dennis Muilenburg says the airframer is "making steady progress towards certification" he gives no timeframe to achieve the required regulatory approvals.
Muilenburg says that Boeing pilots have completed 120 test flights using the updated Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS) software, which has been implicated into two recent crashes of the 737 Max.
This amounts to more than 203h of flight time, Muilenburg says.
He adds that more than 85% of the 737 Max's customers worldwide have had exposure to the updated software through a series of simulator sessions.
Muilenburg was aboard a previous 737 Max demonstration flight, where he "saw first-hand this software in its final form, operating as designed, across a range of flight conditions".
Muilenburg's comments came a day after the US Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) updated pilot training standards to ensure that 737 Max crews understand how MCAS works.
"The purpose of this revision is to add the [737 Max's] manoeuvring characteristics augmentation system," says the FAA. Its preliminary report into the system was released on 16 April and remains open for comment until 30 April.
Under a section titled "special emphasis areas" for pilot training, the report says that "MCAS ground training must address system description, functionality, associated failure conditions and flightcrew alerting.
"These items must be included in initial, upgrade, transition, differences and recurrent training," it says.
The FAA has also briefed airline and pilot representatives on the state of the 737 Max grounding.
"Boeing will, and should, continue to face scrutiny of the ill-designed MCAS and initial non-disclosure of the new flight-control logic" Jon Weaks, president, Southwest Airlines Pilots Association
The 3h meeting in Washington DC on 12 April reviewed three items: preliminary reports into the two 737 Max crashes; Boeing's anticipated update to the 737 Max's flight-control software; and pilot training, says the agency.
In addition, the meeting also gave FAA acting administrator Daniel Elwell the opportunity to "hear from the participants for a fuller understanding of the safety issues presented by the Boeing 737 Max".
Attendees included representatives from three US-based 737 Max operators - American Airlines, Southwest Airlines and United Airlines - as well as their unions.
"Elwell said that he wanted to know what operators and pilots of the 737 Max think as the agency evaluates what needs to be done before the FAA makes a decision to return the aircraft to service," the FAA says.
"Elwell said that the participants' operational perspective is critical input as the agency welcomes scrutiny on how it can do better."
The meeting left some sources with the impression that FAA officials feel optimistic about Boeing's response to the grounding.
The discussions raised questions about pilot training, the actions of the pilots in the 10 March Ethiopian Airlines crash, and the regulatory system that certificated MCAS, say sources who spoke on condition of anonymity.
"Geopolitical issues continue in their complexity and they will intertwine with everything from crew training and experience to the pilot supply/demand equation, to codeshare agreements and subsidies, and much more," Southwest Airlines Pilots Association (SWAPA) president Jon Weaks says in a letter distributed to union members immediately after the meeting.
"The FAA flight safety board is continuing to evaluate Boeing's proposed software changes, and the FAA, as well as SWAPA, are still waiting on a final proposed training product from Boeing," says Weaks. "Boeing will, and should, continue to face scrutiny of the ill-designed MCAS and initial non-disclosure of the new flight-control logic."
Boeing recently announced that it would cut production of the 737 Max from 52 to 42 aircraft per month amid the continued grounding. However, fuselage manufacturer Spirit AeroSystems intends to maintain output at the higher rate, storing completed assemblies at its facilities.
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Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di Ethiopian
Secondo alcuni manca poco perché il 737m torni a volare
https://www.seattletimes.com/business/b ... ssion=true
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https://www.seattletimes.com/business/b ... ssion=true
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Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di Ethiopian
Da copia di flight international in mio possesso
The worldwide grounding of the 737 Max has so far cost Boeing $1 billion, the airframer has revealed in its first-quarter accounts.
Boeing attributes the figure to the cost of labour to update the flight-control software that has been linked with two fatal crashes, along with charges for undelivered aircraft and slowing production.
The manufacturer generated revenue of $22.9 billion during the period ended 31 March, down 2% year on year, as commercial aircraft deliveries fell short of target by 50 units.
Boeing will publish revised financial guidance for the year "at a later date", amid what chief executive Dennis Muilenburg describes as "challenging times".
"Our first order of business is the safe return to service of the 737 Max," Muilenburg said on a 24 April earnings call. "We know it will take time. We have to earn and re-earn the trust of the flying public."
URGENT QUERIES
US lawmakers and regulators around the world are still seeking answers about the safety certification and training processes for the 737 Max following two crashes within five months of each other, which killed 346 people.
Investigators studying Ethiopian Airlines flight 302 and Lion Air flight 610 are concerned about the involvement of the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS) added by Boeing to the 737 Max, which repeatedly brought the nose of both aircraft down.
Boeing is co-ordinating with the US Federal Aviation Administration and is nearly ready to begin the certification process for the MCAS software fix, following 135 evaluation flights of the update on 737 Max aircraft, Muilenburg says.
"That's our responsibility, we own that," he says.
"I personally had the chance to fly on two of those test and demonstration flights."
Muilenburg says Boeing remains "confident in the fundamental processes" of its safety certification, but an internal committee formed by the company will analyse ways to improve that, in addition to reviewing how it designs and builds aircraft.
Aside from the growing inventory of built but undelivered Max aircraft in and around Seattle, the clearest impact of the ongoing crisis is visible in the company's first-quarter financial performance: net profit was $2.1 billion, down 13% year on year; operating profit fell 18%; commercial aircraft deliveries slid by 19%; and operating cash flow decreased 11%.
CONTINGENCY PLANS
This has placed pressure on the manufacturer to conserve cash amid uncertainty on how long the Max will remain grounded.
Boeing in January forecast 2019 revenue of $110-$112 billion, a 10% increase on the previous year.
"We expect our financial results to continue to be adversely impacted until we safely return the 737 Max to service, ramp up production rates and resume deliveries to customers," chief financial officer Greg Smith says.
Boeing has already trimmed monthly output of the re-engined narrowbody and 737NG from 52 to 42 aircraft.
Total backlog at the end of the first quarter was worth $487 billion, including 5,600 commercial aircraft valued at $399 billion
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The worldwide grounding of the 737 Max has so far cost Boeing $1 billion, the airframer has revealed in its first-quarter accounts.
Boeing attributes the figure to the cost of labour to update the flight-control software that has been linked with two fatal crashes, along with charges for undelivered aircraft and slowing production.
The manufacturer generated revenue of $22.9 billion during the period ended 31 March, down 2% year on year, as commercial aircraft deliveries fell short of target by 50 units.
Boeing will publish revised financial guidance for the year "at a later date", amid what chief executive Dennis Muilenburg describes as "challenging times".
"Our first order of business is the safe return to service of the 737 Max," Muilenburg said on a 24 April earnings call. "We know it will take time. We have to earn and re-earn the trust of the flying public."
URGENT QUERIES
US lawmakers and regulators around the world are still seeking answers about the safety certification and training processes for the 737 Max following two crashes within five months of each other, which killed 346 people.
Investigators studying Ethiopian Airlines flight 302 and Lion Air flight 610 are concerned about the involvement of the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS) added by Boeing to the 737 Max, which repeatedly brought the nose of both aircraft down.
Boeing is co-ordinating with the US Federal Aviation Administration and is nearly ready to begin the certification process for the MCAS software fix, following 135 evaluation flights of the update on 737 Max aircraft, Muilenburg says.
"That's our responsibility, we own that," he says.
"I personally had the chance to fly on two of those test and demonstration flights."
Muilenburg says Boeing remains "confident in the fundamental processes" of its safety certification, but an internal committee formed by the company will analyse ways to improve that, in addition to reviewing how it designs and builds aircraft.
Aside from the growing inventory of built but undelivered Max aircraft in and around Seattle, the clearest impact of the ongoing crisis is visible in the company's first-quarter financial performance: net profit was $2.1 billion, down 13% year on year; operating profit fell 18%; commercial aircraft deliveries slid by 19%; and operating cash flow decreased 11%.
CONTINGENCY PLANS
This has placed pressure on the manufacturer to conserve cash amid uncertainty on how long the Max will remain grounded.
Boeing in January forecast 2019 revenue of $110-$112 billion, a 10% increase on the previous year.
"We expect our financial results to continue to be adversely impacted until we safely return the 737 Max to service, ramp up production rates and resume deliveries to customers," chief financial officer Greg Smith says.
Boeing has already trimmed monthly output of the re-engined narrowbody and 737NG from 52 to 42 aircraft.
Total backlog at the end of the first quarter was worth $487 billion, including 5,600 commercial aircraft valued at $399 billion
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Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di Ethiopian
Come per sottolineare quanto l'incidente sia marginale sulla produzione del 737 nel lungo periodo
Da copia di flight international in mio possesso
Thompson/AP/REX/Shutterstock
Suppliers to the 737 Max programme are so far remaining resilient in the face of Boeing's decision to trim monthly production of the re-engined single-aisle.
Faced with the continued grounding of the twinjet over safety concerns in the wake of a pair of fatal accidents, the airframer in mid-April announced it was trimming output to 42 aircraft per month.
Spirit AeroSystems has clarified that Boeing will pay for each 737 fuselage produced in excess of that output rate.
In a recent regulatory filing, Wichita-based Spirit says it will store excess fuselages, which will be considered delivered to Boeing.
The filing follows Spirit's announcement several weeks ago that it will continue producing 737 fuselages at a rate of 52 per month.
"All 737 shipsets produced in excess of Boeing's production rate… will be deemed to be delivered to Boeing… at Spirit's facilities, which will trigger Boeing's payment obligations for the excess shipments," the filing says.
"If requested by Boeing, and [if] Spirit has available storage space, Spirit will maintain the excess shipsets at Spirit's facilities."
Spirit and Boeing agreed to the terms of the deal in a 12 April memorandum of understanding that expires on 1 May 2020.
Meanwhile, Honeywell predicts little impact from the reduction of 737 Max production.
"Based on [Boeing's] current production schedules, we do not expect a significant impact in our 2019 results," Honeywell chief financial officer Greg Lewis says.
Chief executive Darius Adamczyk adds that Honeywell produces numerous systems for the 737 Max. "But… the impact for us is negligible, certainly for [the second quarter] and given that just about everybody expects a resolution," he points out.
"We do expect delivery of these planes and the production rates to resume in the second half of this year."
United Technologies (UTC), meanwhile, expects the global grounding of the 737 Max will trim its 2019 profits, although the company still expects that its Collins Aerospace division will meet financial targets.
"We are very confident that this segment will be able to deliver on its full-year operating profit commitment, and that is even with the potential for up to 10 cents of headwind related to the Boeing 737 Max programme," says UTC chief financial officer Akhil Johri.
Collins supplies a range of components for the 737 Max, including landing systems, avionics, sensors, power systems and cabin systems.
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Da copia di flight international in mio possesso
Thompson/AP/REX/Shutterstock
Suppliers to the 737 Max programme are so far remaining resilient in the face of Boeing's decision to trim monthly production of the re-engined single-aisle.
Faced with the continued grounding of the twinjet over safety concerns in the wake of a pair of fatal accidents, the airframer in mid-April announced it was trimming output to 42 aircraft per month.
Spirit AeroSystems has clarified that Boeing will pay for each 737 fuselage produced in excess of that output rate.
In a recent regulatory filing, Wichita-based Spirit says it will store excess fuselages, which will be considered delivered to Boeing.
The filing follows Spirit's announcement several weeks ago that it will continue producing 737 fuselages at a rate of 52 per month.
"All 737 shipsets produced in excess of Boeing's production rate… will be deemed to be delivered to Boeing… at Spirit's facilities, which will trigger Boeing's payment obligations for the excess shipments," the filing says.
"If requested by Boeing, and [if] Spirit has available storage space, Spirit will maintain the excess shipsets at Spirit's facilities."
Spirit and Boeing agreed to the terms of the deal in a 12 April memorandum of understanding that expires on 1 May 2020.
Meanwhile, Honeywell predicts little impact from the reduction of 737 Max production.
"Based on [Boeing's] current production schedules, we do not expect a significant impact in our 2019 results," Honeywell chief financial officer Greg Lewis says.
Chief executive Darius Adamczyk adds that Honeywell produces numerous systems for the 737 Max. "But… the impact for us is negligible, certainly for [the second quarter] and given that just about everybody expects a resolution," he points out.
"We do expect delivery of these planes and the production rates to resume in the second half of this year."
United Technologies (UTC), meanwhile, expects the global grounding of the 737 Max will trim its 2019 profits, although the company still expects that its Collins Aerospace division will meet financial targets.
"We are very confident that this segment will be able to deliver on its full-year operating profit commitment, and that is even with the potential for up to 10 cents of headwind related to the Boeing 737 Max programme," says UTC chief financial officer Akhil Johri.
Collins supplies a range of components for the 737 Max, including landing systems, avionics, sensors, power systems and cabin systems.
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Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di Ethiopian
Se sto spammando troppo ditemelo che smetto
Da copia di flight international in mio possesso
The difficult position of Boeing's chief executive - and the delicate balancing act he must perform - became particularly evident during the company's annual shareholder meeting on 29 April.
The event played out like a 737 Max press conference, with shareholders peppering Dennis Muilenburg with questions about the twinjet and its under-fire Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS).
Immediately afterwards, Muilenburg stepped before a group of actual reporters, who pursued a similar line of enquiry: Why did the company not disclose that the MCAS flight-control system existed? Why does MCAS rely on a single sensor? Was the design faulty?
Such are the questions still facing Muilenburg, a 34-year Boeing veteran, who took the top job in 2015.
Muilenburg had previously addressed the Max crisis via a series of videos and brief statements, expressing sorrow, condolences and sympathy, but not admitting any error on Boeing's part.
Little changed on 29 April: Muilenburg again expressed contrition, while sidestepping questions of culpability and company failures. Boeing's design processes had no "technical slip or gap", he said, pledging fixes while defending the manufacturer's work against a sceptical press and public.
While a robust defence of the company and its employees, his position feels like a refusal to accept any blame
Muilenburg also repeated a line Boeing has taken since the October 2018 Lion Air crash: pilots can address MCAS failures by following a checklist of tasks they should know by heart. "In some cases those procedures were not completely followed," he says.
While a robust defence of the company and its employees, that position feels like a refusal to accept any blame and runs the risk of enraging airline customers.
Boeing's current challenges have also led to speculation about how long Muilenburg will remain in post. "Have you considered resigning?" asked one reporter.
Muilenburg dodged: "The important thing here is, again, [that] we are very focused on safety," he replied. After 15min and a handful of questions, he dodged again: the press conference ended abruptly when Muilenburg headed for the door.
His exit spurred uproar among journalists who felt Muilenburg left much unanswered.
"Sir, wait a minute!" one reporter shouted. "Three-hundred and forty-six people died. Can you answer a few questions about that?"
It is a situation littered with possible missteps, but Muilenburg will not be able to dodge those questions forever
Inviato dal mio WAS-LX1A utilizzando Tapatalk
Da copia di flight international in mio possesso
The difficult position of Boeing's chief executive - and the delicate balancing act he must perform - became particularly evident during the company's annual shareholder meeting on 29 April.
The event played out like a 737 Max press conference, with shareholders peppering Dennis Muilenburg with questions about the twinjet and its under-fire Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS).
Immediately afterwards, Muilenburg stepped before a group of actual reporters, who pursued a similar line of enquiry: Why did the company not disclose that the MCAS flight-control system existed? Why does MCAS rely on a single sensor? Was the design faulty?
Such are the questions still facing Muilenburg, a 34-year Boeing veteran, who took the top job in 2015.
Muilenburg had previously addressed the Max crisis via a series of videos and brief statements, expressing sorrow, condolences and sympathy, but not admitting any error on Boeing's part.
Little changed on 29 April: Muilenburg again expressed contrition, while sidestepping questions of culpability and company failures. Boeing's design processes had no "technical slip or gap", he said, pledging fixes while defending the manufacturer's work against a sceptical press and public.
While a robust defence of the company and its employees, his position feels like a refusal to accept any blame
Muilenburg also repeated a line Boeing has taken since the October 2018 Lion Air crash: pilots can address MCAS failures by following a checklist of tasks they should know by heart. "In some cases those procedures were not completely followed," he says.
While a robust defence of the company and its employees, that position feels like a refusal to accept any blame and runs the risk of enraging airline customers.
Boeing's current challenges have also led to speculation about how long Muilenburg will remain in post. "Have you considered resigning?" asked one reporter.
Muilenburg dodged: "The important thing here is, again, [that] we are very focused on safety," he replied. After 15min and a handful of questions, he dodged again: the press conference ended abruptly when Muilenburg headed for the door.
His exit spurred uproar among journalists who felt Muilenburg left much unanswered.
"Sir, wait a minute!" one reporter shouted. "Three-hundred and forty-six people died. Can you answer a few questions about that?"
It is a situation littered with possible missteps, but Muilenburg will not be able to dodge those questions forever
Inviato dal mio WAS-LX1A utilizzando Tapatalk
Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di Ethiopian
Nessuno spam, anzi grazie per gli aggiornamenti e tutti i retroscena.
Marco
The engine is the heart of an airplane but the pilot is its soul.
The engine is the heart of an airplane but the pilot is its soul.
Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di Ethiopian
Figurati, personalmente dal punto di vista tecnico non sono ferratissimo, quindi mi limito a leggere le info :ciao:kco ha scritto:Se sto spammando troppo ditemelo che smetto
Da copia di flight international in mio possesso
The difficult position of Boeing's chief executive - and the delicate balancing act he must perform - became particularly evident during the company's annual shareholder meeting on 29 April.
The event played out like a 737 Max press conference, with shareholders peppering Dennis Muilenburg with questions about the twinjet and its under-fire Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS).
Immediately afterwards, Muilenburg stepped before a group of actual reporters, who pursued a similar line of enquiry: Why did the company not disclose that the MCAS flight-control system existed? Why does MCAS rely on a single sensor? Was the design faulty?
Such are the questions still facing Muilenburg, a 34-year Boeing veteran, who took the top job in 2015.
Muilenburg had previously addressed the Max crisis via a series of videos and brief statements, expressing sorrow, condolences and sympathy, but not admitting any error on Boeing's part.
Little changed on 29 April: Muilenburg again expressed contrition, while sidestepping questions of culpability and company failures. Boeing's design processes had no "technical slip or gap", he said, pledging fixes while defending the manufacturer's work against a sceptical press and public.
While a robust defence of the company and its employees, his position feels like a refusal to accept any blame
Muilenburg also repeated a line Boeing has taken since the October 2018 Lion Air crash: pilots can address MCAS failures by following a checklist of tasks they should know by heart. "In some cases those procedures were not completely followed," he says.
While a robust defence of the company and its employees, that position feels like a refusal to accept any blame and runs the risk of enraging airline customers.
Boeing's current challenges have also led to speculation about how long Muilenburg will remain in post. "Have you considered resigning?" asked one reporter.
Muilenburg dodged: "The important thing here is, again, [that] we are very focused on safety," he replied. After 15min and a handful of questions, he dodged again: the press conference ended abruptly when Muilenburg headed for the door.
His exit spurred uproar among journalists who felt Muilenburg left much unanswered.
"Sir, wait a minute!" one reporter shouted. "Three-hundred and forty-six people died. Can you answer a few questions about that?"
It is a situation littered with possible missteps, but Muilenburg will not be able to dodge those questions forever
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Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di Ethiopian
Ma quale spam?!! [emoji2]
Mi sembrano tutte informazioni rilevanti e interessanti.
Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk
Mi sembrano tutte informazioni rilevanti e interessanti.
Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk
Ultima modifica di I-GABE il ven 03 mag 2019, 22:27:27, modificato 1 volta in totale.
- malpensante
- Messaggi: 18627
- Iscritto il: mar 20 nov 2007, 18:05:14
- Località: Milano
Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di Ethiopian
Vedremo come questa storia finirà. Per ora è come se Boeing fosse toppo grossa per metterla seriamente nei guai. Altrove Muilenburg avrebbe fatto meglio a suicidarsi.
Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di Ethiopian
Da copia di flight international in mio possesso
Boeing's chief executive has faced an onslaught of questions about the 737 Max and the internal processes that contributed to the development of the flight-control system suspected of contributing to the deaths of 346 people.
Dennis Muilenburg walked a fine line when fielding questions during the company's annual shareholders' meeting in Chicago on 29 April, defending the Max's flight-control system - even as originally designed - while conceding Boeing had a responsibility to make it "better".
"Understand that these airplanes are flown in the hands of pilots, and in some cases our system safety analysis includes not only the engineering design, but also the actions pilots would take as part of a failure scenario," he says.
Muilenburg sidestepped questions about Boeing's culpability and his own job security, leaving the meeting with his titles of chief executive and board chairman intact, having survived a shareholder vote on whether to split the roles.
ON MESSAGE
In both his prepared comments and responses to questions, Muilenburg returned repeatedly to several themes: Boeing's dedication to ensuring the 737 Max's safety; its history of building safe aircraft; and the overall safety of air transportation. He also expressed condolences for those who died and were affected by two fatal accidents over a six-month period.
"The recent accidents have only intensified our dedication to safety," Muilenburg says. "When it comes to safety, there are no competing priorities. This is clear in the steps we have taken since the accidents."
He dismisses suggestions that Boeing misunderstood the 737 Max's Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS), or that its design was fundamentally flawed.
"We have gone back and taken a look at the design of the MCAS system itself, the original design. We have confirmed that it was designed per our standards, certified per our standards and we are confident in that process," he says. "We haven't seen a technical slip or gap in terms of the fundamental design or certification."
MCAS has been implicated in both 737 Max 8 crashes: Lion Air flight JT610 on 29 October 2018 and Ethiopian Airlines flight ET302 on 10 March. Investigators say the system activated in both instances, pushing the aircraft's nose down due to faulty angle-of-attack (AOA) indications.
When pressed on why Boeing developed a flight-control system that could cause an aircraft to dive based on the failure of a single AOA sensor, Muilenburg says: "We have designed the Max to have the flying qualities that were desired in the hands of the pilots. We followed exactly the steps in our design and certification processes that consistently produce safe airplanes."
He then assessed the actions of the pilots of the crashed 737-8s, pointing to the company's "runaway stabiliser checklist" - the steps crew members should use to address erroneous activation of the MCAS.
"If you go through the checklist, it calls out actions that would be taken around power management and pitch management of the airplane," Muilenburg says. "In some cases, those procedures were not completely followed."
The pilots of flight ET302 did cut off their aircraft's trim switches, as per the checklist, but the aircraft's engines remained throttled up through most of the flight, causing the twinjet to exceed its safe allowable speed, which may have hindered their ability to manually trim the stabiliser.
UPDATE PENDING
Boeing is working to gain approval from the US Federal Aviation Administration and other regulatory bodies for an update which will prevent MCAS from activating based on faulty flight data, and which makes the system reliant on information from two AOA sensors.
"We know this is a link in both accidents that we can break," Muilenburg says. "We are making steady progress on certification."
Muilenburg suggests that pilots will not require simulator time as part of a return-to-service effort for the grounded 737 Max fleet, believing that updated computer-based training will be sufficient. However, Boeing will, "where it makes sense", and based on carriers' "individual needs", provide the option to augment that with simulator access, he adds.
With an eye on other programmes, he says that the massive effort to return the 737 Max to service has not had "any direct impact" on its 777X, with two flight-test aircraft having been rolled out at its Everett facility in Washington, and two others in final assembly. The company still expects to perform a first flight this year, and to deliver a first example in 2020.
Boeing also continues to study the potential development of a New Mid-market Airplane (NMA), he adds, noting: "We still have work to do before we get to an authority-to-offer decision. We're still working on a pace to try to do that this year."
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Boeing's chief executive has faced an onslaught of questions about the 737 Max and the internal processes that contributed to the development of the flight-control system suspected of contributing to the deaths of 346 people.
Dennis Muilenburg walked a fine line when fielding questions during the company's annual shareholders' meeting in Chicago on 29 April, defending the Max's flight-control system - even as originally designed - while conceding Boeing had a responsibility to make it "better".
"Understand that these airplanes are flown in the hands of pilots, and in some cases our system safety analysis includes not only the engineering design, but also the actions pilots would take as part of a failure scenario," he says.
Muilenburg sidestepped questions about Boeing's culpability and his own job security, leaving the meeting with his titles of chief executive and board chairman intact, having survived a shareholder vote on whether to split the roles.
ON MESSAGE
In both his prepared comments and responses to questions, Muilenburg returned repeatedly to several themes: Boeing's dedication to ensuring the 737 Max's safety; its history of building safe aircraft; and the overall safety of air transportation. He also expressed condolences for those who died and were affected by two fatal accidents over a six-month period.
"The recent accidents have only intensified our dedication to safety," Muilenburg says. "When it comes to safety, there are no competing priorities. This is clear in the steps we have taken since the accidents."
He dismisses suggestions that Boeing misunderstood the 737 Max's Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS), or that its design was fundamentally flawed.
"We have gone back and taken a look at the design of the MCAS system itself, the original design. We have confirmed that it was designed per our standards, certified per our standards and we are confident in that process," he says. "We haven't seen a technical slip or gap in terms of the fundamental design or certification."
MCAS has been implicated in both 737 Max 8 crashes: Lion Air flight JT610 on 29 October 2018 and Ethiopian Airlines flight ET302 on 10 March. Investigators say the system activated in both instances, pushing the aircraft's nose down due to faulty angle-of-attack (AOA) indications.
When pressed on why Boeing developed a flight-control system that could cause an aircraft to dive based on the failure of a single AOA sensor, Muilenburg says: "We have designed the Max to have the flying qualities that were desired in the hands of the pilots. We followed exactly the steps in our design and certification processes that consistently produce safe airplanes."
He then assessed the actions of the pilots of the crashed 737-8s, pointing to the company's "runaway stabiliser checklist" - the steps crew members should use to address erroneous activation of the MCAS.
"If you go through the checklist, it calls out actions that would be taken around power management and pitch management of the airplane," Muilenburg says. "In some cases, those procedures were not completely followed."
The pilots of flight ET302 did cut off their aircraft's trim switches, as per the checklist, but the aircraft's engines remained throttled up through most of the flight, causing the twinjet to exceed its safe allowable speed, which may have hindered their ability to manually trim the stabiliser.
UPDATE PENDING
Boeing is working to gain approval from the US Federal Aviation Administration and other regulatory bodies for an update which will prevent MCAS from activating based on faulty flight data, and which makes the system reliant on information from two AOA sensors.
"We know this is a link in both accidents that we can break," Muilenburg says. "We are making steady progress on certification."
Muilenburg suggests that pilots will not require simulator time as part of a return-to-service effort for the grounded 737 Max fleet, believing that updated computer-based training will be sufficient. However, Boeing will, "where it makes sense", and based on carriers' "individual needs", provide the option to augment that with simulator access, he adds.
With an eye on other programmes, he says that the massive effort to return the 737 Max to service has not had "any direct impact" on its 777X, with two flight-test aircraft having been rolled out at its Everett facility in Washington, and two others in final assembly. The company still expects to perform a first flight this year, and to deliver a first example in 2020.
Boeing also continues to study the potential development of a New Mid-market Airplane (NMA), he adds, noting: "We still have work to do before we get to an authority-to-offer decision. We're still working on a pace to try to do that this year."
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- malpensante
- Messaggi: 18627
- Iscritto il: mar 20 nov 2007, 18:05:14
- Località: Milano
Re: Precipitato un B737 Max 8 di Ethiopian
Non ricordo di aver mai letto niente di più ipocrita in vita mia. Persino Cesare Battisti, che peraltro ha sulla coscienza solo qualche morto e non centinaia, ultimamente mi sembra più serio.
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